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Abstract
The goal of this thesis is twofold. First, intention recognition is studied from an
Artificial Intelligence (AI) modeling perspective. We present a novel and efficient
intention recognition method that possesses several important features: (i) The
method is context-dependent and incremental, enabled by incrementally construct-
ing a three-layer Bayesian network model as more actions are observed, and in a
context-dependent manner, relying on a logic programming knowledge base con-
cerning the context; (ii) The Bayesian network is composed from a knowledge base
of readily specified and readily maintained Bayesian network fragments with simple
structures, enabling an efficient acquisition of the corresponding knowledge base (ei-
ther from domain experts or else automatically from a plan corpus); and, (iii) The
method addresses the issue of intention change and abandonment, and can appro-
priately resolve the issue of multiple intentions recognition. Several aspects of the
method are evaluated experimentally, achieving some definite success. Furthermore,
on top of the intention recognition method, a novel framework for intention-based
decision making is provided, illustrating several ways in which an ability to recognize
intentions of others can enhance a decision making process.
A second subgoal of the thesis concerns that, whereas intention recognition has
been extensively studied in small scale interactive settings, there is a major shortage
of modeling research with respect to large scale social contexts, namely evolution-
ary roles and aspects of intention recognition. Employing our intention recognition
method and the tools of evolutionary game theory, this thesis explicitly addresses
the roles played by intention recognition in the final outcome of cooperation in large
populations of self-regarding individuals. By equipping individuals with the capacity
for assessing intentions of others in the course of social dilemmas, we show how in-
tention recognition is selected by natural selection, opening a window of opportunity
for cooperation to thrive, even in hard cooperation prone games like the Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
In addition, there are cases where it is difficult, if not impossible, to recognize the
intentions of another agent. In such cases, the strategy of proposing commitment,
or of intention manifestation, can help to impose or clarify the intentions of others.
Again using the tools of evolutionary game theory, we show that a simple form of
commitment can lead to the emergence of cooperation; furthermore, the combination
of commitment with intention recognition leads to a strategy better than either one
by itself.
How the thesis should be read? We recommend that the thesis be read se-
quentially, chapter by chapter [1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8].
However, for those more interested in intention recognition from the AI modeling
perspective, i.e. the first subgoal of the thesis, Chapters 6 and 7 can be omitted and
Chapters 4 and 5 are optional [1-2-3-(4)-(5)-8].
In addition, for those more keen on the problem of the evolution of cooperation,
i.e. the second subgoal of thesis, Chapter 3 and even Chapter 2, can be omitted
[1-(2)-4-5-6-7-8].
Keywords: Intention Recognition, Commitment, Evolution of Cooperation,
Evolutionary Game Theory, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Bayesian Network, Logic Pro-
gramming, Evolution Prospection, Decision Making.
Sumário
Nesta tese é estudado o Reconhecimento de Intenções definido numa perspectiva de
modelação da Inteligência Artificial (IA). Neste contexto, esta tese é composta por
dois objectivos principais. Como primeiro objectivo, apresentamos um novo e efi-
ciente método de Reconhecimento de Intenções que possui propriedades importantes:
(i) O método é dependente do contexto e incremental, permitindo a construção de
uma rede Bayesiana de três camadas. Assim, esta rede é constrúıda incremental-
mente à medida que mais acções são observadas, e dependente do contexto, já que
depende de uma base de conhecimento definida em programação lógica, integrando a
informação sobre contexto; (ii) A rede Bayesiana é constrúıda através de uma base de
conhecimento composta por vários fragmentos de rede Bayesiana, fragmentos estes
com uma estrutura simples, permitindo assim um processo eficiente de construção
desta base de conhecimento (tanto através de informação fornecida por especial-
istas da área ou automaticamente, através de um plan corpus); (iii) O método,
para além de considerar a questão da mudança e abandono de intenções, consegue
resolver correctamente o problema do reconhecimento de múltiplas intenções. Por
outro lado, diversos aspectos deste método são avaliados experimentalmente, demon-
strando resultados claros do sucesso da solução proposta. Adicionalmente, em cima
deste método de reconhecimento de intenções, propomos uma nova framework para
processos de decisão baseados em intenções, ilustrando diversos exemplos nos quais
a capacidade de reconhecer as intenções de outrem pode melhorar o processo de
decisão.
O segundo objectivo desta tese está relacionado com o estudo dos vários aspectos
de reconhecimento de intenções no contexto da teoria de jogos evolucionária. Se,
por um lado, o reconhecimento de intenções tem sido extensivamente estudado em
contextos pequenos e interactivos, existe uma escassez de trabalho relacionado de
modelação de contextos sociais de larga escala, nomeadamente no que diz respeito
ao papel do reconhecimento de intenções nos modelos de evolução destes contextos.
Utilizando o nosso método de reconhecimento de intenções em conjunto com ferra-
mentas de teoria de jogos evolucionária, esta tese permite estudar o papel que este
reconhecimento de intenções possui no resultado final da cooperação de agentes
individualistas em grandes populações. Deste modo, ao equiparmos indiv́ıduos com
a capacidade de avaliar as intenções de outrem na resolução de dilemas sociais,
mostramos como o reconhecimento de intenções é utilizado no processo de selecção
natural, abrindo assim uma nova janela de oportunidades para o aparecimento de
cooperação entre indiv́ıduos, mesmo em jogos de dif́ıcil cooperação como o Dilema
do Prisioneiro.
No entanto, existem diversos casos onde é bastante dif́ıcil, se não imposśıvel,
de reconhecer as intenções de outro agente. Nestes casos, a estratégia de propor
um compromisso ou manifestação de intenções pode ajudar a impor, ou a clarificar
as intenções dos restantes agentes. Mais uma vez, utilizando as técnicas da teoria
de jogos evolucionária, demonstramos como uma simples proposta de compromisso
pode levar à emergência de cooperação; e, ainda, que a combinação de compromissos
com o reconhecimento de intenções resulta numa melhor estratégia que qualquer
uma delas em separado.
Como é que a tese deve ser lida? A nossa recomendação é que a tese deve ser
lida sequencialmente, caṕıtulo a caṕıtulo [1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8].
No entanto, para os leitores particularmente interessados no reconhecimento de
intenções de uma perspectiva de modelação de IA, i.e. o primeiro objectivo desta
tese, os Caṕıtulos 6-7 podem ser omitidos e os Caṕıtulos 4-5 são opcionais [1-2-3-
(4)-(5)-8].
Por último, para os leitores especialmente focados no problema da evolução da
cooperação, i.e. no segundo objectivo desta tese, o Caṕıtulo 3, e até o Caṕıtulo 2,
podem ser omitidos [1-(2)-4-5-6-7-8].
Palavras-chave: Reconhecimento de Intenções, Compromisso, Teoria de Jogos
Evolucionária, Emergência da Cooperação, Dilema do Prisioneiro, Rede Bayesiana,
Programação em Lógica, Prospecção da Evolução, Processos de Decisão.
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All that counts in life is intention.
Andrea Bocelli




nce you recognize it, intention recognition is everywhere. Driving on the street,
we recognize intentions of other drivers for our safety. Do they want to turn
right, turn left, or just go straight? Talking to friends, for a smooth conversation
we usually need to recognize what they mean as messages are not always explicitly
conveyed. To secure a successful collaboration with others, we recognize what they
want and intend to do. One might risk our life or the life of our beloved ones if
one cannot recognize intentions of a hostile enemy. Intention recognition frequently




1.1.1 Intention Recognition in AI
In AI, because of its important role, research on intention and plan recognition has
been carried out over more than three decades. Generally, intention recognition
(also called goal recognition) is defined as the process of becoming aware of the
intention of another agent and, more technically, as the problem of inferring an
agent’s intention through its actions and their effects on the environment (Charniak
and Goldman, 1993; Tahboub, 2006; Heinze, 2003; Armentano and Amandi, 2007;
Sadri, 2011b). For the recognition task, several issues can be raised grounded on
the eventual distinction between the model an agent creates about himself and the
one used to describe others, often addressed in the context of the “Theory of Mind”
theory, which neurologically reposes in part on “mirror neurons”, at several cortical
levels, as supporting evidence (Iacoboni et al., 2005; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004;
Nakahara and Miyashita, 2005). Plan recognition is closely related to intention
recognition, extending it to also recognize the plan the observed agent is following
in order to achieve his intention (Armentano and Amandi, 2007; Sadri, 2011b).
Intention recognition is performed in domains in which it is better to have a fast
detection of just the user goal or intention than a more precise but time consuming
detection of the user’s complete plan (Armentano and Amandi, 2007; Sadri, 2011b).
Generally, the input to both intention and plan recognition systems is a set of
conceivable intentions and a set of plans achieving each intention, given in terms of
a plan library (Charniak and Goldman, 1993; Geib and Goldman, 2009) or a plan
corpus (Lesh, 1998; Blaylock and Allen, 2003, 2004; Armentano and Amandi, 2009;
Han and Pereira, 2011b).
Intention and plan recognition have been applied and shown to be useful in a
wide range of application domains (Sadri, 2011b), including story understanding
(Charniak and Goldman, 1990), human-computer interaction and interface-agents
systems (Lesh, 1998; Hong, 2001; Armentano and Amandi, 2007), traffic monitoring
(Pynadath and Wellman, 1995), assistive living (e.g. Elder Care, Ambient Intel-
ligence) (Geib, 2002; Haigh et al., 2004; Tahboub, 2006; Roy et al., 2007; Pereira
and Han, 2011a,b; Han and Pereira, 2010c) and military settings (Mao and Gratch,
2004; Heinze, 2003).
Cohen et al. (1981) distinguish between two kinds of intention recognition, in-
tended and keyhole intention recognition. In the intended case, the observed agent
(intending agent) is cooperative; he wants his intentions to be understood by the
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observing agent (recognizing agent) and intentionally signals his true intentions. An
example would be in case of language understanding where the speaker wants to
convey his intentions (Cohen et al., 1981; Pinker et al., 2008). In the keyhole case,
the observed agent is unaware of, or indifferent to, being observed and recognized;
it is as if the recognizing agent is looking through a keyhole. In this case, partial
observability of actions of the intending agent might need to be considered.
Sadri (2011b) further classifies intention recognition as either adversarial or di-
versionary. In the former case, the observed agent is hostile to his actions being ob-
served, for instance when the actions are aimed at intrusion in a computer network
system (Geib and Goldman, 2001). The latter case points to the circumstances in
which the observed agent is in fact attempting to conceal his intentions by perform-
ing misleading actions or signaling false information. For example, in the Fox-Crow
fable (Aesop), the Fox tried to hide his intention of deceiving the Crow for a piece
of cheese from her, pretending that he wants to listen to her singing and praising
her—so that she sings and drops the cheese (Pereira and Han, 2009c).
Intention recognition is a rich and challenging field. Often multiple competing
hypotheses are possible regarding the intentions and plans of an observed agent.
The choice between these hypotheses for the efficiency of the envisaged method so
as not to lose its generality is a challenge. For instance, when can we assume the
complete information of observed actions, or partial observability needs instead to
be considered? When can we assume that the observed agent follows only a single
intention at a time, or multiple intentions recognition needs to be performed? Usu-
ally, the assumptions are made depending on the nature of the application domains
which the envisaged intention recognition method aims at.
Moreover, there are many challenging issues that have attracted much effort
from the community. Some most typical and popular ones are the issues of handling
incompleteness of observations (e.g. in (Geib and Goldman, 2009; Pereira and Han,
2009c)) and of incompleteness of prior plan library (e.g. in (Sadri, 2010)); the ob-
served agent may follow multiple intentions or interleaved plans simultaneously, or
multiple plans toward the same intention (Geib and Goldman, 2009); agents may
change or abandon their original intentions (Geib and Goldman, 2003; Han and
Pereira, 2011b); incremental (online) intention and plan recognition (see, e.g. (Bui
et al., 2002; Han and Pereira, 2011b)). Also, intention recognition becomes more
difficult when the uncertainty of the observed actions or even their interpretation
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needs to be taken into account, e.g. when dealing with people suffering from cogni-
tive impairments (Roy et al., 2007).
Many methods have been proposed to address these challenging issues, which we
will look more closely at in Chapter 2. But usually each of them can handle only a
small subset of the issues. That is partly because of their lack in taking into account
the aspect of situation-dependent modelling—mostly, only the available observed
actions are used for the recognition task. Part of this PhD research is devoted to
provide intention recognition methods that take into account contextual information,
and show how they can appropriately tackle several unavoidable issues in intention
recognition.
1.1.2 Evolutionary, Psychological, and Philosophical Aspects of In-
tention Recognition
(. . . ) because intention-reading is so critical for human social functioning
and the development of key human abilities, such as language and culture,
it is reasonable to assume that it has been shaped by natural selection.
Woodward et al. (2009)
Intention recognition can be found abundantly in many kinds of interactions and
communications, not only in Human but also many other species (Tomasello, 1999;
Woodward et al., 2009; Cheney and Seyfarth, 2007; Meltzoff, 2007; Tomasello, 2008).
Tomasello documented the evidence concerning nonhuman primate understanding
of the intentionality of other animate beings, which comes from both experimental
and naturalistic studies (Tomasello, 1999, pages 19-22) (Tomasello, 2008). Further-
more, Woodward et al. (2009) provide an extensive review on experimental evidence
showing the development of humans’ capacity for understanding intentions of oth-
ers, which trace it roots to the first year of life. Undoubtedly, the knowledge about
intentions of others in a situation could enable to plan in advance, either to secure
a successful cooperation or to deal with potential hostile behaviors (Geib and Gold-
man, 2001; van Hees and Roy, 2008; Roy, 2009a; Han and Pereira, 2011c). Given
the advantage of knowing the intentions of others and the abundance of intention
recognition among different species, undoubtedly intention recognition should be
taken into account when studying or modeling collective behavior.
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Intention recognition, and the recognition process or heuristics in general, are
important mechanisms used by human bounded rationality to cope with real-life
complexity (Simon, 1957, 1990; Arthur, 1994; Selten, 2001). In contrast to the un-
realistic assumption of perfect rationality, we usually have to make decision in com-
plicated and ill-defined situations, with incomplete information and time constraints
(Todd, 2001; Simon, 1990), under computational processing limitations, including
limited memory capacity (Simon, 1990; Kareev, 1995; Johnson-Laird, 2010). The
recognition processes, based on stored knowledge in terms of generic patterns, have
been known to play a major role in that respect. In problems with such complica-
tions, we look for patterns, based on them we simplify the problem by using these to
construct temporary internal models as working hypotheses (Arthur, 1994; Simon,
1990). It becomes even more relevant when considering interactive settings where
the achievement of a goal by an agent does not depend solely on its own actions,
but also on the decisions and actions of others, especially when the possibility of
communication is limited or includes uncertainty (Kraus, 1997; Heinze, 2003; Pinker
et al., 2008; Van Segbroeck et al., 2010). The agents cannot rely on others to behave
under perfect or improved rationality, and therefore need to be able to recognize
their behaviors and even predict the intention beyond the surface behaviors.
In population-based artificial intelligence applications (Bonabeau et al., 1999;
Ampatzis et al., 2008; Gutierrez et al., 2009), such as collective robotics and others,
the inherent problem of lack of intention recognition due to the simplicity of the
agents is often solved by assuming homogeneous populations, in which each agent
has a perfect image of the other as a copy of their own self. Yet, the problem
remains in heterogeneous agent systems where it is likely that agents speak different
languages, have different designs or different levels of intelligence; hence, intention
recognition may be the only way agents understand each other to secure successful
cooperation or coordination among heterogeneous agents (Heinze, 2003). Moreover,
in more realistic settings where deceiving may offer additional profits, individuals
often attempt to hide their real intentions and make others believe in faked ones
(Robson, 1990; Tomasello, 1999, 2008; Skyrms, 2010; Pereira and Han, 2009c, 2011b;
Santos et al., 2011; Trivers, 2011).
The problem of intention recognition has been paid much attention in AI, Phi-
losophy and Psychology for several decades (Kautz and Allen, 1986a; Charniak
and Goldman, 1993; Bratman, 1987, 1999; Geib and Goldman, 2009; Searle, 2010).
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Whereas intention recognition has been extensively studied in small scale interac-
tive settings, there is a significant shortage of modelling research with respect to
large scale social contexts; namely the evolutionary roles and aspects of intention
recognition.
In this thesis, we study the role of intention recognition for one of the most
challenging but intriguing issues, traversing areas as diverse as Biology, Economics,
Artificial Intelligence, Political Science, or Psychology: the problem of evolution of
cooperation (Hardin, 1968; Axelrod, 1984; Nowak, 2006b; Sigmund, 2010). In his
“The Origin of Species”, Darwin already recognized it as a very fundamental ex-
planatory difficulty (Darwin, 1859). Humans are the champions of cooperation, but
cooperative acts are also pervasive in many other species. Insects forgo reproduc-
tion to help others. Primates gang up against predators by protecting each other at
personal cost. Cooperation also occurs in low levels of organization, from genomes,
cells to multicellular organisms (Nowak, 2006a), but we envisage the scope of the
roles of intention recognition in the evolution of cooperation for rather high level
species, including humans and primates.
The problem of the evolution of cooperation usually entails a social dilemma—
situations in which collective interests are at odds with private interests. The most
popular and well studied one is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (Axelrod, 1984; Hof-
bauer and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 2006b; Sigmund, 2010) 1. In an interaction, each
player has two options, cooperate (C) or defect (D), and defect is the dominant op-
tion – it is always better to defect in a one-shot interaction. Rationally, both players
should choose to defect, while they would be better off by choosing to cooperate
instead, thus leading to the destruction of social welfare and individuals’ fitness. In
an evolutionary setting, we may ask why would natural selection equip selfish in-
dividuals with altruistic tendencies while it incites competition between individuals
and thus apparently rewards only selfish behavior? Several mechanisms respon-
sible for promoting cooperative behavior have been recently identified (Sigmund,
2010; Nowak, 2006b). From kin and group ties (Hamilton, 1964; West et al., 2002;
Traulsen and Nowak, 2006), to different forms of reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund,
1992; Imhof et al., 2005; Trivers, 1971; Pacheco et al., 2006; Nowak and Sigmund,
2005) and networked populations (Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Santos et al., 2006a;
1There are other social dilemmas such as the Stag Hunt and Chicken Game (for an overview see
(Sigmund, 2010)), but the Prisoner’s Dilemma is known to represent one of the most difficult or
fierce environments for cooperation to emerge.
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Szabó and Fáth, 2007; Santos et al., 2008; Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994), several
aspects have been shown to play an important role in the emergence of cooperation.
In contradistinction, in this thesis we shall describe how cooperation may emerge
from the interplay between population dynamics and individuals’ cognitive abilities,
namely the ability to perform intention recognition.
We provide computational models showing that intention recognition can pro-
mote the emergence of improved cooperation, i.e. it leads to higher levels of coopera-
tion in the population and/or a facilitating condition for cooperation to emerge. The
study will be carried out within the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)
(Maynard-Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 2006a; Sigmund et al.,
2010).
1.1.3 Commitment and Intention Recognition
There are cases where it is difficult, if not impossible, to recognize the intentions
of another agent. It might be your first interaction with someone in your life, and
you have no information about him/her which can be used for intention recognition.
You also might know someone well, but you still might have very little relevant
information in a given situation to predict the intentions with high enough confi-
dence. Furthermore, you might also have abundance of relevant observations about
him/her, but he/she is so unpredictable that you have rarely managed to predict
his/her true intention in the past. In all such cases, the strategy of proposing com-
mitment, or intention manifestation 2, can help to impose or clarify the intentions
of others.
Agents make commitments towards others when they give up options in order
to influence others in a certain way. Most commitments depend on some incentive
that is necessary to ensure that an action (or even an intention) is in the agent’s
interest and thus will be carried out (Gintis, 2001). The capacity for using commit-
ment strategies effectively is so important that natural selection may have shaped
specialized capacities to make this possible (Skyrms, 2010; Robson, 1990; Santos
et al., 2011; Ruse, 2001; Nesse, 2001b; de Vos et al., 2001; Back and Flache, 2008).
2Intention is choice with commitment (Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Bratman, 1987; Roy, 2009b).
Once an agent intends to do something, it must settle on some state of affairs for which to aim,
because of its resource limitation and in order to coordinate its future actions. Deciding what
to do established a form of commitment (Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Roy, 2009b). Proposing a
commitment deal to another agent consists in asking it to express or clarify its intentions.
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The commitment we all know is marriage. By giving up the option to leave
someone else, spouses gain security and an opportunity for a much deeper relation-
ship than would otherwise be possible (Nesse, 2001b). It might be risky to assume a
partner’s intention of staying faithful without the commitment of marriage. A con-
tract is another popular kind of commitment, e.g. for an apartment lease (Frank,
2001). When it is risky to assume another agent’s intention of being cooperative,
arranging an appropriate contract provides incentives for cooperation. However, for
instance in accommodation rental, a contract is not necessary when the coopera-
tive intention is of high certainty, e.g. when the business affair is between closed
friends or relatives. It said, arranging a commitment deal can be useful to encourage
cooperation in case intention recognition is difficult, or cannot be performed with
sufficiently high confidence. On the other hand, arranging commitments is not for
free, and requires a specific capacity to set it up within a reasonable cost (for the
agent to actually benefit from it) (Nesse, 2001b,a)—therefor it should be avoided
when opportune. In the case of marriage, partners sometimes choose to stay to-
gether without an official commitment when it might be too costly (e.g., it could
be against parents’ or families’ wish, or it may need to be in secret because of their
jobs) and/or they strongly trust each other’s faithfulness (e.g., because of emotional
attachment (Frank, 1988)). In short, a combination of the two strategies, those of
commitment and intention recognition, seems unavoidable.
In this thesis, again resorting to EGT tools, we show how the most simple of
commitment strategies work, and how they can give rise to the emergence of cooper-
ation. Furthermore, we show that combining the strategies of intention recognition
and commitment in a reasonable way can lead to the emergence of improved co-
operation, not solely achievable by either strategy. Our study seeks what can be a
reasonable combination of such strategies.
1.2 Aim and Scope
The aim of the research is twofold. First, we aim at developing a context-dependent
and incremental intention recognition method, based on which we will address and
clarify different challenging issues in the field, and namely those mentioned above
(Section 1.1.1). Second, resorting to this intention recognition method we shall
study the roles of intention recognition in the evolution of cooperation, providing
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computational models showing that intention recognition promotes the emergence of
cooperation. Furthermore, we study how commitment, or intention manifestation,
in combination with intention recognition, can lead to the emergence of improved
cooperation.
We will use Bayesian networks as a basis structure of our intention recognition
model, and sometimes couple them with Logic Programming techniques for mod-
elling the changing world and reasoning about it (Baral, 2003). The flexibility of
Bayesian networks for representing probabilistic dependencies and the efficiency of
inference methods for Bayesian networks have made them an extremely powerful
tool for problem solving under uncertainty (Pearl, 1988, 2000).
Furthermore, for decades, Logic Programming has proven to be a very powerful
tool for knowledge representation (monotonic and non-monotonic logics, and dif-
ferent kinds of negation, etc.) (Baral and Gelfond, 1994; Lloyd, 1987; Baral, 2003;
Kowalski, 2011) and cover a wide range of reasoning problems, such as deduction
(Hayes, 1973), abduction, integrity constraint handling (Kakas et al., 1993; Alferes
et al., 2004), preferences modelling (Brewka and Eiter, 1999; Pereira et al., 2011a;
Pereira and Han, 2009b), updates and revision (Alferes et al., 2000, 2005). Logic
Programming representation and reasoning techniques are appropriate for our aim
of modelling the changing world and reasoning about it—in order to extract relevant
information for intention recognition as well as fine tuning the model.
In order to study the roles of intention recognition and commitment in the evo-
lution of cooperation, we will resort to Evolutionary Game Theory as analytical and
simulation tools, and to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game as the interacting model of
agents.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
There are two primary contributions of this PhD thesis, corresponding to the two
deployed composite aims described above.
• We provide a novel and efficient method for incremental and context-dependent
intention recognition. Our method can appropriately address several impor-
tant issues in intention recognition, including intention change/abandonment
and multiple intentions recognition (Han and Pereira, 2011a, 2010a, 2011b).
The method is applicable in particular in the context of evolutionary game
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theory, which is important for the second aim of the thesis.
• We provide computational models showing the roles of intention recognition in
the evolution of cooperation (Han et al., 2011a,b). The result of our research
provides new evidence for the evolutionary advantages of having high cognitive
skills in the problems where cooperation is beneficial, and putting forward a
new approach to using AI cognitive modelling methods to tackle the problem
of explaining the evolution of cooperation. We also provide computational
models showing that commitment can lead to emergence of reinforced cooper-
ation (Han et al., 2012b), and even more when combining with the intention
recognition strategy (Han et al., 2012c).
Additionally, the thesis contains two secondary contributions.
• We provide an intention-based decision making framework, where we demon-
strate several ways intention recognition can be useful for decision making
(Han and Pereira, 2011c).
• We describe how intention recognition can be useful for different application
domains, including Elder Care and Ambient Intelligence in the home environ-
ment (Han and Pereira, 2010c; Pereira and Han, 2011a,b).
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis is split into two parts. In Part I, we study techniques for intention
recognition from the AI modelling perspective, which spans two chapters (Chapters
2 and 3).
Chapter 2 presents a corpus-based method for intention recognition, which is
context-dependent and incremental. The method is evaluated with several bench-
marks. We show that taking into account contextual information appropriately
influences the intention recognition process, and can significantly improve the per-
formance (Han and Pereira, 2010a, 2011b,a).
Chapter 3 describes a framework for intention-based decision making on top
of our previously implemented Evolution Prospection system (Pereira and Han,
2009a,b; Han, 2009). It serves to bridge intention recognition to real application
domains, where it is important and useful to take into account intentions of other
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agents in the environment. Its illustration on the Elder Care and Ambient Intelli-
gence domains will be described (Han and Pereira, 2011c, 2010c; Pereira and Han,
2011b,a; Han and Pereira, 2011a).
In Part II, we study the roles of intention recognition and commitment in the
evolution of cooperation, including four chapters (Chapters 4-7).
In Chapter 4, based on a general Bayesian network for intention recognition
provided in Part I, we derive a Bayesian network model for intention recognition
in the context of social dilemmas. It takes into account mutual trusts between the
intention recognizer and the co-player, accumulated throughout past interactions.
We show, analytically and by computer simulations, that the intention recognition
strategy outperforms the most famous successful strategies in the iterated Prisoner’s
dilemma (Han et al., 2011a).
Chapter 5 offers a corpus-based intention recognition model in the course of
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, which is based on the general corpus-based incremental
intention method described in Part I. It results in an intention recognition strategy
that can recognize the strategy of its co-player, and make appropriate decisions
based on the recognized strategy. We show that the strategy prevails against the
most famous successful strategies of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Han et al.,
2011b).
Chapter 6 provides a computational model showing that commitment of the
simplest form can lead to the emergence of cooperation, even in non-iterated settings
of the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (Han et al., 2012b).
Chapter 7 describes a model showing that an appropriate combination of the
two previous strategies, those of intention recognition and commitment, can lead to
a strategy performing better than either one solely (Han et al., 2012c).





We cannot perceive the thought of another person at all, we can only
infer it from his behavior.
Charles Darwin (1809-1882): Old and useless notes, 1840
We call an intention good which is right in
itself,
but the action is good, not because it contains
within it some good, but because it issues
from a good intention.
Peter Abelard (1079-1142)
Abstract. In this chapter, we present a novel method for context-
dependent and incremental intention recognition. It is performed by
incrementally constructing a three-layer Bayesian network model as more
actions are observed, and in a context-dependent manner. The Bayesian
0This chapter encompasses the publications (Han and Pereira, 2010a), (Han and Pereira, 2011b),
(part of) (Pereira and Han, 2011b), and a journal submission (Han and Pereira, 2011a).
15
2.1. Introduction
network is composed from a knowledge base of readily specified and read-
ily maintained Bayesian network fragments. The simple structure of the
fragments enables us to easily and efficiently acquire the corresponding
knowledge base, either from domain experts or else automatically from a
plan corpus. We illustrate the method in the Elder Care domain, showing
how contextual information can appropriately influence the recognition
results of an observed elder’s intention. Furthermore, we experimentally
show the improved performance of the method in the Linux plan corpus
and the so-called IPD plan corpora (that is, in the framework of the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma). We show that taking into account con-
textual information can considerably improve the intention recognition
performance.
2.1 Introduction
We propose a method for intention recognition in a dynamic, real-world environment.
An important aspect of intentions is future-directedness, i.e., if we intend something
now, we mean to execute a course of actions to achieve something in the future
(Bratman, 1987; Roy, 2009b). Most actions may be executed only at a far distance
in time. During that period, the world is changing, and the initial intention may
be changed to a more appropriate one or even abandoned (Singh, 1991; Bratman,
1992; Geib and Goldman, 2009). An intention recognition method should take into
account these changes, and, when necessary, be able to reevaluate the intention
recognition model depending on some time limit. In addition, as new actions are
observed, the model should be reconfigurable to incorporate them. In other words,
the model is incremental and, furthermore, the intention recognition prediction is
available at anytime (Han and Pereira, 2010a).
Generally, intention recognition (also called goal recognition) is defined as the
process of becoming aware of the intention of another agent and, more technically,
as the problem of inferring an agent’s intention through its actions and their effects
on the environment (Charniak and Goldman, 1993; Tahboub, 2006; Heinze, 2003;
Armentano and Amandi, 2007). Plan recognition is closely related to intention
recognition, extending it to also recognize the plan the observed agent is following
in order to achieve his intention (Sadri, 2011b; Armentano and Amandi, 2007).
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Mere intention recognition is performed in domains in which it is preferred to have
a fast detection of just the user’s goal/intention rather than a more precise but
time consuming detection of the user’s complete plan, e.g., in the interface agents
domain (Armentano and Amandi, 2007; Horvitz et al., 1998; Madani et al., 2009).
Like most other intention or plan recognition work, we assume that the actions to
be used for the recognition task are given, and are observed with certainty. Usually,
the actions are given by an action or activity recognition system (see, e.g. (Turaga
et al., 2008; Duong et al., 2009)). Dealing with uncertainty in action recognition is
beyond the scope of our work here 1. Generally, the inputs to both intention and
plan recognition systems are a set of conceivable intentions and a set of plans for
achieving each intention, given in terms of a plan library (Charniak and Goldman,
1993; Geib and Goldman, 2009) or a plan corpus (Blaylock and Allen, 2003, 2004;
Armentano and Amandi, 2009)). There are also generative approaches based on
planning algorithms, which do not require plan library/corpus (e.g., see (Ramı́rez
and Geffner, 2010)).
The future-directedness of intentions also means that once an agent intends some-
thing, he has settled on a particular course of action (Bratman, 1987; Cohen and
Levesque, 1990; Singh, 1991; Roy, 2009b). This makes the intentions relatively sta-
ble, pending new information. An agent who made the decision to act in a certain
way commits to sticking to this decision by the reasons which led to it, unless coun-
terbalancing reasons meanwhile appear and trigger further deliberations (for more
discussion see (Bratman, 1987, p. 16-17) and (Singh, 1991)). In other words, inten-
tions are relatively resistant to reconsideration unless there are pondered reasons to
do so (Bratman, 1992, 1987; Singh, 1991; Roy, 2009b). Following this, any attempt
to tackle the issues of intention change or abandonment cannot solely be based on
observable actions. The reasons why the intention is changed or abandoned must be
taken into account. The reasons can be changes in the environment (possibly made
by other agents) which do not support or force the observed agent to keep following
his initial intention anymore. And here the context-dependent modeling appears to
be unavoidable (Section 2.7).
In this work, we resort to Bayesian Networks (BNs) as the intention recognition
model. The flexibility of BNs for representing probabilistic dependencies and the
1Though in our paper “Moral Reasoning with Uncertainty” (Han et al., 2012d), we address
the case of judging under uncertainty of actions performed, and the giving of a verdict by a jury,
illustrated with an example.
17
2.1. Introduction
efficiency of inference methods for BNs have made them an extremely powerful
and natural tool for problem solving under uncertainty (Pearl, 1988, 2000). To
perform intention recognition, we construct a three-layer BN (Pereira and Han,
2009c, 2011b)—justified based on Heinze’s causal intentional model (Heinze, 2003;
Tahboub, 2006)—and use it for evidential reasoning from observations to intention
hypothesis.
We surmise a knowledge representation method to support incremental BN
model construction for performing intention recognition during runtime, from an
initially given domain knowledge base. As more actions are observed, a new BN is
constructed from the previous one reinforcing some intentions whilst ruling out oth-
ers. This incremental method allows domain experts to specify knowledge in terms
of small and simple BN fragments, which can be easily maintained and changed,
and which are used to compose the situated ongoing BN model. Alternatively, these
fragments can be easily learned from data. We also propose a method to represent
relationships among intentions, when considering the case of agents that may pursue
multiple intentions simultaneously (Section 2.5). It is an indispensable aspect, but
mostly omitted in prior work, which moreover allows us to sometimes significantly
decrease the complexity of the BN inference (Gogate and Dechter, 2011).
Our method is generally inspired in that knowledge experts often consider a re-
lated set of variables together, and organize domain knowledge in larger chunks. An
ability to represent conceptually meaningful groupings of variables and their inter-
relationships facilitates both knowledge elicitation and knowledge base maintenance
(Laskey and Mahoney, 1997). To this end, there have been several methods pro-
posed for Bayesian Network construction from small and easily maintained network
fragments (Pearl, 1988; Pfeffer et al., 1999; Mahoney and Laskey, 1996; Laskey and
Mahoney, 1997; Xiang and Poh, 2005; Natarajan et al., 2008; Laskey, 2008). In
essence, a combination of BNs is a graph that includes all nodes and links of the
networks, where nodes with the same name are combined into a common node. The
main issue for a combination method is how the influence of different parents of the
common node can be combined in the new network, given the partial influence of
each parent in the corresponding fragment. The most extensively used and popu-
lar combination method is Noisy-Or, firstly proposed by (Pearl, 1988) for BNs of
Boolean variables, and generalized by (Srinivas, 1993; Diez, 1993) for the general
case of arbitrary domains. The Noisy-OR method is discussed in Section 2.4.
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The rest of this chapter has the following structure. The next section describes
a short review of prior work, pointing out those limitations of that work which we
address in our method (Section 2.2). Section 2.3 recalls some background of BNs
that is necessary for further discussion of the intention recognition method, which
is described in detail in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 describes a method for expressing
relationships amongst intention variables in a BN model for intention recognition.
Section 2.6 discusses terminologies used for the evaluation of our method, including
the evaluation metrics, and the first set of experimental results on the Linux plan
corpus. Section 2.7 presents our own, so-called IPD plan corpora benchmarks based
on the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, and show our experimental results for it. We
also describe how to incorporate contextual information in our model, and how it
helps to improve the intention recognition performance. Section 2.8 proffers some
extensions of our method to take into account contextual information. Further
developments and concluding remarks, in Section 2.9, end the chapter.
2.2 Related Work
Work on intention and plan recognition has been paid much of attention for more
than thirty years, and a large number of methods have been applied. They can be
roughly categorized into two main groups: Consistency and Probabilistic approaches
(Armentano and Amandi, 2007; Singla and Mooney, 2011; Geib and Goldman, 2009;
Sadri, 2011b).
Consistency approaches face the problem by determining which intention is con-
sistent with the observed actions, i.e. whether the observed actions match with at
least a plan achieving the intention. The earliest work on plan recognition belongs
to this group (Schmidt et al., 1978; Wilensky, 1983; Kautz and Allen, 1986a; Hong,
2001). More recent work can be found in a rather comprehensive survey by Sadri
(2011b). The problem with the consistency approaches is that they cannot handle
well the case where the current observed actions enable more than one intention—
they cannot directly select between those intentions.
Probabilistic approaches, on the other hand, are mainly based on Bayesian net-
work and (Hidden) Markov models (Charniak and Goldman, 1993; Pynadath and
Wellman, 1995; Forbes et al., 1995; Albrecht et al., 1998; Forbes et al., 1995; Conati
et al., 1997; Albrecht et al., 1998; Bui et al., 2002; Huber and Simpson, 2004; Tah-
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boub, 2006; Schrempf et al., 2007; Geib and Goldman, 2009; Pereira and Han, 2009c,
2011b; Armentano and Amandi, 2009). A significant advantage of the probabilis-
tic approaches is that they can directly address the above issue of the consistency
approaches—by finding the most probable intentions given the current observations,
on the basis of accumulated statistical evidence or simply subjective beliefs encoded
in a Bayesian network or Markov model.
Bayesian approaches have exhibited the most successful models applied to inten-
tion/plan recognition (Charniak and Goldman, 1993; Pynadath and Wellman, 1995;
Goldman et al., 1999; Geib, 2004; Geib and Goldman, 2009). The first model was
built by Charniak and Goldman (1991, 1993). Depending on the structure of plan
libraries, a knowledge-based model construction is employed to build BNs from the
library—which is then used to infer the posterior probability of explanations (for the
set of observed actions). This approach, mostly advanced by Goldman et al. (1999)
and especially in the more recent work (Geib and Goldman, 2009) 2, addresses a
number of issues in intention/plan recognition, e.g., when the observed agent fol-
lows multiple intentions or interleaved plans simultaneously; fails to observe actions;
addresses partially ordered plans. However, there are some important aspects not
yet explored therein, partially for the sake of computational efficiency. First, prior
probabilities of intentions are assumed to be fixed. This assumption is not always
reasonable because those prior probabilities should in general depend on the situ-
ation at hand (Bratman, 1992, 1987; Pynadath and Wellman, 1995; Brown, 1998),
and can justifiably be captured by causes/reasons of the intentions, as in our method
(Pereira and Han, 2011b; Han et al., 2011a; Tahboub, 2006; Heinze, 2003). Indeed,
Geib and Goldman (2009) also highlighted the need to account for contextual in-
formation or state of the world as a potential extension to their plan recognizer. In
(Pynadath and Wellman, 1995), a similar context-dependent Bayesian approach is
used, though the model therein is not incremental. The authors demonstrated that
taking into account contextual information is important to appropriately recognize
drivers’ intention in the traffic monitoring domain (Pynadath and Wellman, 1995).
Second, intentions are assumed to be independent of each other. This is not
generally the case since the intentions may support or exclude one another, leading
to the need to reconfigure the model. Those works hence might not appropriately
address multiple intentions recognition. Pynadath and Wellman (1995) proposed
2Note that this work is based on Bayesian inference, though they do not build Bayesian networks
as in (Charniak and Goldman, 1991, 1993).
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to combine, in their BN model for plan recognition, the mutually exclusive plan
nodes into a single variable. As a step further, we formally define how that can be
done appropriately, so as to guarantee the consistency in the obtained BN (Section
2.5). This latter assumption must always, explicitly or implicitly, be made by the
approaches based on (Hidden) Markov models, e.g. (Armentano and Amandi, 2009;
Bui, 2003), or statistical corpus-based machine learning (Blaylock and Allen, 2003,
2004). Generally, in those approaches, a separate model is built for each intention;
thus no relations amongst the intentions are expressed or can be expressed. These
works were restricted to the single intention case. The method in this chapter
attempts to tackle the multiple case more appropriately.
Different from most above mentioned works, our model is context-dependent,
which is partly achieved by including in it causes/reasons of intentions. This way,
our model can appropriately deal with the abandonment/changes of intentions—
when the causes/reasons do not support or force the intending agent to hold those
intentions anymore—in an integrated manner. In contrast, in (Geib and Goldman,
2003), the authors build a separate model to recognize when the observed agent
abandons its current intention, which may then trigger revision of the intention
recognition model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only work address-
ing the abandonment issue. However, the system therein is only evaluated with a
rather small benchmark (with three intentions), and only for the accuracy of the
abandonment recognition itself. The benefit from having this additional intention
abandonment recognition module for enhancing intention/plan recognition perfor-
mance has not been studied, as the authors themselves mention in their recent study
(Geib and Goldman, 2009). We address this issue in Section 2.7.
2.3 Bayesian Networks
Definition 2.3.1 A Bayesian Network (BN) is a pair consisting of a directed acyclic
graph (DAG) whose nodes represent variables and missing edges encode conditional
independencies between the variables, and an associated probability distribution sat-
isfying the Markov assumption of conditional independence, saying that variables
are independent of non-descendants given their parents in the graph (Pearl, 1988,
2000).
In a BN, associated with each node of its DAG is a specification of the dis-
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tribution of its variable, say A, conditioned on its parents in the graph (denoted
by pa(A))—i.e., P (A|pa(A)) is specified. If pa(A) = ∅ (A is called root node), its
unconditional probability distribution, P (A), is specified. These distributions are
called Conditional Probability Distribution (CPD) of the BN.
The joint distribution of all node values can be determined as the product of
conditional probabilities of the value of each node on its parents




where V = {Xi|1 ≤ i ≤ N} is the set of nodes of the DAG.
Suppose there is a set of evidence nodes (i.e. their values are observed) in the
DAG, say O = {O1, . . . , Om} ⊂ V . We can determine the conditional probability
distribution of a variable X given the observed value of evidence nodes by using the
conditional probability formula
P (X|O) = P (X,O)
P (O)
=
P (X,O1, . . . , Om)
P (O1, . . . , Om)
(2.2)
where the numerator and denominator are computed by summing the joint proba-
bilities over all absent variables with respect to V as follows
P (X = x,O = o) =
∑
av∈ASG(AV1)
P (X = x,O = o,AV1 = av)
P (O = o) =
∑
av∈ASG(AV2)
P (O = o,AV2 = av)
(2.3)
where o = {o1, ..., om} with o1, ..., om being the observed values of O1, ..., Om, respec-
tively; ASG(V t) denotes the set of all assignments of vector V t (with components
are variables in V ); AV1, AV2 are vectors components of which are corresponding
absent variables, i.e. variables in V \ (O ∪ {X }) and V \O, respectively.
2.4 Incremental Intention Recognition
In (Pereira and Han, 2009c, 2011b), a general BN model for intention recognition
is presented and justified based on Heinze’s causal intentional model (Heinze, 2003;
Tahboub, 2006). Basically, the BN consists of three layers: cause/reason nodes in
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Figure 2.1: General structure of a Bayesian network for intention recognition. The
Bayesian network consists of three layers. The pre-intentional layer consists of
cause/reason nodes, connecting to intention nodes in the intentional layer, which
in turn connect to action nodes in the activity layer.
the first layer (called pre-intentional), connecting to intention nodes in the second
one (called intentional), in turn connecting to action nodes in the third (called
activity) (Figure 2.1).
In general, it is possible to build a single BN containing all the relevant factors.
But in a real application domain, it can be envisaged that such a network is very
large, which clearly leads to high complexity for the BN inference (Pearl, 2000,
1988). To address this problem, in this work we present a method for incrementally
constructing a BN model with the purpose of performing incremental intention
recognition. The idea is that, given the current observations, only their relevant
factors are incorporated for the moment into the network.
Definition 2.4.1 (Intention Recognition BN – IRBN) A BN for intention
recognition (IRBN) W is a triple 〈{Cs, Is,As}, pa, PW 〉 where
• Cs, Is and As are the sets of cause/reason nodes, intention nodes and action
nodes, respectively. They stand for binary random variables (i.e. their value
is either true (T) or false (F)).
• pa is a mapping which maps a node to the set of its parent nodes such that:
pa(C ) = ∅ ∀C ∈ Cs; pa(I ) ⊆ Cs ∀I ∈ Is; and ∅ 6= pa(A) ⊆ Is ∀A ∈ As.
• CPD tables are given by the probability distribution PW , i.e. PW (X|pa(X))
defines the probability of X conditional on pa(X) in W, ∀X ∈ Cs ∪ Is ∪As.
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Figure 2.2: Elder Intentions Recognition IRBN
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Note that the set of cause/reason nodes of an IRBN, Cs, can be empty, as in the
case of the Linux plan corpus we shall see later on (Section 2.6).
For illustration of the concepts and the intention recognition method presented in
this section, we consider an extended example from the Elder Care domain (Pereira
and Han, 2011a,b).
Example 2.4.1 (Elder’s Care with Intention Recognition) An elder stays
alone in his apartment. The assistant system (with the capability of intention
recognition) observes that he is looking for something in the living room. In order
to assist him, the system needs to figure out what he intends to find. The possible
things are: something to read (Book – i(B)); something to drink (Drink – i(D)); the
TV remote control (Rem – i(R)); and the light switch (Switch – i(S)). The IRBN
representing this scenario is that of Figure 2.2, but without the grey-filled nodes for
now.
There are five nodes in the first layer: Thirsty (thsty), Like reading (lr),
Like watching (lw), Light on (light) and TV on (tv). We have, Cs = {thsty, lr, lw,
light, tv}. Intention nodes in the middle layer are, Is = {i(B), i(D), i(R), i(S)}.
Action nodes are, As = {Looking}.
The mapping pa is defined by the arrows in the IRBN, e.g., pa(i(B)) =
{thsty, lr, lw, light, tv} and pa(Looking) = {i(B), i(D), i(R), i(S)}.
The intention recognition method will be performed by incrementally construct-
ing an IRBN as more actions are observed. The construction is based on a prior
knowledge base consisting of unit fragments of BN (Figure 2.3).
Definition 2.4.2 (Unit Fragments) There are just two types of unit fragments
issued for IRBN model construction (Figure 2.3):
1. A unit fragment for an action A consists of an intention I connecting to (i.e.
causally affecting) A, and is denoted by UFA(I ,A).
2. A unit fragment for an intention I consists of a context-independent and fixed
over time set of causes/reasons Cs connecting to (i.e. causally affecting) I,
and is denoted by UFI(Cs, I ).
Note that a unit fragment for an action contains a single action, which thus enables
to easily handle the set of conceivable intentions in the IRBN, in a context-dependent
manner, as implemented with operators described in the sequel. In contradistinction,
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Unit Fragment for Action
Unit Fragment for Intention
Figure 2.3: Two Types of Unit Fragments.
a unit fragment for an intention includes a fixed set of causes/reasons rather than a
single one. This simplified modification can be made because the prior probability of
each cause/reason node can be updated in a context-dependent manner (as we shall
see in Section 2.8), allowing us to easily switch on and off the effect of a cause/reason
node. Differently, prior probabilities of the intention nodes depend in general on the
cause/reason nodes.
Example 2.4.2 (Unit Fragments) Here are some unit fragments for actions and
intentions that will be used later for constructing the IRBN in Figure 2.2.
Some unit fragments for the action Looking: UFA(i(B),L), UFA(i(D),L),
UFA(i(R),L) and UFA(i(S ),L).
Some unit fragments for intentions: UFI({thsty , lr , lw , light , tv}, i(B)),
UFI({thsty , light , tv}, i(D)), UFI({thsty , lr , lw , light , tv}, i(R)) and UFI({light}, i(S )).
We next stipulate some conditions to guarantee the consistency of the knowledge
base.
Definition 2.4.3 (Knowledge Base) The domain knowledge base KB consists of
a set of actions ∆, a set of intentions Υ, a set of unit fragments for each action in
∆ and a single unit fragment for each intention in Υ, satisfying that
• An intention I has a unique unit fragment in KB. The set of its parents
(causes/reasons) and the CPD table associated with it are fixed. Let C(I)
denote the set of the parents of I and PKB(I|C(I)) define its CPD table.
• A cause C has the same prior probability distribution in all the unit fragments
(for intentions) that it belongs to, denoted by PKB(C).
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The simple structures of unit fragments enable domain experts to easily construct
and maintain the knowledge base. The fragments can also be learnt from appropriate
datasets, as we shall see later for the Linux and IPD plan corpora.
Before presenting the intention recognition algorithm, let us define some (origi-
nal) operators for handling CPD tables and IRBNs.
2.4.1 Operators for constructing IRBNs
As a new action A is observed, we need to incorporate it into the current IRBN.
Firstly, the appropriate unit fragments for A are selected from the prior domain
knowledge base. In Section 2.8.2, we will discuss methods for selecting the appropri-
ate fragments in a situation-sensitive manner. They are based on the intuition that
whether an intention may give rise to an action depends on the situation in which
the action is observed. That enables to reduce the size of the BN model, which
otherwise could be very large.
For now, let us assume that the operator select(A,SIT) provides the (context-
dependent) set of unit fragments for action A given the situation at hand, SIT. If
SIT is empty, select(A,SIT) is the set of all unit fragments for action A from the
knowledge base.
Then, after having obtained the appropriate fragments, we combine them using
the Noisy-OR method (Pearl, 1988; Srinivas, 1993; Cozman, 2004), thereby ob-
taining a BN with a single action (Figure 2.4). We then add into it appropriate
causes/reasons for each intention.
Definition 2.4.4 (Unit IRBN via Noisy-OR) The unit IRBN W for action A
in a given situation SIT is an IRBN with a single action, denoted by irBN (A) =
〈{Cs, Is, {A}}, pa, PW 〉. It is obtained via the Noisy-OR method as follows.
Let select(A,SIT ) = {UFA(I1 ,A), . . . ,UFA(IN ,A)} and for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , P (A =
T |Ii = T ) = qi (defined in fragment UFA(Ii ,A)). Then,
• Is = {I1, . . . , IN}; Cs =
⋃
I∈Is C(I);
• pa(I) = C(I) ∀I ∈ Is; pa(A) = Is;
• PW (C) = PKB(C) ∀C ∈ Cs; PW (I|pa(I)) = PKB(I|C(I)) ∀I ∈ Is; and,
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Figure 2.4: Noisy-OR Combination Method (Pearl, 1988; Srinivas, 1993; Diez, 1993): P (A =
T |I1, . . . , IN ) = 1−
∏
i:Ii=T
(1− qi) where P (A = T |Ii = T ) = qi.
according to the Noisy-OR method




The rationale and appropriateness of the application of the Noisy-OR method here
for combining unit fragments for an action is based on the intuition that each inten-
tion can be interpreted as “cause” of the observed action (Bratman, 1987; Pynadath
and Wellman, 1995); and the action occurs when one or more of such intentions are
active. More detailed arguments for this can be found in (Cozman, 2004; Pearl,
1988).
Example 2.4.3 (Noisy-OR) Consider the action node Looking (i.e., L), with four
parent intention nodes i(B), i(D), i(R), and i(S). In the unit fragments for L,
UFA(i(B),L), UFA(i(D),L), UFA(i(R),L), and UFA(i(S ),L), we define P (L =
T |i(B) = T ) = 0.9, P (L = T |i(D) = T ) = 0.7, P (L = T |i(R) = T ) = 0.8, P (L =
T |i(S) = T ) = 0.2, respectively.
The combination of these unit fragments using the Noisy-OR method, in Figure
2.5, and the CPD table for the node L in the obtained BN is defined following Eq.
(2.4). The CPD for the node Looking (L) in Figure 2.2, now instead of being fully
constructed beforehand, can be defined by this Noisy-OR combination from the simple
unit fragments.
Obviously, from the design point of view, it is easier and usually much cheaper
to construct the small fragments (and then combine them) than to construct the
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Figure 2.5: Noisy-OR Combination for the node Looking.
whole BN (Pearl, 1988; Laskey, 2008) (see also the discussion in this chapter’s
introduction, Section 2.1).
Now we need to combine the obtained unit IRBN, irBN(A), with the current IRBN.
For that, in the sequel we define how to combine two IRBNs. Intuitively, we simply
add up all the new nodes and links of the new IRBN to the current IRBN, keeping
the CPD tables from the two original IRBNs.
Definition 2.4.5 (Combination of IRBNs) Let W1 = 〈{Cs1 , Is1 ,As1}, pa1 ,P1 〉
and W2 = 〈{Cs2 , Is2 ,As2}, pa2 ,P2 〉 be two IRBNs, such that As1 ∩As2 = ∅ (any
actions in As2 which are already so named in As1 are renamed). The combination
of these two IRBNs is an IRBN, denoted by comb(W1, W2) = 〈{Cs, Is,As}, pa,PW 〉,
where
• As = As1 ∪As2; Is = Is1 ∪ Is2; Cs = Cs1 ∪ Cs2;
• pa(I) = C(I) ∀I ∈ Is; pa(A) = pa1(A) ∪ pa2(A) ∀A ∈ As;
• PW (C) = PKB(C) ∀C ∈ Cs; PW (I|pa(I)) = PKB(I|C(I)) ∀I ∈ Is;
PW (A|pa(A)) = Pk(A|pak(A)) if A ∈ Ask (with k = 1, 2).
Note that here it is allowed the possibility that the observed agent follows multiple
intentions simultaneously.
When some intentions are found irrelevant, e.g., because they are much unlikely 3,
those intentions should be removed from the IRBN. These intentions might resurface
3One intention is much less likely than the other if the fraction of its likelihood and that of the
most likely intention is less than some small threshold. It is up to the KB designer to provide it.
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in the IRBN later if there appear newly observed actions triggering them. This could
happen frequently when one considers the case where agents might abandon/change
their initial intentions—especially for the multiple intention recognition case.
The removal is enacted by considering the intentions (to be removed) as com-
pletely false and employing a project operator, described below.
Definition 2.4.6 (Project of CPD Table) Let Tb be a CPD table defining
P (X|V ), the probability of a random variable X conditional on a set of random
binary variables V. Considering a strict subset V ′ ( V , the project of Tb on V ′,
denoted by proj(Tb, V′), is the part of Tb corresponding to all variables in V \ V ′
being false.
Note that this approach guarantees the consistency of the probability distribution
over the set of the remaining intentions. It requires neither normalization over the
set nor creating a new CPD: any computation can be done directly with the original
CPD.
Definition 2.4.7 (Remove Intentions from IRBN) Let W = 〈{Cs, Is,As},
pa,PW 〉 be an IRBN and R ⊂ Is be a strict subset of Is. The result of remov-
ing the set of intentions R from W is an IRBN, denoted by remove(W, R) =
〈{CsR, IsR,AsR}, paR,PR〉, where
• AsR = As; IsR = Is \R; CsR =
⋃
I∈IsR C(I);
• paR(I ) = C(I ) ∀I ∈ IsR; paR(A) = pa(A) \R ∀A ∈ AsR;
• PR(C) = PKB(C) ∀C ∈ CsR; PR(I|paR(I)) = PKB(I|C(I)) ∀I ∈ IsR;
and for each A ∈ AsR, PR(A|paR(A)) is defined by the CPD table
proj (Tb, paR(A)) where Tb is the CPD table for A in W, i.e. defined by
PW (A|pa(A)).
Based on these operators, we now describe an algorithm for incremental intention
recognition in a real-time manner.
Algorithm 1 (Incremental Intention Recognition) Repeat the following steps
until some given time limit is reached. The most likely intention in the previous
cycle of the repeat loop is the final result 4.
4Obviously, one can easily modify the algorithm to find the set of N most likely intentions. In
the next section we shall see that in more detail.
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1. Let A be a new observed action. Combine the current IRBN W with irBN(A)
to obtain W′ = comb(W, irBN(A)). If A is the initially observed action, let
W′ = irBN(A).
2. Compute the probability of each intention in W ′, conditional on the set of
current observations in W ′. Remove the intentions which are much less likely
than the others (following Definition 2.4.7).
Example 2.4.4 (Elder’s Incremental Intention Recognition) When observ-
ing the action Looking, the IRBN in Figure 2.2 (without action node Open Fridge)
is created. We compute the probabilities 5 V1, V2, V3, V4 of each intention i(B),
i(D), i(R), and i(S), respectively, conditional on the observations, including action
node Looking and the two cause/reason nodes, tv on and light on. Let us consider
the possible cases.
• If light is off, then V1 = V2 = V3 = 0 and V4 = 1, regardless of the observed
state of the TV.
• If light is on and tv is off, then V1 = 0.71, V2 = 0.49, V3 = 0.50, and V4 =
0.011.
• If light is on and tv is on, then V1 = 0, V2 = 0.50, V3 = 0.80, and V4 = 0.01.
Hence, if one observes that the light is off, the elder is definitely looking for the light
switch, given that he is looking around. Otherwise, if one observes the light is on,
and that the TV is on too, the intention of looking for the remote control, i(R), is
most probable; but, if the TV is off, then looking for something to read, i(B), is most
probable. They are the output of the algorithm whenever the decision needs to be
made immediately after observing the first action.
Now suppose we are in the second case (light is on and tv is off), and the
decision has not had to be made. Another action, open the fridge – Open fridge
(OpenF), is observed. Suppose there are two unit fragments for this action,
UFA(i(D),OpenF ), and UFA(i(F ),OpenF ), and one unit fragment for the inten-
tion i(F), UFI({Hungry}, i(F )), in the knowledge base (where i(F) stands for the
intention of looking for some food). Respectively, CPD tables in these unit fragments
5In this work, for Bayesian network reasoning and inference, we utilize the Bayesian reasoning
engine SMILE running in a MAC-OS-X computer, publicly available at: http://genie.sis.pitt.edu/.
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are given by, P (OpenF = T |i(D) = T ) = 0.3, P (OpenF = T |i(F ) = T ) = 0.8,
and P (i(F ) = T |Hungry = T ) = 0.9. A new IRBN with the new action node is
created (Figure 2.2 in full, with all grey-filled nodes). Note that now the intention
node i(Switch), and with all its in- and out- connections, is being removed, since it
is very unlikely compared with others (see above, V4 = 0.011).
Now the conditional probabilities of intentions in the IRBN are: V1 = 0.57,
V2 = 0.55, V3 = 0.47, and V5 = 0.63 (V5 is that of the intention i(Food)). Looking
for food becomes the most probable intention.
2.5 Relation Among Intentions
When considering the case in which the observed agent may pursue multiple in-
tentions simultaneously, it is undoubtedly indispensable to take into account and
express the relations amongst the intentions in the model. Pursuing one intention
may exclude some other intention to be pursued (Pynadath and Wellman, 1995;
Bratman, 1987; Roy, 2009b). It may be so because of some resource limitation, e.g.,
allowance time is not enough for accomplishing both intentions at the same time
(Keng and Yun, 1989). It also may be because of the nature or restriction of the
observed agent’s task: the agent is restricted to pursuing a single intention (e.g.,
in constructing Linux and Unix plan corpora, a user is given one task at a time to
complete) (Blaylock and Allen, 2003, 2004; Lesh, 1998).
We introduce a so-called exclusive relation e—a binary relation on the set of
intention nodes—representing that if one intention is pursued, then the other inten-
tion cannot be pursued. It is usually, although perhaps not always, the case that
intentions exclusiveness is symmetric. It holds for the resource limitation case: one
intention excludes the other intention because there is not enough resource for ac-
complishing both, which in turn implies that the latter intention excludes the former
one too. It also clearly holds for the case where the agent is restricted to pursuing
a single intention. Here we assume that e is symmetric; it can be renamed mutually
exclusive relation.
Intentions I1 and I2 are mutually exclusive iff they cannot be pursued simultane-
ously, i.e. P (I1 = T, I2 = T ) = 0. Thus, for any action A, if I1, I2 ∈ pa(A) then the
CPD table for A is undefined. Hence, the BN needs to be restructured. The mutually
exclusive intentions must be combined into a single intention node since they cannot
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co-exist as parents of a node. Each intention represents a possible value of the new
combined node. Namely, let I1, . . . , It be such that e(Ii, Ij), ∀i, j : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ t.
The new combined node, I, stands for a random variable whose possible outcomes
are either Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ t, or Ĩ—the outcome corresponding to the state that none of
the Ii = T . Note that if the intentions are exhaustive, Ĩ can be omitted. Next, I is
linked to all the action nodes that have a link from one of Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
There remains to re-define CPD tables in the new BN. They are kept the same
for action A where I 6∈ pa(A). For A such that I ∈ pa(A), the new CPD table at
I = Ii corresponds to the CPD table in the original BN at Ii = T and Ij = F ∀j 6= i,
i.e. P (A|I = Ii, . . . ) = P (A|I0 = F, . . . , Ii−1 = F, Ii = T, Ii+1 = F, . . . , It = F, . . . ).
Note that the left hand side is defined in the new BN, and the right hand side is
defined in the original BN. Similarly, the new CPD table at I = Ĩ corresponds to
Ii = F for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. In addition, prior probability P (I = Ii) = P (Ii = T ) and
P (I = Ĩ) =
∏t
i=1 P (Ii = F ) (and then being normalized).
We now specify the CPD table of I. In the new BN, the causes/reasons of each
intention are connected to the combined node, i.e. pa(I) =
⋃t
i=1 C(Ii). Applying the
Markov assumption (see Def. 2.3.1) we have P (I = Ii|pa(I)) = Pi(Ii = T |C(Ii)) and
P (I = Ĩ|pa(I)) =
∏t
i=1 Pi(Ii = F |C(Ii)), where Pi is the probability distribution of
the unit fragment for Ii.
In the next section we focus on the single intention recognition case, showing
how the approach to representing relationships amongst several intentions can sig-
nificantly decrease the complexity of the probability inference therein. We then
present experimental results on the Linux plan corpus. After that, in Section 2.7,
we provide further experimentation on our novel so-called IPD plan corpora.
2.6 Single Intention Recognition
2.6.1 The Model
Suppose the observed agent pursues a single intention at a time. In this case, all
intentions are mutually exclusive, and they can be combined into a single node. The
IRBN then has a single intention node, linking to all action nodes. All cause/reason
nodes are connected to the intention node.
Let I1, . . . , In be the intentions in the original IRBN. As usual, they are assumed
to be exhaustive, i.e. the observed agent is assigned an intention from them. The
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combined node I thus has n possible outcomes Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let As = {A1, . . . , Am}
be the set of current observed actions, all linked to the single intention I. The
set of all cause/reason nodes are Cs = ∪ni=1C(Ii). Suppose Ce ⊆ Cs is the set
of cause/reason nodes which are observed (evidence nodes). For instance, in the
Elder Care examples presented above, the state of TV and the state of the light are
observed cause/reason nodes.
Let Cne = Cs \ Ce. Applying Eq. (2.2), we obtain the probability of each
intention conditional on the current observations
P (I = Ij |Ce, As) =
P (Ij , Ce, As)∑n
i=1 P (Ii, Ce, As)
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n (2.5)
where, by applying the joint probability formulas (2.1) and (2.3), we obtain for all
j that












This implies that, when not including causes/reasons for intentions (i.e., Cs = ∅)
as in the case of Linux plan corpus below, our intention recognizer has a linear
complexity on the number of intentions O(|n|).
If no cause/reason nodes are observed, i.e. Cne = Cs (as in the case of the Linux
and IPD plan corpora we examine in the next subsection), we obtain




If all of them are observed, i.e. Cne = ∅ (as we shall see in the IPD Plan corpora),
the term
∏
C∈Cs P (C) is simplified in the fraction of Eq. (2.5), since it appears
and is the same in both numerator and denominator. Thus, in these two cases, we
do not need to define prior probabilities distribution of the root nodes in Cs, as to
be applied to obtain experimental results for the Linux and IPD plan corpora in
the following sections. Note that in the latter case we still need to compute the
conditional probabilities P (Ij |Cs), which will be explicitly defined when needed.
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2.6.2 Experiments with Linux Plan Corpus
2.6.2.1 The Linux Plan Corpus
Plan corpus is the term used to describe a set of plan sessions and consists of a
list of goals/intentions and the actions a user executed to achieve them (Armentano
and Amandi, 2009). Although there are many corpora available for testing machine
learning algorithms in other domains, just a few are available for training and testing
plan/intention recognizers; furthermore, each of the plan/intention recognizers using
plan corpora usually has its own datasets—which leads to a difficult comparison
amongst each other. For that important reason, we chose the Linux plan corpus
(Blaylock and Allen, 2004)—one of the rare regularly used plan corpora—which was
kindly made publicly available by Nate Blaylock—in order to test our system. It
also enables a better comparison with other systems using this corpus (Blaylock and
Allen, 2005, 2004; Armentano and Amandi, 2009; Singla and Mooney, 2011).
The Linux plan corpus is modeled after Lesh’s Unix plan corpus (Lesh, 1998). It
was gathered from 56 human users (graduate and undergraduate students, faculty,
and staff) from the University of Rochester Department of Computer Science. The
users have different levels of expertise in the use of Linux, and they were allowed to
perform as many times as they wished, in order to contribute more plan sessions.
The sessions, consisting in sequences of commands performed by the users to achieve
a given goal/intention, were automatically recorded. For example, a goal is to find
a file with a given name or copy some files to a given folder, and the users can
use the Linux commands such as “find”, “cp”, “cd”, “ls”, etc. At the end of each
session, the users were asked to indicate whether they succeeded in achieving their
goal/intention. In total, there are 547 sessions, 457 of which were indicated as
successfully completing the goal, 19 goals and 43 actions (commands).
The Linux plan corpus is an important and hard benchmark for intention/goal
recognition. First, data is collected from real humans and thus noisy. Second,
involved humans expertise is varied, and they sometimes used wrong commands
due to limited knowledge about the domain (Blaylock and Allen, 2004; Linux-Plan-
Corpus). Furthermore, we observe that plan sessions’ lengths in the corpus are quite
varied. The minimum, maximum, and mean number of actions in a plan session are
1, 60, and 6.124, respectively.
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2.6.2.2 Learning Unit Fragments from Data
For unit fragment UFA(I ,A), the conditional probability of A given I is defined by
the frequency of A in a plan session for achieving the goal/intention I divided by
the frequency of any action for achieving I:
P (A = T |I = T ) = freq(AI )
freq(I )
. (2.8)
For better understanding, in the plan corpus each action is marked with the intention
which the action is aiming at. Then, freq(AI ) is the frequency of A being marked
by I, and freq(I ) is the frequency of seeing the mark I.
Note that prior probabilities of all the intentions in the corpus are given initially,
and used for generating tasks for users (Linux-Plan-Corpus; Blaylock and Allen,
2004).
2.6.2.3 Making Predictions
Similar to (Blaylock and Allen, 2004; Armentano and Amandi, 2009), instead of let-
ting the recognizer make a prediction after each observed action, we set a confidence
threshold τ (0 ≤ τ ≤ 1) , which allows the recognizer to decide whether or not it is
confident enough to make a prediction; the recognizer only makes a prediction if the
likelihood of the most likely intention in the model is greater than τ . Otherwise, it
predicts “don’t know”.
In addition, instead of only predicting the most likely intention, the recognizer
provides a set of N most likely ones (N-best prediction).
2.6.2.4 Evaluation Metrics
For evaluating our system and comparing with the previous ones (Blaylock and
Allen, 2004; Armentano and Amandi, 2009), we use three different metrics. Preci-
sion and recall report the number of correct predictions divided by total predictions
(predicts when confident enough) and total prediction opportunities (always pre-
dicts, whatever the confidence is), respectively. More formally (Armentano and
Amandi, 2009), let Seq = a1, . . . , an be a sequence of actions for achieving intention
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I (a session for testing). Considering the N -best prediction case, let
correct(A) =
1 if I is one of the N most likely intentions when observing A0 otherwise










where z and Z are the number of predictions made (when the recognizer is confident
enough) and the total number of prediction opportunities, respectively.
On the other hand, convergence is a metric that indicates how much time the
recognizer took to converge on what the current user goal/intention was. Let t be
such that correcti = 0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ t − 1 and 1 for t ≤ i ≤ n (i.e. t is the first
time point which from there on the system always correctly predicts), convergence
for sequence Seq is
convergence(Seq) =
z − t+ 1
z
.
Finally, the overall precision, recall and convergence are obtained by taking averages
over all testing sessions.
2.6.2.5 Experiments and Results
Because of the small size of the Linux corpus, and similar to previous work, we ran
experiments using the one-out cross validation method (Armentano and Amandi,
2009). Just one at a time, one plan session in the whole corpus is left out. The
rest of the corpus is used for training the model, which is then evaluated against
the left out plan session. We study the effect of confidence level τ with respect to
the precision and convergence (for recall, it clearly is a decreasing function of τ)
(Figure 2.6). As expected, the greater N the better the precision and convergence
scores. The difference in the precision and convergence between two different values
of N is large when τ is small, and gets smaller for greater τ . Most interestingly, we
observe that the precision and convergence are not monotonic increasing on τ . There
are critical values of τ at which the measures have the maximal value, and those
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Figure 2.6: Plot of our method’s precision and convergence for τ ∈ [0, 1] and for differ-
ent values of N (N = 1, 2, 3, 4) in Linux plan Corpus. The greater N , the better
precision and convergence. The difference in precision and convergence between two
different values of N is large when τ is small, and gets smaller for greater τ . Most in-
terestingly, we observe that precision and convergence are not monotonic increasing on
τ . There are critical values of τ at which the measures have maximal value, and those
values are smaller for greater N . This observation suggests that in plan/intention
recognition task, the more precise (i.e. the smaller N) the decision needed to make
is, the greater confidence level the recognizer should gain to make a good (enough)
decision. On the other hand, the recognizer should not be too cautious to make a
prediction, leading to refuse to make a prediction when it would have been able to
make a correct one. In short, it suggests the important need to study (experimentally)
the confidence threshold τ carefully for particular application domains.
values are smaller for greater N . This observation suggests that in a plan/intention
recognition task, the more precise (i.e. the smaller N) the decision needed to make
is, the greater confidence level the recognizer should gain to make a good (enough)
decision. On the other hand, the recognizer should not be too cautious, possibly
leading to refuse to make a prediction when it would have been able to make a correct
one. In short, these experiments suggest an important need to (experimentally)
study the confidence threshold τ carefully, for particular application domains and
particular values of N . Using the same τ for all values of N could decrease the
recognizer’s performance.
Table 2.1 shows some of the results for different values of N (and the correspond-
ing value of τ). Similar to the previous works on the same Linux corpus (Blaylock
and Allen, 2004; Armentano and Amandi, 2009), we keep the best results of each
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Table 2.1: Intention Recognition Results on the Linux Plan Corpus
N-best 1-best 2-best 3-best 4-best
τ 0.95 0.5 0.45 0.42
Precision 0.786 0.847 0.870 0.883
Recall 0.308 0.469 0.518 0.612
Converg. 0.722 0.799 0.822 0.824
case with respect to τ for the comparison. For example, we obtained a precision
of 78.6% for 1-best that is increased to 87.0% for 3-best prediction and 88.3% for
4-best one. Convergence is increased from 72.2% for 1-best to 82.2% for 3-best and
82.4% for 4-best prediction.
The best performance on the Linux plan corpus so far, in terms of precision and
convergence (recall is not referred), has been reported in (Armentano and Amandi,
2009), where the authors use a variable Markov model with exponential moving
average. In this respect we obtained an increment of 14% better precision and
13.3% better convergence for 1-best prediction, 8.2% better precision and 9.3% bet-
ter convergence for 2-best prediction, and 7.5% better precision and 7.7% better
convergence for 3-best prediction. We also obtained better recalls in all cases and
for all metrics of 4-best prediction compared with (Blaylock and Allen, 2004), the
only work reporting these scores. For the Linux plan corpus, Singla and Mooney
(2011) reports only the precision score, which is worse than that of Armentano and
Amandi (2009).
Note that in (Armentano and Amandi, 2009) the authors use a more fine-grained
preprocessing method for their work, but we suspect it will have increased their
performance. To fairly compare with all previous work we use the original corpus.
The Linux plan corpus allows an appropriate comparison with prior work. How-
ever, it does not include contextual information (reasons/causes of intentions), and
there is no intention change/abandonment occurrences (users follow a single inten-
tion throughout entire plan sessions). To evaluate the context-dependent aspect
as well as the capability of dealing with intention change/abandonment, we next
present new plan corpora.
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2.7 IPD Plan Corpora
We present new plan corpora in the context of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD)
6 (Sigmund, 2010) and provide experimental results for them. The intentions/goals
to be recognized are the (known) strategies in IPD (see below). Strategies in the
(evolutionary) game theory context are usually considered representative types of
agents’ behavior in a social or biological setting. An agent that adopts a given strat-
egy can be interpreted as if it intends to follow the corresponding type of behavior,
in the given social or biological setting. This interpretation satisfies the generally
accepted definition of intention, which is ‘choice with commitment’ (Bratman, 1987;
Cohen and Levesque, 1990). Plan sessions are sequences of moves played by such
strategies. This way of interpreting game strategies was explored in (Han et al.,
2011b) for studying the evolutionary roles of intention recognition.
2.7.1 Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a symmetric two-player non-zero game defined by the
payoff matrix
( C D
C R,R S, T
D T, S P, P
)
.
Each player has two options in each round, cooperates (C) or defects (D). A player
who chooses to cooperate with a player who defects receives the sucker’s payoff S,
whereas the defecting player gains the temptation to defect, T . Mutual cooperation
(resp., defection) yields the reward R (resp., punishment P ) for both players. PD is
characterized by the payoff ranking T > R > P > S (and, in addition, 2R > S + T
for IPD). Thus, in a single round, it is always best to defect, but cooperation may
be rewarded if the game is iterated. Let r denote the average number of rounds the
game is iterated.
IPD is usually known as a story of tit-for-tat (TFT), which won both Axelrod’s
tournaments (Axelrod, 1984). TFT starts by cooperating, and does whatever the
opponent did in the previous round. It will cooperate if the opponent cooperated,
6The approach also applies readily to other social dilemmas such as Snow Drift and Stag Hunt
(Sigmund, 2010). A social dilemma represents a particular type of situation in a social or biological
context.
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and will defect if the opponent defected. But if there are erroneous moves due to
noise (i.e. an intended move is wrongly performed with a given execution error),
the performance of TFT declines: it cannot correct errors or mistakes. Tit-for-
tat is then replaced by generous tit-for-tat (GTFT), a strategy that cooperates if
the opponent cooperated in the previous round, but sometimes cooperates even if
the opponent defected (with a fixed “forgiveness” probability p > 0) (Nowak and
Sigmund, 1992; Sigmund, 2010). GTFT can correct mistakes. Subsequently, TFT
and GTFT were replaced by win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) as the winning strategy
chosen by evolution (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993; Sigmund, 2010). WSLS repeats
the previous move whenever it did well, but changes otherwise.
Some other less famous strategies which we are going to use later are GRIM –
a grim version of TFT, prescribing to defect except after a round of mutual cooper-
ation, and Firm-But-Fair (FBF) – known as a tolerant brother of TFT, prescribing
to defect only if getting a sucker’s payoff S in the previous round. Details of all
strategies summarily depicted above can be found in (Sigmund, 2010) (Chapter 3).
2.7.2 Corpus Description
In the following, we prescribe how to create plan corpora for training and testing
the described intention recognition method, for a given set of strategies. We start
by making an assumption that all strategies to be recognized have the memory size
bounded by M ≥ 0, i.e. their decision at the current round is independent of the past
rounds that are at a time distance greater than M . Note that the above mentioned
strategies have memory bounded by M = 1.
For clarity of representation, abusing notations, R, S, T and P are henceforth
also referred to as elementary game states, in a single round of interaction. Ad-
ditionally, E (standing for empty) is used to refer to a game state having had no
interaction. The most basic element in a plan corpus is the corpus action, having
the following representation.
Definition 2.7.1 (Corpus Action) An action in a plan corpus is of the form
s1 . . . sMξ, where si ∈ {E,R, T, S, P}, 1 ≤ i ≤ M , are the states of the M last
interactions, and ξ ∈ {C,D} is the current move 7.
7From now on, this notion of an action is used, which is different from the notion of a move
(either C or D).
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Definition 2.7.2 (Plan Session) A plan session of a strategy is a sequence of
corpus actions played by that strategy (more precisely, of a player using that strategy)
against an arbitrary player.
We denote by ΣM the set of all possible types of action for memory size M . Clearly,
|ΣM | = 2× 5M . For example,
Σ1 = {EC,RC, TC, SC, PC,ED,RD, TD, SD,PD}.
Now, for an example of a plan session, let us consider the strategy TFT and the
following sequence of its interactions with some other player (denoted by X), in the
presence of noise
round : 0 1 2 3 4 5
TFT : − C C D D D
X : − C D D C D
TFT-states : E R S P T P
The corresponding plan session for TFT is [EC,RC, SD,PD, TD]. At the 0-th
round, there is no interaction, thus the game state is E. TFT starts by cooperating
(1-st round), hence the first action of the plan session is EC. Since player X also
cooperates in the 1-st round, the game state at this round is R. TFT reciprocates
in the 2-nd round by cooperating, hence the second action of the plan session is RC.
Similarly for the third and the fourth actions. Now, at the 5-th round, TFT should
cooperate since X cooperated in 4-th round, but because of noise, it makes an error
to defect. Therefore, the 5-th action is TD.
This way of encoding actions and the assumption about the players’ memory size
lead to the equivalent assumption that the action in the current round is independent
of the ones in previous rounds, regardless of the memory size. The independence of
actions will allow to derive a convenient and efficient intention recognition model,
discussed in the next subsection. Furthermore, it enables to save us the game states
without having to save the co-player’s moves, thus simplifying the representation of
plan corpora.
Definition 2.7.3 (Plan Corpus) Let S be a set of strategies to be recognized. A
plan corpus for S is a set of plan sessions generated for each strategy in the set.
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For a given set of strategies, different plan corpora can be generated for different
purposes. In the sequel, for example, we generate different plan corpora for training
and for testing the intention recognition method.
2.7.3 Plan Corpora Generation
Let us start by generating a plan corpus for seven most popular strategies within
the IPD framework: AllC (always cooperate), AllD (always defect), TFT, GTFT
(probability of forgiving a defect is p = 0.5), WSLS, GRIM and FBF (described
above).
We collect plan sessions of each strategy by playing a random move (C or D) with
it in each round. To be more thorough, we can also play all possible combinations
for each given number of rounds r. E.g, if r = 10, there are 210 = 1024 combinations:
C or D in each round. When noise is present, each combination is played repeatedly
a number of times, since each time one might obtain different reaction moves from
the simulated co-player.
The training corpus to be used here is generated by playing with each strategy
all the possible combinations 10 times, for each number of rounds r from 5 to 10.
The testing dataset is generated by playing a random move with each strategy in
each round, also for r from 5 to 10 8. We continue until obtaining the same number
of plan sessions as for the training dataset (corpus). Both datasets are generated in
the presence of noise. Namely, an intended move is wrongly performed, with respect
to the definition of the strategy, with probability 0.05.
In this testing dataset, changes/abandonment of players’ initial intention (strat-
egy) are not allowed. The players use the same strategy in all the rounds. We refer
to this testing dataset as Testset-IRFIX.
For testing the context-dependent aspect of our intention recognition method,
as well as taking into account intention changes/abandonment, we next introduce
the concept of social learning within the framework of evolutionary game theory
(Sigmund et al., 2010; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Tuyls and Parsons, 2007).
8It might seem unnatural to interact with a strategy randomly, but it enables us to collect a
highly diverse set of move sequences of the strategy, for both training and testing. It allows to
thoroughly evaluate our intention recognizer, even if our additional experiments confirm that its
relative performance (shown in Subsection 2.7.5) would not change much when the strategy interacts
with a big enough set of strategies.
43
2.7. IPD Plan Corpora
2.7.4 Social Learning
We consider it necessary for an agent to acquire knowledge from other agents, i.e.
learn “by being told” instead of learning only by experience. Indeed, this social
learning is a fairly practical and economical way of increasing abilities, widely used
by human beings, as widely studied in evolutionary biology and economics (Richerd-
son and Boyd, 2006; Rendell et al., 2010; Sigmund et al., 2010). Let us see how social
learning can be modeled in Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) (Hofbauer and Sig-
mund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010) given a fixed set of strategies. Agent strategies can
change, say through mutation or learning from experience, but we shall not consider
that issue here.
In social learning, agents in a population can observe the behavior of others and
the outcomes of that behavior. They may copy the behavior of others whenever
these appear to be more successful (Sigmund, 2010; Sigmund et al., 2010; Rendell
et al., 2010). The accumulated payoff from all interactions emulates the agents’
fitness or social success and the most successful agents will tend to be imitated
by others. There are many ways to model social learning (Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998; Sigmund et al., 2010). The most popular one is implemented using the so-
called pairwise comparison rule (Traulsen et al., 2006; Sigmund, 2010): an agent A
with fitness fA will adopt the strategy of a randomly chosen agent B with fitness






where the quantity β controls the “imitation strength”, i.e. how strongly the players
are basing the decision to imitate on payoff comparisons. Henceforth, A and B are
referred to as imitating and imitated agents, respectively. For simplicity, we use
β = 1 in the remainder of this chapter: the imitation depends on comparing the
exact payoffs.
It is now allowed the possibility that a player can change his/her strategy (inten-
tion) by imitating the randomly met player’s strategy (intention), depending on how
much the latter player is more successful. The two players’ ongoing success differ-
ence (SD) causally affects the imitating player’s current intention. In addition, this
intention is causally affected by the so-called imitation event (IE), stating whether
the player is meeting some other player for learning/imitating.
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Figure 2.7: Bayesian Network for intention recognition (IRBN) in the context of iter-
ated Prisoner’s Dilemma, where players can change their initial intention (strat-
egy) by imitating successful others, based on a social learning model (Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund et al., 2010; Rendell et al., 2010). The IRBN have two
cause/reason nodes in the first layer (IE and SD), connecting to a single intention
node in the second layer (I ), in turn connecting to action nodes in the third layer.
In an everyday life situation, an imitation event, IE, can be more generally
thought of as a contact of the intending agent with some source of information
that might influence its current intention to change. For example, an intention of
going out might be influenced to change/abandon by information about weather,
traffic, etc., whether the source of that information is a person, a newspaper, TV
or Radio. In turn, the success difference, SD, measures how strong is the influence
on the change, based on the credibility or strength of the information. The above
mentioned intention of going out is undoubtedly influenced more by the forecast
information provided by a trustworthy TV channel than an untrustworthy one or
unreliable person. Another example is that a suggestion from a doctor, after some
tests, apparently has more effect on changing/abandoning the intention of drinking
alcohol than that from a friend, or that from a daily newspaper.
Now we can specify a Bayesian network for intention recognition IRBN with two
cause/reason nodes, a single intention node, and observed action nodes (Figure 2.7).
In the following we define the CPD tables of the IRBN.
Bayesian Network definition. Recall that the intention node I has n possi-
ble outcomes Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ n (Subsection 2.6.1). We define the conditional prob-
ability distribution P(Ii |IE ,SD). If the player does not meet any other player
for imitation (i.e., IE = F ), Ii is independent of the success difference SD. Hence,
P(Ii |IE = F ,SD) = P(Ii |IE = F ). Now, let us consider the case IE = T . If the
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successes are also observable (thus, SD is observed, say, equal χ)9, but the strategy
of the imitated player is not, we have






where u = (1 + e−χ)−1, pi is the probability that Ii was the player’s intention in
the last prediction, and S is the number of strategies in the corpus. The equation
is explained as follows. With probability (1 − u)pi the imitating player’s strategy
remains Ii. Moreover, when not being observed, the probability that Ii was the
imitated player’s strategy is (assumed) equal 1/(S − 1). The second term expresses
the probability that the player adopts the new strategy Ii by imitation.
In the case the imitated player’s strategy is also observed, denoted by Ii∗ , simi-
larly we have




P(Ii |IE = T ,SD = χ) = (1− u)pi ∀ i 6= i∗.
(2.11)
Testing Dataset Generation (IRCHANGE). The testing dataset in this set-
ting is generated by using a simplified evolutionary simulation involving the seven
strategies described in Subsection 2.7.3. Similarly to the previous dataset, we play
a random choice sequence with each of the seven above mentioned strategies for 10
rounds. The payoff of each strategy is accumulated over these rounds. Then, for
each strategy, another strategy is randomly chosen from the other six, for possible
imitation. The imitation decision is guided by the pairwise comparison rule (see Eq.
(2.9)), which is based on a comparison of the performance of the two strategies, in
terms of the difference of their accumulated payoffs in these 10 rounds.
After all the seven strategies are given the chance to change their strategy by imi-
tating another, the interactions are repeated for 10 more rounds. At the 10-th round,
we save the accumulated payoff values of the imitating and imitated strategies. We
experiment until obtaining the same number of plan sessions as in the training
9There may be noise in the evaluation of the successes. The observed value χ of SD is randomly
taken in the range ((1− ε)χ1, (1 + ε)χ1), where ε is a small positive number (here we use ε = 0.01)
and χ1 is the exact value of the difference.
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Figure 2.8: Precision and convergence for τ ∈ [0, 1] and for different values of N (N =
1, 2, 3) with respect to Testset-IRFIX dataset, where N is the number of most
likely considered intentions. The greater N , the better the precision and convergence.
For high enough confidence τ , the intention recognizer obtained quite good scores.
dataset. The PD payoff matrix being used is: T = 20, R = 15, P = 10, S = 5; and
noise = 0.05. This testing dataset is referred to as Testset-IRCHANGE.
Clearly, each plan session in the dataset consists of 20 actions. The first 10
actions are played by the initial strategy. The last 10 ones are played by a strategy
which might be either the initial one or a different one, as the outcome of imitation
(or social learning). The intention recognition system must identify both the first
and the second strategies. While identifying the first strategy can be done efficiently
without taking into account contextual information, as we have seen in the previous
datasets, identifying the second strategy is more difficult due to the stochastic change
of the strategies (resulting from the stochasticity from the comparison rule). In the
course of observing the first 10 actions generated by the initial strategy, the system
(on average) converges to a correct prediction of it. If the strategy is changed to
a different one, and the system has no clue about that change, it would poorly
predict the new strategy, since it would still consider the old actions generated
by the first strategy as belonging to the new strategy. Having (contextual) clues
about the potential effects leading to strategy change could significantly enhance
the prediction of the second strategy, as we shall see from our experimental results
in the sequel.
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Figure 2.9: Precision for three different levels of contextual information, for τ ∈ [0, 1],
with respect to Testset-IRCHANGE dataset. We plot for N = 1 (dashed diamond) and
N = 2 (circle).
2.7.5 Results on IPD Plan Corpora
The intention recognition model is acquired using the training corpus. Fig-
ure 2.8 shows the precision and convergence of the model with respect to the
Testset-IRFIX, where again N is the number of most likely considered intentions.
Given that the training as well as the testing datasets are generated in the presence
of noise, the achieved performance is quite good. Namely, for a big enough τ , both
precision and convergence scores are greater than 0.9, even for the 1-best case.
It is noteworthy that, in Chapter 5 (see also (Han et al., 2011b)), a similar good
performance is obtained for a smaller set of four strategies (intentions). Therein,
based on the intention recognition model above presented, we implement a novel
strategy capable of intention recognition that outperforms other strategies in an
evolutionary setting.
In Figure 2.9 we show the effects of having different levels of contextual infor-
mation on the intention recognition performance, using Testset-IRCHANGE dataset,
where we consider N = 1 (dashed diamond) and N = 2 (circle). Namely, in the
first case (blue curves), there is no information about the imitation event (IE) – it is
not known if the recognized player may imitate and adopt another strategy. In the
second case (black curves), IE and the successes are observable. In the third case
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(red curves), the strategy of the imitated player is also observable (see a discussion
below for how these three levels of contextual information can be mapped into real
world situations). It is clearly shown that the performance is considerably increased
as more contextual information is available. Namely, comparing with the first case
where no contextual information is taken into account, an increase of about 5% and
15% precision is achieved in the second and third cases, respectively.
These results show that, besides observable actions from the recognizing agent,
it is important to take into account contextual information for intention recognition.
That is what most previous work on intention/plan recognition has omitted, with
the exception of Pynadath and Wellman (1995), though the authors did not provide
experimental results to show its importance (see Related Work in Section 2.2).
Note that our three-layer Bayesian network model described in Figure 2.7 is not
restricted to context-dependent intention recognition in the (evolutionary) game
theory setting. The two cause/reason nodes in the BN, imitation event (IE) and
success difference (SD), account for key relevant contextual information for inten-
tion recognition. The first one stands for relevant factors that might influence the
stability of current intentions in the model, while the second measures how strong
are such influences. Conceivably, those are all the relevant contextual information
needed for the context-dependent intention recognition task in a given application
domain.
We next further discuss the rationale of using (evolutionary) game-theoretic
methods and concepts for modeling real world situations.
2.7.6 Scope Enlargement Discussion
The task of intention/plan recognition is mostly concerned with actions or behavior.
In previous work, for a given application domain, these actions are supposed to be
supplied by an activity recognition system. In contrast, here we aim at providing
a general framework (and benchmarks) for studying and evaluating intention/plan
recognition models. For that, it is crucial to have a general model of agent behavior
and its changes.
We adopted here one of the most popular frameworks for modelling agents’
behavior (including those amongst humans), the social dilemmas (not only the Pris-
oner’s dilemma) and social learning within the framework of evolutionary game
theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010; Rendell et al., 2010). They
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have been widely used in Economics, Biology, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence,
etc. to describe human (and other species) behavior (Axelrod, 1984; Sigmund et al.,
2010; Traulsen et al., 2010; Sigmund, 2010; Rendell et al., 2010; Tuyls and Par-
sons, 2007). Although they do not exhibit all aspects of human behavior in the
real world, they have been, experimentally as well as analytically, shown to reflect
its core nature (most famously, in the context of the evolution of cooperation study
(Axelrod, 1984; Traulsen et al., 2010; Morgan et al., 2011; Santos and Pacheco, 2011;
Sigmund, 2010)). For example, the notorious strategies described above (including
TFT, WSLS, GTFT ) frequently show up in many real-world experimental settings,
ranging from Global Warming issues to Psychology and Economics behavioral re-
searches (Milinski et al., 2006; Falk et al., 2008; Morgan et al., 2011). They are also
widely observed in a broad range of real human social behavior. For a review of
social learning and evolutionary games in the real world the readers are referred to
the seminal experimental studies in (Traulsen et al., 2010; Morgan et al., 2011).
Using game-theoretic concepts allows a higher level of abstraction of domain
knowledge. That is, it enables us to account for and generalize similar situations in
different application domains. As a result, our IPD benchmarks above presented are
deemed domain-independent. Let us consider a simple scenario in the Elder Care
domain to illustrate how it is mapped to game theoretic concepts, namely the three
levels of contextual information, “No Info”, “Successes”, and “Strategy”, alluded
above (Figure 2.9). Suppose an elder intends to go fishing the next morning. But
‘being told’ that evening that it is going to rain then, it was suggested (he intend)
to do something else. Whether he changes (or even abandons) his intention strongly
depends on by whom he was ‘being told’. Was it his 3-year old granddaughter or
the TV/Radio forecast? That is, whether he adopts another person’s suggested
intention (of not going fishing the next morning) depends on that person’s expertise
or past success in the matter, or the credibility of the information provided. It
seems almost sure that he would drop the intention of going fishing if it was said by
the TV/Radio forecast. In order to appropriately recognize the elder’s intention, it
is crucial to account for such contextual information, and that it was encountered.
Further, if he was also ‘being told’ by the forecast that, although it is going to rain in
the morning, the weather in the afternoon should be perfect, one can predict that he
might likely to adopt the intention of going fishing in the afternoon instead. Briefly,
it corresponds to the first case, “No Info”, if the system cannot observe (despite its
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actual occurrence) that the elder was ‘being told’ by another person. The second
case, “Successes”, corresponds to when the system can observe who passed him
the information. The third case, “Strategy”, corresponds to when the system also
observes what he was advised by another.
In short, using the models of evolutionary game theory and social learning, one
can generate general-purpose or domain-independent benchmarks for intention/plan
recognition systems. The applicability of a system to such benchmarks may serve
to show its applicability to a wider range of application domains.
2.8 More on Situation Sensitiveness
In the following we discuss some extensions to the above intention recognition model,
which enable to take into account contextual information in several manners. We
mainly focus on exploiting the powerful knowledge representation tool of Logic Pro-
gramming (LP) (Baral, 2003) 10.
2.8.1 Situation-sensitive Bayesian Networks
Undoubtedly, BNs should be situation-sensitive since using a general BN for all spe-
cific situations of a problem domain is unrealistic and most likely imprecise (Xiang
and Poh, 2005; Laskey, 2008). For example, in the Elder Care domain, different
elders might have different living conditions and habits that need to be taken into
account to recognize their intentions. Also, place, time of day, temperature, etc.
need to be considered (Pereira and Han, 2011b; Han and Pereira, 2010b). How-
ever, consulting the domain expert to manually change the BN with respect to each
situation is costly or unfeasible.
In (Pereira and Han, 2009c, 2011b), we described a method to construct
situation-sensitive BNs, i.e. ones that change according to the given situation. It
uses LP techniques to compute situation specific probabilistic information that
is then updated into the BN. The BNs themselves are also encoded with P-log,
10Here we consider solely normal logic programs, which consist of a set of rules of the form
A← B1, . . . , Bm, not C1, . . . , not Cn (m,n ≥ 0)
where A, B1, . . . , Bm, C1, . . . , Cm are domain atoms, and not Ci denotes the default negation of
atom Ci, i.e. being false by default. The rule reads, if all the atoms and default negations in the
body are true, then the head A is true. If the body is empty, that is, m = n = 0, the head is true
unconditionally. In this case, it has the form, A← or simply A, and is also called a fact.
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a probabilistic logic implemented system (Baral et al., 2009; Han et al., 2008,
2009), which supports coherent updates. The LP techniques employed for this
are deduction with top-down procedure (XSB-Prolog) (XSB, 2009) (to deduce
situation-specific probabilistic information) plus integrity constraints and abduction
(to abduce probabilistic information needed to support and explain observations
in the given situation). However, we can employ too various other types of LP
based reasoning, e.g., constraint satisfaction, contradiction removal, preferences, or
inductive learning, whose results can be compiled (in part) into an evolving BN.
Consider three-layer BN for intention recognition (IRBN), we assume that only
prior probabilities of the top nodes (causes/reasons) are subject to changes along
with the changing situation. The CPD tables for intention and action nodes reflect
the internal state of the recognizing agent about world (Heinze, 2003; Tahboub,
2006). They may change in the long-term periods, but just occasionally. In short,
for a given situation at hand, an IRBN can be situated in it by recomputing the
prior probabilities of the cause/reason nodes in accordance with the situation.
Based on this idea, we now revise the Algorithm 1, making the IRBN model
situation-sensitive. For that, we first describe a new operator. In a given situation,
an IRBN can be situated by recomputing the prior probabilities of the top nodes.
Definition 2.8.1 (Situate IRBN) Let W = 〈{Cs, Is,As}, pa, PW 〉 be an IRBN.
We say that W is situated into a situation SIT if the prior probabilities of the top
nodes of W, i.e. PW (C) (C ∈ Cs), are recomputed according to SIT . In this work, a
situation is encoded by a logic program and the prior probabilities of the top nodes are
computed using LP techniques, as described above (Pereira and Han, 2009c, 2011b).
Formally, the situate operator is defined by situate(W, SIT) = 〈{Cs, Is,As}, pa, PS〉,
where
• PS(C), for all C ∈ Cs, are the new prior probabilities of top nodes, resulted
from the re-computation according to SIT.
• PS(X|pa(X)) = PW (X|pa(X)) ∀X ∈ Is ∪As.
It might be too costly to always change the IRBN as the situation relevant factors
could constantly evolve. Here, we propose a simple criterion allowing to decide when
the IRBN should be reconfigured to account for the situation at hand. It says, if
there is a conceivable “salient” intention currently figuring in the IRBN, the IRBN
should be reconfigured (after observing a new action), that is, be situated according
52
2.8. More on Situation Sensitiveness
to the latest information about the situation at hand. Otherwise, the IRBN remains
the same. The property “salient” reads differently in different application domains,
and it is up to the domain experts to design its specification. For example, in the
Elder Care domain, “salient” may read dangerous, e.g., when suspecting an intrusion
intention to elders’ house, or the elders’ committal suicide intention. It may also
read urgent, e.g., when detecting the elders’ intention to find something to eat or
something to drink.
Accordingly, a simple change to the Algorithm 1 needs to be made.
Algorithm 2 After the first step (item 1) in Algorithm 1, insert the following item:
• If there is a “salient” intention in the current IRBN W ′, situate it according
to the situation at hand SIT, i.e. situate(W′, SIT). Otherwise, the IRBN
remains the same.
For illustration, let us extend the previous example in the Elder Care domain.
Example 2.8.1 (Elder Care (cont’d)) In the scenario provided in Example
2.4.4, the IRBN model (after observing and including both actions) may vary
depending on some factors such as the time of day, of the elders’ last drink or
last meal, his interest in football, etc. For illustration, we design a simple logical
component for the IRBN to take into account those factors.
pa_rule(pa(hg(T),d_(0,1)),[]) :- time(X), last_eating(X1), X-X1 < 1.
pa_rule(pa(hg(T),d_(9,10)),[]) :- time(X), last_eating(X1), X-X1 > 3.
pa_rule(pa(thsty(T),d_(1,10)),[]) :- time(X), last_drink(X1), X1-X < 1.
pa_rule(pa(thsty(T),d_(9,10)),[]) :- time(X), last_drink(X1), X1-X > 3.
pa_rule(pa(lr(T),d_(1,100)),[]) :- time(X), X > 0, X < 5.
pa_rule(pa(lw(T),d_(9,10)),[]) :- time(X),schedule(X1,football), X1-X<0.25, !.
pa_rule(pa(lw(T),d_(1,100)),[]) :- time(X), (X > 23; X < 5).
Basically, in P-log, probabilistic information is given by pa/2 rules (Han et al., 2008;
Baral et al., 2009). For example, the rule (pa(hg(T ), d (9, 10))← Body) means that
the probability of being hungry (i.e. hg(T )) is 9/10 if the precondition in the body
of the rule, Body, holds. We provide a reserved pa rule/2 predicate which takes the
head and body of some pa/2 rule as its first and second arguments, respectively,
53
2.8. More on Situation Sensitiveness
and includes preconditions for its activation in its own body. Thus, e.g., the second
pa rule above means, if the elder’s last eating is more than 3 hours ago, it is quite
probably that he is being hungry (with probability 9/10) (note that here the pa
rule body, representing the precondition, is empty—represented by an empty list
[]). Now, a situation is given by asserted facts representing it and, in order to
find the probabilistic information specific to the given situation, we simply use the
XSB Prolog built-in findall/3 predicate (XSB, 2009) to find all true pa/2 literals
expressed by the pa rule/2 rules with true bodies in the situation.
There are several predicates specific to the domain knowledge base. For example,
time/1 provides the current time of the day (in hours). The predicates last drink/1
and last eating/1, with an argument in time, hold if the elder’s last drink and last
meal were at the given time, respectively.
Now let us exhibit how some different situations can be encoded in our frame-
work, and how they appropriately affect the intention recognition results, in a
context-dependent manner.
• If the current time is 18 (i.e. time(18)) and the last time the elders ate was
half an hour before (i.e. last eating(17.5)). But they did not have any drink
for 3 hours (e.g., last drink(14)). Those three facts are asserted. Hence, the




Now the result is, V1 = 0.55; V2 = 0.77; V3 = 0.41; V5 = 0.21. It is now the
case that looking for something to drink, i(Drink), is the most likely intention,
instead of looking for food as previously.
• If the elder also had the last drink just half an hour before (i.e. last drink(17.5)),
then we have the following two rules instead
pa_rule(pa(hg(T),d_(0,1)),[]).
pa_rule(pa(thty(T),d_(1,10)),[]).
We obtain, V1 = 0.60; V2 = 0.14; V3 = 0.54; V5 = 0.12. In other words, the
intention of looking for something to read, i(Book), becomes the most likely
intention.
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• If the situation remains the same, but the time is changed to 1 a.m., that is,
the facts time(1), last eating(0.5), and last drink(0.5) hold. And if there is
no football scheduled around that time, we have two additional rules
pa_rule(pa(lr(T),d_(1,100)),[]).
pa_rule(pa(lw(T),d_(1,100)),[]).
We thus obtain, V1 = 0.40; V2 = 0.14; V3 = 0.29; V5 = 0.121, i.e.,
the intention of looking for something to read, i(Book), remains the most
likely intention. But, if there is football scheduled around that time, say,




Now the result is, V1 = 0.13; V2 = 0.14; V3 = 0.21; V5 = 0.12. In other words,
he intention of looking for the remote control now becomes the most likely
one.
In short, we have demonstrated the flexibility of our technique by means of repre-
senting situations as logic programs, and used them to update the current IRBN.
We show how the context information can appropriately influence the interpretation
of the observed agent’s intention.
2.8.2 Situation-sensitive selection of unit fragments
In all the plan corpora benchmarks we have been using in previous sections, no
context-dependent selection of unit fragments for actions is needed. In operator
select(A,SIT) (recall from Subsection 2.4.1), the parameter SIT is always empty.
However, the selected set of intentions for an action should in general be context
dependent, that is, which intentions conceivably give rise to the action should depend
on the situation in which the action is observed (Bratman, 1992, 1987; Roy, 2009b).
Commonsense reasoning can be employed for this purpose, which will be enacted by
LP reasoning techniques (Baral, 2003) in the following.
The prior domain knowledge base KB is accompanied by a logic program PKB
in order to help decide which unit fragments for an observed action are selected in
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a given situation, i.e., which intentions are conceivable. Let ∆ = {A1, . . . , AN} be
the set of actions of KB and Υi = {I| UFA(I, Ai) ∈ KB} the set of intentions that
belong to a unit fragment for action Ai in KB.
We say that an intention I is conceivable when observing action A if it is expected
in the given situation and there is no expectation to the contrary (a similar technique
was used in (Pereira and Han, 2009b, 2011b; Han and Pereira, 2011c)). Thus, for
1 ≤ i ≤ N and I ∈ Υi, PKB contains the following rule:
conceivable(I)← Ai, expect(I), not expect not(I).
Furthermore, for each I ∈
⋃N




The rules about expectations are domain-specific knowledge used to constrain the
conceivable intentions in a situation. Counter-expectation rules supplement expec-
tation rules for representing defeasible conditions or exceptions.
Now suppose that an action A, A ∈ ∆, is observed. The current situation is
encoded by a logic program SIT , consisting of LP facts describing the situation.
In order to compute the set of conceivable intentions that may give rise to Ai,
we simply use the XSB Prolog built-in findall/3 predicate (XSB, 2009) to find all
true conceivable/1 atoms of the program PKB ∪ SIT ∪ {A ←}. This provides the
operational definition of the select(A,SIT ) operator discussed in Subsection 2.4.1.
For illustration, we modified the previous example in Elder Care domain, as
follows.
Example 2.8.2 (Elder Care variant) An elderly person stays alone in his apart-
ment. An intention recognition system is set up to support his activities in the
living room. At the moment the system observes that the elder is looking around
for something ( look). The knowledge base KB of the system has a unit IRBN
for this action. For illustration, consider a small set of conceivable intentions,
Is = {book ,water ,weapon, lightSwitch}.
The accompanying logic program PKB contains the following rules, for each I ∈ Is:
conceivable(I)← look, expect(I), not expect not(I).
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Suppose in PKB the expectation and counter-expectation rules for these intentions
are
1. expect(book).
expect not(book)← light off .
expect not(book)← burglar alarm ring .
2. expect(water).
expect not(water)← light off .
expect not(water)← burglar alarm ring .
3. expect(weapon)← burglar alarm ring .
expect not(weapon)← light off .
expect not(weapon)← no weapon availabe.
4. expect(lightSwitch).
expect not(lightSwitch)← light on, tv on.
For example, the rules in line 1 say the intention of looking for a book is always
expected except when the light is off or the burglar alarm is ringing. Let us
consider some cases. If at the moment the light is off, i.e. SIT = {light off ←},
then conceivable(light switch) is the only true conceivable/1 atom of the program
PKB∪SIT ∪{look ←}. In this case, since there is only one conceivable intention, we
can conclude immediately that looking for the light switch is the elder’s intention,
without having to construct an IRBN.
Now suppose the light is on, the tv is not on, and the burglar alarm is not ringing.
That is, SIT = {light on ←}. Recall that what we consider here are normal logic
programs, with default negation. It means that if something is not stated true
as a fact, its negation is true by default. There are three conceivable intentions,
book, water, and lightSwitch, since they are expected in this situation, and there
are no expectations to the contrary (lines 1, 2, and 4). Hence, they are selected
for constructing the unit IRBN for action look, given the current situation. The
intention weapon is irrelevant, or not conceivable, and can be ruled out immediately
at this situation-dependent selection stage.
If light is on, tv is not on, but now the burglar alarm is ringing, i.e,
SIT = {light on ←, burglar alarm ring ←}. Weapon is accordingly expected,
and there is no expectation to the contrary (line 3). Furthermore, water and book
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are not expected (line 2). Hence, there are two conceivable intentions: weapon and
lightSwitch.
If, additionally, the tv is on, that is, SIT = {light on ←, tv on ←,
burglar alarm ring ←}, then the intention of looking for the light switch is not
expected (line 4). Hence, looking for weapon is the only conceivable intention rec-
ognizable in this situation.
Despite its simplicity, in considering only a small set of possible conceivable
intentions, this example has demonstrated how the LP techniques can help to
(significantly) reduce the size of the result IRBN, and sometimes reach the solution
immediately. We envisage that the approach can provide even greater advantage,
in terms of time complexity, when the set of conceivable intentions is large.
In this section we have presented two LP techniques which aim at enabling and
enhancing context-dependent intention recognition. Taking into account contextual
information can help significantly reduce the size of the IRBN in which the BN in-
ference is performed. Although much work remains to be done—including gathering
real data or generating appropriate plan corpora to evaluate them—the proposed
techniques are quite promising. We admit that all these might be done using BNs
solely, it however appears that their combination can provide a more efficient solu-
tion. The BN inference is much costlier than LP inference. For example, consider a
(definite) logic program that encodes all the causal relations of a BN. In the general
case, while the inference, e.g. of a conditional probability in the BN, is exponen-
tial, the corresponding deductive inference in the logic program can be performed
in polynomial time.
2.9 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a novel method for context-dependent and incremental intention
recognition. The method is performed by dynamically constructing a three-layer
BN model for intention recognition (IRBN), from a prior knowledge base consisting
of readily maintained and constructed fragments of BN. Their simple structures al-
low easy maintenance by domain experts or automatically building from available
plan corpora. The three-layer IRBN follows a causal intentional structure (Heinze,
2003; Tahboub, 2006), from causes/reasons (of intentions) to intentions (as causes
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of actions), then to (actually observed) actions. This causal structure enabled us to
appropriately capture different aspects of the context-dependent intention recogni-
tion, from the context-dependent selection of intentions for the model construction
to sensitizing prior probabilities of the intentions already in the model.
The presented above examples in the Elder Care domain illustrate several as-
pects of our intention recognition method, highlighting the importance of taking
into account contextual information – an aspect usually omitted in the previous
work (Pynadath and Wellman, 1995; Geib and Goldman, 2009). In addition, for the
first time, we have shown experimentally that accounting for contextual information
is crucial for the recognition accuracy when the observed agents might change or
abandon their initial goals/intentions. It is apparently an unavoidable aspect of real
agents, clearly pointed out in (Geib and Goldman, 2003, 2009). Taking into account
such information enables us to account for the reasons why the agents change or
abandon their goals/intentions.
Our method performs particularly well on the Linux plan corpus, showing its
applicability to the important interface-agents domain (Horvitz et al., 1998; Armen-
tano and Amandi, 2007; Madani et al., 2009). It outperforms the existent meth-
ods that make use of the corpus. For further experimentation, we have presented
the so-called IPD plan corpora for the famous strategies in the context of the it-
erated Prisoner’s Dilemma. We employed the popular model of human behavior
enacted by means of social learning and evolutionary game theory to simulate in-
tention changes/abandonment—thus enabling us to evaluate the context-dependent
aspect of our intention recognizer as well as its capability for dealing with inten-
tion changes/abandonment. Given that this modelling approach has been widely
adopted and employed in several fields, as diverse as Economics, Psychology and
Biology (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010), the good performance of
the method for the IPD corpora makes it highly applicable for a wide range of ap-
plication domains therein. Particularly in Part II of the thesis (see also (Han et al.,
2011b,a)), we employ this intention recognition method to implement strategies that
outperform the most successful known strategies in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Herein we have also attempted to tackle the problem where an observed agent
may follow multiple intentions simultaneously in a more appropriate manner. We
formally described how to represent relationships amongst intentions in the Bayesian
network for intention recognition, particularly in order to maintain its consistency
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when one needs to combine mutually exclusive intentions (Pynadath and Wellman,
1995). This aspect is indispensable in multiple intentions recognition, but mostly
omitted in previous work. However, the scalability of our method remains to be
seen. For its evaluation we need to gather an appropriate plan corpus allowing for
the possibility that users might pursue multiple intentions simultaneously. An idea
is that instead of giving users one task at a time (in the case of the Linux or Unix
domain (Lesh, 1998; Blaylock and Allen, 2004)), they are given several, so that they
can complete them separately or in parallel. Another method is to use a planner to
generate interleaved plans for multiple intentions.
A limitation of the current formalization in the multiple intentions recognition
case is that we need to assume that the intentions to be combined are perfectly
mutually exclusive. This assumption can be relaxed by utilizing a latent variable
for any subset of perfectly mutually exclusive intention nodes. The latent variable
figures in the BN either as a child or parent of the nodes, whichever works better
for inference. We are exploring this direction to provide a more general method for
representing relationships amongst intention nodes.
Another limitation of our current method is that it did not explicitly take into
account temporal evolution of domain variables in the BN. It is usually done using
Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBNs) (Pynadath and Wellman, 1995; Forbes et al.,
1995; Albrecht et al., 1998), where the state of each variable is represented by a
series of nodes. In our method, the time evolution, to some degree, is implemented
by means of updating the IRBN from time to time. For example, the states of the
cause/reason nodes are updated using an external logic program which represents the
evolving world. In this way not only can one significantly reduce the size of the BN,
thereby its inference complexity (as the LP inference is significantly less expensive),
but the declarative representation and reasoning of the LP techniques (Baral, 2003)
could be important when the states of a node cannot be easily represented in an
explicit manner. However, in domains where the states of the nodes might constantly
change, the explicit time series representation of DBNs is apparently necessary. We
envisage to bring in, to some degree, the time series representation of DBNs (Dean




INTENTION BASED DECISION MAKING
AND APPLICATIONS
Each decision we make, each action we take,
is born out of an intention.
Sharon Salzberg, O Magazine,
The Power of Intention, January 2004
Abstract. In this chapter we present an intention-based decision making
system. We exhibit a coherent combination of two Logic Programming
based implemented systems, Evolution Prospection and Intention Recog-
nition. The Evolution Prospection system has proven to be a powerful
system for decision making, designing and implementing several kinds
of preferences and useful environment-triggering constructs. It is here
enhanced with an ability to recognize intentions of other agents—an im-
portant aspect not well explored so far. The usage and usefulness of
the combined system are illustrated with several extended examples in
different application domains, including Ambient Intelligence and Elder
Care.
0This chapter is based on the publications: (Han and Pereira, 2011c), (Han and Pereira, 2010c),




Given the important role that intentions play in the way we make decisions (Brat-
man, 1987; Roy, 2009b; Searle, 2010), one would expect intentions to occupy a
substantial place in any theory of action. Surprisingly enough, in what is perhaps
the most influential theory of action—rational choice theory (Russell and Norvig,
2003; Roy, 2009b)—which includes the theory of decision making—explicit refer-
ence is made to actions, strategies, information, outcomes and preferences but not
to intentions.
This is not to say that no attention has been paid to the relationship between
rational choice and intentions. Quite the contrary, a rich philosophical and AI
literature has developed on the relation between rationality and intentions (Bratman,
1987; Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Singh, 1991; van Hees and Roy, 2008). Some
philosophers, e.g. in (Bratman, 1987, 1999; Roy, 2009b), have been concerned with
the role that intention plays in directing rational decision making and guiding future
actions. In addition, many agent researchers have recognized the importance of
intentions in developing useful agent theories, architectures, and languages, such as
Rao and Georgeff with their BDI model (Rao and Georgeff, 1995), which has led
to the commercialization of several high-level agent languages, e.g. in (Burmeister
et al., 2008; Wooldridge, 2000, 2002). However, to the best of our knowledge, there
has been no real attempt to model and implement the role of intentions in decision
making, within a rational choice framework. Intentions of other relevant agents are
always assumed to be given as the input of a decision making process; no system
that integrates a real intention recognition system into a decision making system
has been implemented so far.
In this chapter, we present a coherent Logic Programming (LP) based framework
for decision making—which extends our previous work on Evolution Prospection for
decision making (Pereira and Han, 2009a,b; Han, 2009)—but taking into consid-
eration now the intentions of other agents. Obviously, when being immersed in a
multi-agent system, knowing the intentions of other agents can benefit the recogniz-
ing agents in a number of ways. It enables the recognizing agents to predict what
other agents will do next or might have done before—thereby being able to plan
in advance to take the best advantage from the prediction, or to act so as to take
remedial action. In addition, an important role of recognizing intentions is to enable
coordination of your own actions and in collaborating with others (Bratman, 1999,
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1987; Roy, 2009b; Searle, 1995, 2010; Kaminka et al., 2002). We have also recently
shown the role of intention recognition in promoting improved cooperative behavior
in populations or societies of self-interested agents (Han et al., 2011a,b) (this will
be described in Part II of the thesis).
The Evolution Prospection (EP) system is an implemented LP-based system for
decision making (Pereira and Han, 2009a,b)—which will be described in Section
3.2. An EP agent can prospectively look ahead a number of steps into the future to
choose the best course of evolution that satisfies a goal. This is achieved by designing
and implementing several kinds of prior and post preferences (Pereira et al., 2011a;
Pereira and Lopes, 2009) and several useful environment-triggering constructs for
decision making.
In order to take into account intentions of other agents in decision making pro-
cesses, we employ the intention recognition system described in the previous chapter
as an external module of the EP system. For an easy integration, the Bayesian net-
work inference of the intention recognition system is performed by P-log (Baral et al.,
2009; Han et al., 2008, 2009), a probabilistic logic system 1.
3.2 Evolution Prospection
3.2.1 Preliminary
The implemented EP system 2 has proven useful for decision making (Pereira and
Han, 2009a,b; Pereira and Lopes, 2009; Han et al., 2012d). It is implemented on top
of ABDUAL 3, a preliminary implementation of (Alferes et al., 2004), using XSB
Prolog (XSB, 2009). We next describe the constructs of EP, to the extent we use
them here. A full account can be found in (Pereira and Han, 2009b; Han, 2009).
Language Let L be a first order language. A domain literal in L is a domain atom
A or its default negation not A. The latter is used to express that the atom is false
1The implementation of P-log systems described in (Baral et al., 2009) can be found in:
http://www.cs.ttu.edu/~wezhu/
2The implementation of the Evolution Prospection system can be downloaded at:
http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/~lmp/software/epa.zip




by default (Closed World Assumption). A domain rule in L is a rule of the form:
A← L1, . . . , Lt (t ≥ 0)
where A is a domain atom and L1, . . . , Lt are domain literals. An integrity constraint
in L is a rule with an empty head. A (logic) program P over L is a set of domain
rules and integrity constraints, standing for all their ground instances.
Here we consider solely Normal Logic Programs (NLPs), those whose heads of
rules are positive literals, or empty (Baral, 2003). We focus furthermore on abductive
logic programs (Kakas et al., 1993; Alferes et al., 2004), i.e. NLPs allowing for
abducibles – user-specified positive literals without rules, whose truth-value is not
fixed. Abducibles instances or their default negations may appear in bodies of rules,
like any other literal. They stand for hypotheses, each of which may independently
be assumed true, in positive literal or default negation form, as the case may be, in
order to produce an abductive solution to a query.
Definition 3.2.1 (Abductive Solution) An abductive solution is a consistent
collection of abducible instances or their negations that, when replaced by true
everywhere in P , affords a model of P (for the specific semantics used on P ) which
satisfies the query and the ICs – a so-called abductive model.
Active Goals In each cycle of its evolution the agent has a set of active goals or
desires. We introduce the on observe/1 predicate, which we consider as representing
active goals or desires that, once triggered by the observations figuring in its rule
bodies, cause the agent to attempt their satisfaction by launching all the queries
standing for them, or using preferences to select them. The rule for an active goal
AG is of the form:
on observe(AG)← L1, ..., Lt (t ≥ 0)
where L1,...,Lt are domain literals. During evolution, an active goal may be triggered
by some events, previous commitments or some history-related information. When
starting a cycle, the agent collects its active goals by finding all the on observe(AG)
that hold under the initial theory without performing any abduction, then finds
abductive solutions for their conjunction.
64
3.2. Evolution Prospection
Preferring Abducibles An abducible A can be assumed only if it is a considered
one, i.e. if it is expected in the given situation, and, moreover, there is no expectation
to the contrary
consider(A)← expect(A), not expect not(A), A.
The rules about expectations are domain-specific knowledge contained in the theory
of the program, and effectively constrain the hypotheses available in a situation.
Handling preferences over abductive logic programs has several advantages, and
allows for easier and more concise translation into NLPs than those prescribed by
more general and complex rule preference frameworks. The advantages of so pro-
ceeding stem largely from avoiding combinatory explosions of abductive solutions,
by filtering irrelevant as well as less preferred abducibles (Pereira et al., 2011b,a).
To express preference criteria among abducibles, we envisage an extended lan-
guage L?. A preference atom in L? is of the form a/b , where a and b are abducibles.
It means that if b can be assumed (i.e. considered), then a/b forces a to be assumed
too if it can. A preference rule in L? is of the form:
a / b← L1, ..., Lt (t ≥ 0)
where L1, ..., Lt are domain literals over L?. The semantics of this preference rule
can be found in (Pereira et al., 2011b,a).
A priori preferences are used to produce the most interesting or relevant con-
jectures about possible future states. They are taken into account when generat-
ing possible scenarios (abductive solutions), which will subsequently be preferred
amongst each other a posteriori.
Example 3.2.1 Consider a situation where I need to choose to drink either tea or
coffee (but not both). I prefer coffee over tea when sleepy, and do not drink coffee
when I have high blood pressure. This situation is described by the program with
abducibles coffee and tee:
abds[tea/0 , coffee/0 ].
on observe(drink).




expect not(coffee)← blood high pressure.
← tea, coffee.
coffee / tea ← sleepy .
This program has two abductive solutions, one with tea and the other with coffee.
Adding literal sleepy triggers the only a priori preference in the program, which
defeats the solution where only tea is present (due to the impossibility of simulta-
neously abducing coffee). If later we add blood pressure high, coffee is no longer
expected, and the transformed preference rule no longer defeats the abduction of tea
which then becomes the single abductive solution, despite the presence of sleepy.
A Posteriori Preferences Having computed possible scenarios, represented by
abductive solutions, more favorable scenarios can be preferred a posteriori. Typ-
ically, a posteriori preferences are performed by evaluating consequences of ab-
ducibles in abductive solutions. An a posteriori preference has the form:
Ai  Aj ← holds given(Li, Ai), holds given(Lj , Aj)
where Ai, Aj are abductive solutions and Li, Lj are domain literals. This means
that Ai is preferred to Aj a posteriori if Li and Lj are true as the side-effects of
abductive solutions Ai and Aj , respectively, without any further abduction when
testing for the side-effects. Optionally, in the body of the preference rule there can
be any Prolog predicate used to quantitatively compare the consequences of the two
abductive solutions.
Evolution Result A Posteriori Preference While looking ahead a number of
steps into the future, the agent is confronted with the problem of having several
different possible courses of evolution. It needs to be able to prefer amongst them
to determine the best courses from its present state (and any state in general).
The a posteriori preferences are no longer appropriate, since they can be used to
evaluate only one-step-far consequences of a commitment. The agent should be able
to also declaratively specify preference amongst evolutions through quantitatively
or qualitatively evaluating the consequences or side-effects of each evolution choice.
A posteriori preference is generalized to prefer between two evolutions. An
evolution result a posteriori preference is performed by evaluating consequences of
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following some evolutions. The agent must use the imagination (look-ahead capa-
bility) and present knowledge to evaluate the consequences of evolving according to
a particular course of evolution. An evolution result a posteriori preference rule has
the form:
Ei ≪ Ej ← holds in evol(Li, Ei), holds in evol(Lj , Ej)
where Ei, Ej are possible evolutions and Li, Lj are domain literals. This preference
implies that Ei is preferred to Ej if Li and Lj are true as evolution history side-
effects when evolving according to Ei or Ej , respectively, without making further
abductions when just checking for the side-effects. Optionally, in the body of the
preference rule there can be recourse to any Prolog predicate, used to quantitatively
compare the consequences of the two evolutions for decision making.
3.3 Evolution Prospection with Intention Recognition
There are several ways an EP agent can benefit from the ability to recognize inten-
tions of other agents, both in friendly and hostile settings. Knowing the intention of
an agent is a means to predict what he will do next or might have done before. The
recognizing agent can then plan in advance to take the best advantage of the pre-
diction, or act to take remedial action. Technically, in the EP system, this new kind
of knowledge may impinge on the body of any EP constructs, such as active goals,
expectation and counter-expectation rules, preference rules, integrity constraints,
etc., providing a new kind of trigger.
In order to account for intentions of other agents in decision making with EP,
we provide a built-in predicate, has intention(Ag , I ), stating that an agent Ag has
the intention I. The truth-value of this predicate is evaluated by the intention
recognition system. Whenever this predicate is called in an EP program, the in-
tention recognition system is employed to check if Ag has intention I, i.e. I is
the most likely conceivable intention at that moment. We also provide predicate
has intention(Ag , I ,Pr), stating that agent Ag has intention I with probability Pr.
Hence, one can express, for example, the situation where one needs to be more, or
less, cautious.
One can also generalize to consider the N -best intention recognition approach
(see Chapter 2), that is, to assess whether the intention of the agent is amongst
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the N most likely intentions. It has been shown that by increasing N , the recogni-
tion accuracy is significantly improved (Blaylock and Allen, 2004; Armentano and
Amandi, 2007; Han and Pereira, 2011b).
In the sequel we draw closer attention to some EP constructs, illustrating with
several examples how to take into account intentions of other agents for enhancement
of decision making.
3.3.1 Intentions Triggering Active Goals
Recall that an active goal has the form
on observe(AG)← L1, ..., Lt (t ≥ 0)
where L1,...,Lt are domain literals. At the beginning of each cycle of evolution,
those literals are checked with respect to the current evolving knowledge base and
trigger the active goal if they all hold. For intention triggering active goals, the
domain literals in the body can be in the form of has intention predicates, taking
into account intentions of other agents.
This way, any intention recognition system can be used as the goal producer for
decision making systems, the inputs of which are (active) goals to be solved (see for
instance (Pereira and Han, 2011a,b; Han and Pereira, 2010c)).
It is easily seen that intention triggering active goals are ubiquitous. New goals
often appear when one recognizes some intentions in others. In a friendly setting, one








Or, perhaps we simply want to plan in advance to take advantage of the hypothet-
ical future obtained when the intending agent employs the plan that achieves his
intention
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on_observe(take_advantage(F)) <- agent(P),
has_intention(P,G), future(employ(G),F).
Let us look a little closer at each setting, providing some ideas how they can be
enacted. When helping someone to achieve an intention, what we need to do is to
help him/her with executing a plan achieving that intention successfully, i.e., all the
actions involved in that plan can be executed. This usually occurs in multi-agent
collaborative tasks (see for example (Kaminka et al., 2002)), wherein the agents need
to be able to recognize their partners’ intention to secure an efficient collaboration.
In contrast, in order to prevent an intention from being achieved, we need
to guarantee that all possible plans achieving that intention cannot be executed
successfully. To that effect, at least one action in each plan must be prevented if
the plan is conformant (i.e., a sequence of actions (Tu et al., 2011)). If the plan is
conditional (see for example (Pereira and Han, 2009c; Tu et al., 2007)), each branch
is considered a conformant plan and must be prevented.
We shall see several examples in the next sections.
3.3.2 Intention Triggering Preferences
Having recognized an intention of another agent, the recognizing agent may either
favor or disfavor an abducible (a priori preferences), an abductive solution (a pos-
teriori preferences) or an evolution (evolution result a posteriori preferences) with
respect to another, respectively, depending on the setting they are in. If they are in
a friendly setting, the one which provides more support to achieve the intention is
more favored; in contrast, in a hostile setting, the one providing more support is dis-
favored. The recognizing agent may also favor the one which takes better advantage
of the recognized intention.
To illustrate the usage of intention triggering a priori preferences, we revise the
Example 3.2.1.
Example 3.3.1 (Tea-Coffee with Intention Recognition) Being thirsty, I
consider making tea or coffee. I realize that my roommate, John, also wants to have
a drink. To be friendly, I want to take into account his intention when making my
choice. This scenario is represented with the following EP program.
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1. abds([coffee/0, tea/0]).
2. expect(coffee). expect(tea).
3. on_observed(drink) <- thirsty.
drink <- tea. drink <- coffee.
<- tea, coffee.
4. expect_not(coffee) <- blood_high_pressure.
5. tea <| coffee <- has_intention(john,tea).
coffee <| tea <- has_intention(john,coffee).
Figure 3.1: Tea-Coffee Considering Intentions: A Priori Preferences
It is enacted by the preference rules in line 5. The first rule says that tea is preferable,
a priori, to coffee if John intends to drink tea; and vice versa, the second rule says
that if John intends to drink coffee, coffee is preferable. Note that the recognition
of what John intends is performed by the intention recognition system—which is
triggered when a reserved predicate has intention/2 is called.
This scenario also can be encoded using intention triggering a posteriori prefer-
ences. As a good friend of John, I prefer an abductive solution with a side-effect of
John being happy to the one with a side-effect of John being unhappy. This can be
coded as in Figure 3.2.
unhappy <- coffee, has_intention(john,tea).
happy <- coffee, has_intention(john,coffee).
unhappy <- tea, has_intention(john,coffee).
unhappy <- tea, has_intention(john,tea).
Ai << Aj <- holds_given(happy,Ai),
holds_given(unhappy,Aj).
Figure 3.2: Tea-Coffee Considering Intentions: A Posteriori Preferences
Despite its simplicity, the example demonstrates how to solve a class of collab-
orative situations, where one would like to take into account the intentions and the
need of others when deriving relevant hypothetical solutions of our current goals.
Next, to illustrate other kinds of preferences, we consider the following revised
extended version of the saving city example, presented in (Pereira and Han, 2009b).
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Example 3.3.2 (Saving cities by means of intention recognition) During
war time, agent David, a general, needs to decide to save a city from his enemy’s
attack or leave it to keep the military resource, which might be important for some
future purpose. David has recognized that a third party is intending to make an
attack on the enemy on the next day. David will have a good chance to defeat the
enemy if he has enough military resource to coordinate with the third party. The
described scenario is coded with the following EP program.
1. abds([save/0, leave/0]).
2. expect(save). expect(leave).
3. on_observe(choose) <- has_intention(enemy,attack_my_city).
choose <- save. choose <- leave.
4. save_men(5000) <- save. save_men(0) <- leave.
lose_resource <- save. save_resource <- leave.
5. Ai << Aj <- holds_given(save_men(Ni), Ai),
holds_given(save_men(Nj), Aj), Ni > Nj.
6. on_observe(decide) <- decide_strategy.
decide <- stay_still.
decide <- counter_attack.
7. good_opportunity <- has_intention(third_party,attack).
expect(counter_attack) <- good_opportunity, save_resource.
expect(stay_still).
8. pr(win,0.9) <- counter_attack.
pr(win,0.01) <- stay_still.
9. Ei <<< Ej <- holds_in_evol(pr(win,Pi), Ei),
holds_in_evol(pr(win,Pj), Ej), Pi > Pj.
Figure 3.3: Example: Saving or Leaving
In the first cycle of evolution, there are two abducibles, save and leave, declared
in line 1, to solve the active goal choose. The active goal is triggered when David
recognizes the intention of the enemy to attack his city (line 3).
Similar to the original version in (Pereira and Han, 2009b), in the case of being a
bad general who just sees the situation at hand, David would choose to save the city
since it would save more people (5000 vs. 0, line 4), i.e. the a posteriori preference
in line 5 is taken into account immediately, to rule out the case of leaving the city
since it would save less people. Then, next day, he would not be able to attack since
71
3.3. Evolution Prospection with Intention Recognition
Figure 3.4: Fox’s Intentions IRBN
the military resource is not saved (line 7), and that leads to the outcome with very
small probability of winning the whole war (line 8).
But, fortunately, being able to look ahead plus to do intention recognition, David
can see that on the next day, if he has enough military resources, he has a good
opportunity to make a counter-attack on his enemy (line 7), by coordinating with
a third party who exhibits the intention to attack the enemy on that day as well;
and a successful counter-attack would lead to a very much higher probability of
winning the conflict as a whole (line 8). The evolution result a posteriori preference
is employed in line 9 to prefer the evolution with higher probability of winning the
whole conflict.
In this example we can see, in line 7, how a detected intention of another agent
can be used to enhance the decision making process. It is achieved by providing an
(indirect) trigger for an abducible expectation which affects the evolution result a
posteriori preference in line 9.
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3.3.3 Hostile setting
In this hostile setting, having confirmed the intention (and possibly also the plans
achieving that intention being carried out by the intending agent), the recognizing
agent might act to prevent the intention from being achieved, that is, prevent at
least one action of each intention achieving plan from being successfully executed;
and, in case of impossibility to doing so, act to minimize losses as much as possible.
Example 3.3.3 (Fox-Crow) Consider Fox-Crow story, adapted from Aesop’s fa-
ble (Aesop). There is a crow, holding a cheese. A fox, being hungry, approaches the
crow and praises her, hoping that the crow will sing and the cheese will fall down
near him. Unfortunately for the fox, the crow is very intelligent, having the ability
of intention recognition.
The Bayesian network for recognizing Fox’s intentions is depicted in the Figure 3.4.
Fox’s conceivable intentions (that Crow comes up with) are: Food - i(F ), Please -
i(P ) and Territory - i(T ). The facts that might give rise to those intentions are how
friendly the Fox is (Friendly fox ) and how hungry he is (Hungry fox ). Currently,
there is only one observed actions: Fox praised Crow (Praised). More details and
examples can be found in (Pereira and Han, 2011b).
Example 3.3.4 (Fox-Crow, cont’d) Suppose in Example 3.3.3, the final con-
firmed Fox’s intention is that of getting food (details can be found in (Pereira and
Han, 2009c)). That is, the predicate has intention(fox,food) holds. Having recog-
nized Fox’s intention, what should Crow do to prevent Fox from achieving it? The
following EP program helps Crow with that.
There are two possible ways so as not to lose the Food to Fox, either simply decline
to sing (but thereby missing the pleasure of singing) or hide or eat the cheese before
singing.
Line 1 is the declaration of program abducibles (the last two abducibles are for
the usage in the second phase, starting from line 9). All of them are always expected
(line 2). The counter-expectation rule in line 4 states that an animal is not expected
to eat if he is full. The integrity constraints in line 5 say that Crow cannot decline
to sing and sing, hide and eat the cheese, at the same time. The a priori preference
in line 6 states that eating the cheese is always preferred to hiding it (since it may
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1. abds([decline/0, sing/0, hide/2, eat/2, has_food/0, find_new_food/0]).
2. expect(decline). expect(sing).
expect(hide(_,_)). expect(eat(_,_)).
3. on_observe(not_losing_cheese) <- has_intention(fox, food).
not_losing_cheese <- decline.
not_losing_cheese <- hide(crow,cheese), sing.
not_losing_cheese <- eat(crow,cheese), sing.
4. expect_not(eat(A,cheese)) <- animal(A), full(A).
animal(crow).
5. <- decline, sing.
<- hide(crow,cheese), eat(crow,cheese).
6. eat(crow,cheese) <| hide(crow,cheese).
7. no_pleasure <- decline. has_pleasure <- sing.
8. Ai << Aj <- holds_given(has_pleasure,Ai),
holds_given(no_pleasure,Aj).
9. on_observe(feed_children) <- hungry(children).
feed_children <- has_food. feed_children <- find_new_food.
<- has_food, find_new_food.
10.expect(has_food) <- decline, not eat(crow,cheese).
expect(has_food) <- hide(crow,cheese), not stolen(cheese).
expect(find_new_food).
11.Ei <<< Ej <- hungry(children), holds_in_evol(has_food,Ei),
holds_in_evol(find_new_food,Ej).
12.Ei <<< Ej <- holds_in_evol(has_pleasure,Ei),
holds_in_evol(no_pleasure,Ej).
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be stolen), of course, just in case eating is a possible solution (this is assured in our
semantics of a priori preferences (Pereira and Han, 2009b)).
Suppose Crow is not full. Then, the counter expectation in line 4 does not hold.
Thus, there are two possible abductive solutions: [decline] and [eat(crow,cheese),
sing] (since the a priori preference prevents the choice containing hiding).
Next, the a posteriori preference in line 8 is taken into account and rules out the
abductive solution containing decline since it leads to having no pleasure which is
less preferred to has pleasure—the consequence of the second solution that contains
sing (line 7). In short, the final solution is that Crow eats the cheese then sings,
without losing the cheese to Fox and having the pleasure of singing.
Now, let us consider a smarter Crow who is capable of looking further ahead into
the future in order to solve longer term goals. Suppose that Crow knows that her chil-
dren will be hungry later on, in the next stage of evolution (line 9); eating the cheese
right now would make her have to find new food for the hungry children. Finding new
food may take long, and is always less favourable than having food ready to feed them
right away (evolution result a posteriori preference in line 11). Crow can see three
possible evolutions: [[decline], [has food ]]; [[hide(crow , cheese), sing ], [has food ]] and
[[eat(crow , cheese), sing ], [find new food ]]. Note that in looking ahead at least two
steps into the future, local preferences are taken into account only after all evolution-
level ones have been applied (a full discussion can be found in (Pereira and Han,
2009b)).
Now the two evolution result a posterirori preferences in lines 11-12 are taken
into account. The first one rules out the evolution including finding new food since
it is less preferred than the other two which includes has food . The second one rules
out the one including decline. In short, Crow will hide the food to keep for her
hungry children, and still take pleasure from singing.
3.4 Ambient Intelligence in the Home Environment and
Elder Care
Ambient Intelligence (AmI) is the vision of a future in which environments support
people inhabiting in them. The envisaged environment is unobtrusive, intercon-
nected, adaptable, dynamic, embedded and intelligent. It should be sensitive to
the needs of inhabitants, and capable of anticipating their needs and behaviour. It
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should be aware of their personal requirements and preferences, and interact with
people in a user-friendly way (Sadri, 2011a).
From this view of AmI, we can see a number of issues where individual intention
recognition techniques can step in, providing help and enabling improvement. For
example, in order to provide appropriate support, the environment should be able
to proactively recognize the inhabitants’ intention—to see whether they need help
to accomplish what they intend to do—or to warn them (or their carers) in case
they intend something dangerous. Undoubtedly, an ability to recognize intentions
of assisted people as well as other relevant concerns such as intruders, would enable
to deal with a combination of several issues, e.g. pro-activeness (either agonistic
or antagonistic), security, emergency, etc. in a more integrated and timely manner
(Roy et al., 2007; Han and Pereira, 2010c).
One of the key issues of Ambient Intelligence (AmI), which has not been well
studied yet, and reported as an ongoing challenge (Cook et al., 2009), is that AmI
systems need to be aware of users’ preferences, intentions and needs. Undoubtedly,
respecting users’ preferences and needs in decision making processes would increase
their degree of acceptance with respect to the systems, making them more friendly
and thoughtful. Furthermore, an ability to recognize intentions of assisted people
as well as other relevant concerns such as intruders, would enable to deal with a
combination of several issues—including pro-activeness, security, and emergency—
in a more integrated and timely manner. We shall discuss these issues in the sequel.
3.4.1 Proactive Support
A important feature of AmI, particularly desirable in the Elder Care domain, is
that the assisting system should take initiative to help the people it assists. To
this end, the system must be capable of recognizing their intentions on the basis
of their observable actions, then provide suggestions or help achieve the recognized
intentions (Pereira and Han, 2011a). A suggestion can be, for example, what are the
appropriate kinds of drink for the elder, considering the current time, temperature,
or even future scheduled events such as going to have a medical test on the next
day, upon having recognized that he has an intention to drink something. Or, a
suggestion can simply be telling the elder where he put his book yesterday, having
recognized that he might be looking for it. This feature is especially desirable and
important when the assisted people are elderly or individuals with disabilities or
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suffering from mental difficulties (Roy et al., 2007). The need for technology in this
area is obvious looking at the fact that in the last twenty years there has been a
significant increase of the average age of the population in most western countries
and the number of elderly people has been and will be constantly growing (Cook
et al., 2009; Haigh et al., 2004; Cesta and Pecora, 2004; Geib and Goldman, 2001;
Geib, 2002; Roy et al., 2007; Sadri, 2011a).
The EP system can be engaged to provide appropriate suggestions for the elders,
taking into account the external environment, elders’ preferences and already sched-
uled future events. Expectation rules and a priori preferences cater for the physical
state (health reports) information of the elders to guarantee that only contextually
safe healthy choices are generated; then, information such as the elders’ pleasure,
interests, etc. are then considered by a posteriori preferences and the like.
In the Elder Care domain, assisting systems should be able to provide contex-
tually appropriate suggestions for the elders based on their recognized intentions.
The assisting system is supposed to be better aware of the environment, the elders’
physical states, mental states as well as their scheduled events, so that it can provide
good and safe suggestions, or simply warnings. We continue with the Elder Care
example from a previous chapter for illustration.
Example 3.4.1 (Elder Care, cont’d) Suppose in the Elder care examples in
Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.2), the final confirmed intention is that of looking for a
drink. The possibilities are: natural pure water, tea, coffee and juice. The EP
system now is employed to help the elder with choosing an appropriate drink. The
scenario is coded with the EP program in Figure 3.5 below.
The elder’s physical states are utilized in a priori preferences and expectation
rules to guarantee that just choices which are contextually safe for the elder are
generated. Only after that other aspects, for example the elder’s pleasure with respect
to each kind of drink, are taken into account, with the a posteriori preferences.
The information regarding the environment (current time, current temperature) and
the physical states of the elder is coded in the Prolog part of the program (lines 9-
11). The assisting system is supposed to be aware of this information in order to
provide good suggestions.
Line 1 is the declaration of program abducibles: water, coffee, tea, and juice. All
of them are always expected (line 2). Line 3 picks up a recognized intention verified
by the intention recognition module. The counter-expectation rules in line 4 state
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1. abds([water/0, coffee/0, tea/0, juice/0,
precise_result/0, imprecise_result/0]).
2. expect(coffee). expect(tea). expect(water). expect(juice).
3. on_observe(drink) <- has_intention(elder,drink).
drink <- tea. drink <- coffee. drink <- water. drink <- juice.




5. <- tea, coffee. <- coffee, juice.
<- tea, juice. <- tea, water.
6. coffee <| tea <- prolog(morning_time).
coffee <| water <- prolog(morning_time).
coffee <| juice <- prolog(morning_time).
7. juice <| coffee <- prolog(hot). juice <| tea <- prolog(hot).
juice <| water <- prolog(hot). water <| coffee <- prolog(hot).
water <| tea <- prolog(hot).
8. tea <| coffee <- prolog(cold). tea <| juice <- prolog(cold).
tea <| water <- prolog(cold).
9. pleasure_level(3) <- coffee. pleasure_level(2) <- tea.
pleasure_level(1) <- juice. pleasure_level(0) <- water.
10.sugar_level(1) <- coffee. sugar_level(1) <- tea.
sugar_level(5) <- juice. sugar_level(0) <- water.
11.caffein_level(5) <- coffee. caffein_level(0) <- tea.
caffein_level(0) <- juice. caffein_level(0) <- water.
12.Ai << Aj <- holds_given(pleasure_level(V1), Ai),




14.expect(precise_result) <- no_high_sugar, no_high_caffein.
expect(imprecise_result).
no_high_sugar <- sugar_level(L), prolog(L < 2).
no_high_caffein <- caffein_level(L), prolog(L < 2).





late :- time(T), (T > 23; T < 5).
morning_time :- time(T), T > 7, T < 10.
hot :- temperature(TM), TM > 32.




Figure 3.5: Elder Care: Suggestion for a Drink
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that coffee is not expected if the elder has high blood pressure, experiences difficulty
to sleep or it is late; and juice is not expected if it is late. Note that the reserved
predicate prolog/1 is used to allow embedding Prolog code in an EP program. More
details can be found in (Pereira and Han, 2009a,b). The integrity constraints in line
5 say that is is not allowed to have at the same time the following pairs of drink:
tea and coffee, tea and juice, coffee and juice, and tea and water. However, it is the
case that the elder can have coffee or juice together with water at the same time.
The a priori preferences in line 6 say in the morning coffee is preferred to tea,
water and juice. And if it is hot, juice is preferred to all other kinds of drink and
water is preferred to tea and coffee (line 7). In addition, the a priori preferences
in line 8 state if the weather is cold, tea is the most favorable, i.e. preferred to all
other kinds of drink.
Now let us look at the suggestions provided by the Elder Care assisting system
modelled by this EP program, considering some cases:
1. time(24) (late); temperature(16) (not hot, not cold); no high blood pressure;
no sleep difficulty: there are two a priori abductive solutions: [tea], [water].
Final solution: [tea] (since it has greater level of pleasure than water, which is
ruled out by the a posteriori preference in line 12).
2. time(8) (morning time); temperature(16) (not hot, not cold); no high blood
pressure; no sleep difficulty: there are two abductive solutions: [coffee],
[coffee, water]. Final: [coffee], [coffee, water].
3. time(18) (not late, not morning time); temperature(16) (not cold, not hot);
no high blood pressure; no sleep difficulty: there are six abductive solutions:
[coffee], [coffee,water], [juice], [juice,water], [tea], and [water]. Final: [coffee],
[coffee,water].
4. time(18) (not late, not morning time); temperature(16) (not cold, not hot);
high blood pressure; no sleep difficulty: there are four abductive solutions:
[juice], [juice,water], [tea], and [water]. Final: [tea].
5. time(18) (not late, not morning time); temperature(16) (not cold, not hot);
no high blood pressure; sleep difficulty: there are four abductive solutions:
[juice], [juice,water], [tea], and [water]. Final: [tea].
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6. time(18) (not late, not morning time); temperature(8) (cold); no high blood
pressure; no sleep difficulty: there is only one abductive solution: [tea].
7. time(18) (not late, not morning time); temperature(35) (hot); no high blood
pressure; no sleep difficulty: there are two abductive solutions: [juice],
[juice,water]. Final: [juice], [juice,water].
If the evolution result a posteriori preference in line 15 is taken into account and
the elder is scheduled to go to the hospital for health check in the second day: the
first and the second cases do not change. In the third case: the suggestions are
[tea] and [water] since the ones that have coffee or juice would cause high caffein
and sugar levels, respectively, which can make the checking result (health) imprecise
(lines 13-15). Similarly for all the other cases.
Note future events can be asserted as Prolog code using the reserved predicate
scheduled events/2. For more details of its use see (Pereira and Han, 2009a,b).
As one can gather, the suggestions provided by this assisting system are quite
contextually appropriate. We might elaborate current factors (time, temperature,
physical states) and even consider more factors to provide more appropriate sugges-
tions if the situation ever gets more complicated.
3.4.2 Security and Emergency
Security in AmI. Security is one of the key issues for AmI success (Friedewald
et al., 2007), and particularly important in home environments (Friedewald et al.,
2005). It comprises two important categories : security in terms of Burglary Alarm
systems and security in terms of health and well-being of the residents (prevention,
monitoring) (Friedewald et al., 2005).
So far Burglary Alarm technology has been mainly based on sensing and rec-
ognizing the very last action of an intrusion plan, such as “breaking the door”
(Friedewald et al., 2005; Wikipedia). However, it may be too late to provide an ap-
propriate protection. Burglary Alarm systems need to be able to guess in advance
the possibility of an intrusion on the basis of the very first observable actions of po-
tential intruders. For example, it would be useful to find out how likely a stranger
constantly staring at your house has an intrusion intention, taking into account the
particular situation, e.g. if he has weapon or if it is night time. This information
can be sent to the carer (or the elders if there is no carer available) to get prepared
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(e.g. turn on the light or sounders to scare off burglars or call relatives, police, etc.).
Our incremental intention recognition system (Chapter 2) appears to be appropriate
to deal with this scenario. Given any currently observed actions, one can compute
the probability of the on-going conceivable intentions, and if the one of the intrusion
intention is large enough or is among (some of) the most likely intentions, the carer
should be informed of a potential intrusion. To be more certain about the possibility
of an intrusion, more observations may need to be made, but at least now the carer
is ready to handle any potentially negative forthcoming situations. Waiting until
being sure to get ready can be too late to take appropriate actions. The EP system
can thus be used to provide suggestions on the appropriate course of actions to take.
For illustration let us consider the following example.
Example 3.4.2 (Solving Intrusion) Consider a situation where the intention
recognition system recognized an intention of intrusion at night. The system must
either warn the elders who are sleeping, automatically call the nearest police, or
activate the embedded burglary alarm. If the elders are sleeping and ill, they do not
expect to be warned, but prefer other solutions. Due to potential disturbance, the
elders prefer simply activating the burglary system to calling the police as long as
no weapon is detected and there is a single intruder.
The situation is described by the program with three abducibles: call police,
warn persons, activate alarm, and can be coded in EP as follows
1. on observe(solve intrusion)← at night , has intention(stranger, intrusion).
2. solve intrusion← call police.
solve intrusion← warn persons.
solve intrusion← activate alarm.
3. expect(call police). expect(warn persons). expect(activate alarm).
4. expect not(warn persons)← ill, sleeping.
5. activate alarms / call police← no weapon detected, individual.
6. call police / activate alarms← weapon detected.
Suppose it is night-time and an intrusion intention is recognized, then the active
goal solve intrusion (line 1) is triggered, and the EP system starts reasoning to
find the most appropriate solutions.
This program has three abductive solutions: [call police], [warn persons], and
[activate alarm] since all the abducibles are expected and there is no expectation to
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their contrary. Note that for each abducible a consider -rule is added automatically
(Pereira and Han, 2009b). Suppose it detects that the elders are sleeping and known
to be ill, i.e. literals ill and sleeping are factual. In this case, the elders do not expect
to be warned (line 4), thus ruling out the second solution [warn persons]. And if
no weapon is detected and there is only a single intruder, the a priori preference in
line 5 is triggered, which defeats the solution where only call police is present (due
to the impossibility of simultaneously abducing activate alarm). Hence, the only
solution is to activate the burglary alarm. However, if weapons were detected, the
preference in line 6 is triggered and defeats the [activate alarm] solution. The only
solution left is to call the police (call police).
Regarding Burglary Alarm systems, in the following example we consider a sim-
ple scenario of recognizing an elder’s intentions.
Example 3.4.3 (Elder Intentions) An elder stays alone in his apartment. One
day the Burglary Alarm is ringing, and the assisting system observes that the elder
is looking for something. In order to assist him, the system needs to figure out what
he intends to find. Possible things are: Alarm button (AlarmB); Contact Device
(ContDev); Defensible Weapons (Weapon); and light switch (Switch). The IRBN
representing this scenario is in Figure 3.6.
The nodes representing the conceivable intentions are: i(AlarmB), i(ContDev),
i(Weapon), and i(Switch). The Bayesian network for intention recognition (IRBN)
has three top nodes in the pre-intentional level representing the causes/reasons of
the intentions, which are Alarm On, Defensible and Light on. The first and last
nodes are evidence nodes, i.e. their values are observable. There is only one observ-
able action, represented by the node Looking in the last layer. It is a direct child
of the intention nodes. The conditional probability tables (CPD) of each nodes in
the BN are given. For example, the table of the node Defensible says that the elder
is able to defense himself (with weapons) with probability of 0.3 and not able to do
so with probability 0.7. The table in the top-right corner provides the probability
of the elder looking around for something conditional on the intentions. Based on
this IRBN one can now compute the conditional probability of each intention given
the observed action.
Another security issue concerns health and well-being of the residents. AmI
systems need to be able to prevent hazardous situations, which usually come from
dangerous ideas or intentions (e.g. take a bath when drunk, drink alcohol while
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Figure 3.6: Bayesian network for recognizing the elder’s intentions
not permitted, or even commit suicide) of the assisted persons, especially those
with mental impairments (Roy et al., 2007). To this end, guessing their intentions
from the very first relevant actions is indispensable to take timely actions. In our
incremental intention recognition method, an IRBN will be built to compute how
likely there is a dangerous intention, with respect to any currently observed actions,
and carers would be informed in case it is likely enough, in order to get prepared in
time.
Emergency in AmI. Handling emergency situations is another important issue
in AmI. There is a wide range of emergency situations, e.g. in security, when rec-
ognizing intrusion intention of a stranger or dangerous intentions of the assisted
person. They also can occur when detecting fire, unconsciousness or unusualness in
regular activities (e.g. sleep for too long), etc. Emergency handling in the EP system
can be done by having an active goal rule for whichever emergency situation. For
solving the goal, a list of possible actions, all represented by abducible enablers, are
available to form solutions. Then, users’ preferences are encoded using all kinds of
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preference of EP: a priori ones for preferring amongst available actions, a posteriori
ones for comparing solutions taking into account their consequences and utility, and
a posteriori evolution result ones for comparing more-than-one-step consequences.
Moreover, the expectation and counter expectations rules are used to encode pros
and cons of the users towards each available action, or towards any abducible in
general.
3.4.3 Discussion of Other AmI Issues
We have shown how our intention-based decision making framework can enable
the provision of proactive support for assisted people, and the tackling of the AmI
security and emergency issues. We now briefly sketch how it can be utilized to
address yet other important issues in AmI.
First of all, it is known that intention recognition plays a central role in human
communication (Pinker et al., 2008; Heinze, 2003; Tomasello, 2008). In addition,
an important aspect of intentions is future-directedness, i.e. if we intend something
now, it means we intend to execute a course of actions to achieve it in the future
(Bratman, 1987; Singh, 1991; Roy, 2009b). Most actions may be executed only at a
far distance in time. Thus, we usually need to guess others’ intentions from the very
first clues, such as their actions or spoken sentences, in order to secure a smooth
conversation or collaboration. Perhaps we guess a wrong intention, but we need
to be able to react in a timely manner; and that is also part of the conversation.
We can simply attempt to confirm by asking, e.g. “is this (...) what you mean?”.
Our intention-based decision making framework can be used to design better and
more friendly human-computer interaction devices that can react to human behavior
and speech, communicate with them to confirm their intentions so as to provide
appropriate help when necessary, after having guessed their likely intentions using
an intention recognition system.
Another issue is that, in order to be highly accepted by the users, an assistive
system should be able to proffer explanations for the suggestions it provides. In
EP, that can be easily done by keeping all the preferences, integrity constraints,
expectation and counter expectation rules that were used both to consider and to
rule out abductive solutions.
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3.5 Conclusions and Future Work
We have summarized our previous work on Evolution Prospection (EP) (Han, 2009;
Pereira and Han, 2009b) and shown its coherent combination with the intention
recognition system described in Chapter 2, for intention-based decision making.
The EP system has proven useful for decision making (Han, 2009; Pereira and Han,
2009b; Han et al., 2012d; Pereira and Han, 2011a), and has now been empowered to
take into account the intentions of other agents—an important aspect that has not
been well explored so far. The fact that both systems are Logic Programming based
enabled their easy integration. We have described and exemplified several ways in
which an EP agent can benefit from having an ability to recognize intentions of other
agents.
Nonetheless, the approach we used here is not restricted to Logic Programming
based systems. In general, any intention recognition system, and indeed, any deci-
sion making system, can be considered. The ideas of integration described here can
be adopted in other decision making systems to account for intentions.
We have addressed the need of intention-based decision making in different ap-
plication domains, including Ambient Intelligence (Han and Pereira, 2010c; Sadri,
2011a) and Elder Care (Pereira and Han, 2011a; Han and Pereira, 2010b), where
decision making techniques as well as intention recognition abilities are of increas-
ing importance (Sadri, 2011b; Geib, 2002; Sadri, 2011a; Han and Pereira, 2010c).
However, the scalability of our system remains to be studied.
In future work, we consider to apply our combined system to other application
domains, including story understanding (Charniak and Goldman, 1990), human-
computer and interface-agents systems (Lesh, 1998; Hong, 2001; Armentano and
Amandi, 2007), traffic monitoring (Pynadath and Wellman, 1995), assistive living
(Geib, 2002; Haigh et al., 2004; Tahboub, 2006; Roy et al., 2007; Pereira and Han,
2011a), military settings (Mao and Gratch, 2004; Heinze, 2003), and moral reasoning
(Han et al., 2012d), where intention recognition has proven useful and of great
practicality. Another area of future development is to extend our system to enable
collective or group intention recognition (Sukthankar and Sycara, 2008; Sukthankar,
2007) in a decision making process. In this regard, we have made some initial









The main concern of Part I was to develop efficient intention recognition
methods, and application of intention recognition for different AI prob-
lems. In Part II, based on these methods, we study the role of intention
recognition in the evolution of cooperation. In addition, we study how a
simple commitment strategy, in combination with intention recognition,
can lead to improvement in the evolution of cooperation.
(. . . ) because intention-reading is so critical for human social functioning
and the development of key human abilities, such as language and culture,
it is reasonable to assume that it has been shaped by natural selection.
Woodward et al. (2009).
(. . . ) The capacity for using commitment strategies effectively is so im-
portant that natural selection may have shaped specialized signaling ca-
pacities to make this possible.
Nesse (2001b).
The problem of intention recognition has been paid much attention in AI, Philosophy
and Psychology for several decades (Kautz and Allen, 1986a; Charniak and Gold-
man, 1993; Bratman, 1987, 1999; Bui, 2003; Heinze, 2003; Armentano and Amandi,
2007; Geib and Goldman, 2009). However, it has mostly been restricted to small
scale interactive settings, focusing on how to efficiently and appropriately recognize
intentions of an individual or a group of agents. There is a significant shortage of
modelling research with respect to large scale social contexts, namely to address the
evolutionary roles and aspects of intention recognition.
Intention recognition can be found abundantly in many kinds of interactions
and communications, not only in Human but also many other species (Tomasello,
1999; Woodward et al., 2009; Meltzoff, 2007; Tomasello, 2008; Cheney and Seyfarth,
2007). The knowledge about intention of others in a situation could enable to plan
in advance, either to secure a successful cooperation or to deal with potential hostile
behaviours (van Hees and Roy, 2008; Roy, 2009a; Pereira and Han, 2011b; Han and
Pereira, 2011c). Given the advantage of knowing the intentions of others and the
abundance of intention recognition among different species, intention recognition
undoubtedly should be taken into account when studying or modeling collective
behavior. This issue becomes even more relevant when the achievement of a goal by
an individual does not depend uniquely on its own actions, but also on the decisions
and actions of others, namely when individuals cooperate or have to coordinate
their actions to achieve a task—especially when the possibility of communication is
limited (Heinze, 2003; Kraus, 1997; Pinker et al., 2008; Van Segbroeck et al., 2010;
Tomasello, 2008). Additionally, in more realistic settings where deceit may offer
additional profits, individuals often attempt to hide their real intentions and make
others believe in faked ones (Robson, 1990; Tomasello, 2008; Skyrms, 2010; Pereira
and Han, 2011b; Santos et al., 2011; Trivers, 2011). Hence, undoubtedly, a capability
of intention recognition would confer on its holder great evolutionary benefits.
In this part of the thesis we study the role of intention recognition for one of
the most challenging but intriguing issues, that traverses areas as diverse as Biology,
Economics, Artificial Intelligence, Political Science, and Psychology: the problem
of evolution of cooperation (Hardin, 1968; Axelrod, 1984; West et al., 2007; Nowak,
2006b,a; Sigmund, 2010). In its simplest form, a cooperative act is metaphorically
described as the act of paying a cost to convey a benefit to someone else. If two
players simultaneously decide to cooperate or not, the best possible response will be
to try to receive the benefit without paying the cost. In an evolutionary setting, we
may also wonder why would natural selection equip selfish individuals with altruis-
tic tendencies while it incites competition between individuals and thus apparently
rewards only selfish behavior? Several mechanisms responsible for promoting co-
operative behavior have been recently identified (Sigmund, 2010; Nowak, 2006b).
From kin and group ties (Hamilton, 1964; West et al., 2002; Traulsen and Nowak,
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2006), to distinct forms of reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992; Imhof et al.,
2005; Trivers, 1971; Pacheco et al., 2006; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005), networked
populations (Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Santos et al., 2006a; Szabó and Fáth, 2007;
Santos et al., 2008; Lindgren and Nordahl, 1994), and different forms of punishment
(Hauert et al., 2007; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Dreber et al., 2008; Ohtsuki et al.,
2009; Rand and Nowak, 2011), several aspects have been shown to play an impor-
tant role in the emergence of cooperation. Differently from these, here we shall
describe how cooperation may emerge from the interplay between population dy-
namics and individuals’ cognitive abilities, namely the basic and important ability
to perform intention recognition.
Additionally, as a natural extension and supplement to intention recognition, an
ability to arrange commitment might enable to clarify intentions of others when it
is difficult to perform intention recognition with sufficient precision and/or efficacy
(see thesis introduction for a brief discussion, Section 1.1.3). Hence, in this thesis we
shall study how a simple form of commitment provides a pathway to the evolution
of cooperative behavior, and furthermore, how it supplements intention recognition,
thereby leading to a better combined strategy.
Our study is carried out within the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory
(EGT) (Maynard-Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 2006a; Sig-
mund et al., 2010). Here, individuals’ success or fitness is expressed in terms of the
outcome of a two-player game, which, in turn, is used by the individuals to copy
others whenever these appear to be more successful. Comparative accumulated pay-
offs are used to update the population: more successful individuals produce more
offspring, which inherit their strategy. Equivalently, the same process can be seen as
if, instead of inheriting strategies, new individuals adapt by copying strategies from
acquaintances that did better. Overall, this type of dynamics can be conveniently
described as an ordinary differential equation – the replicator equation (Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998)–, which nicely describes any simple evolutionary process. This
framework is however more general one could initially foresee, as the ensuing dynam-
ics may be also shown to be equivalent to finite-action learning automata (Börgers
et al., 1997; Van Segbroeck et al., 2010), in which agents revise their strategies by
means of incipient reinforcement learning techniques (Narendra and Thathachar,
1989).
We start this second part of the thesis by describing the EGT methods based on
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which the models in the next four chapters will be built and analyzed.
Interaction between Individuals Interactions are modeled as symmetric two-
player games defined by the payoff matrix
( C D
C R,R S, T
D T, S P, P
)
.
A player who chooses to cooperate (C) with someone who defects (D) receives the
sucker’s payoff S, whereas the defecting player gains the temptation to defect, T .
Mutual cooperation (resp., defection) yields the reward R (resp., punishment P )
for both players. Depending on the ordering of these four payoffs, different social
dilemmas arise (Macy and Flache, 2002; Santos et al., 2006a; Sigmund, 2010). In
this thesis we are only concerned with the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), which is char-
acterized by the ordering T > R > P > S.
In a single round of the PD, it is always best to defect, but cooperation may
be rewarded if the game is iterated. In the iterated PD, it is also required that
mutual cooperation is preferred over an equal probability of unilateral cooperation
and defection (2R > T+S); otherwise alternating between cooperation and defection
would lead to a higher payoff than mutual cooperation. For convenience and a clear
representation of results, we sometimes use the Donation game (Sigmund, 2010)—
a famous special case of the PD—where T = b, R = b − c, P = 0, S = −c,
satisfying that b > c > 0, where b and c stand respectively for “benefit” and “cost”
(of cooperation).
In a population of N individuals interacting via an iterated PD, whenever two
specific strategies are present in the population, say A and B, the fitness of an
individual with a strategy A (resp., B) in a population with k As and (N − k) Bs












[k πB,A(j) + (N − k − 1)πB,B(j)],
(3.1)
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where πX,Y (j), with X,Y ∈ {A,B}, stands for the payoff obtained from a round
j as a result of their mutual behavior of an X strategist in an interaction with a
Y strategist (as specified by the payoff matrix above), and r is the total number of
rounds of the iterated PD. As usual, instead of considering a fixed number of rounds,
upon completion of each round, there is a probability w that yet another round of
the game will take place, resulting in an average number of < r >= (1−w)−1 rounds
per interaction (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010).
The iterated PD will be used as the interacting environment in Chapters 4 and
5, while the non-iterated or one-shot PD will be used in Chapters 6 and 7. For
the one-shot PD, we can simply substitute r = 1 in Eq. (3.1). In all analyses and
simulations, values of Π will be derived analytically, and when this is not possible,
we shall use numerical simulations.
We now recall some of the most important strategies of the iterated PD, needed for
the studies in Chapters 4 and 5.
Strategies in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma The iterated PD is usually known
as a story of tit-for-tat (TFT), which won both Axelrod’s tournaments (Axelrod,
1984; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). TFT starts by cooperating, and does whatever
the opponent did in the previous round. It will cooperate if the opponent cooperated,
and will defect if the opponent defected. But if there are erroneous moves because
of noise (i.e. an intended move is wrongly performed with a given execution error,
referred here as “noise”), the performance of TFT declines, in two ways: (i) it
cannot correct errors (e.g., when two TFT s playing with one another, an erroneous
defection by one player leads to a sequence of unilateral cooperation and defection)
and (ii) a population of TFT players is undermined by random drift when the
pure cooperator AllC mutants appear (which allows exploiters to grow). Tit-for-tat
is then replaced by generous tit-for-tat (GTFT), a strategy that cooperates if the
opponent cooperated in the previous round, but sometimes cooperates even if the
opponent defected (with a fixed probability p > 0) (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992).
GTFT can correct mistakes, but remains suffering the random drift.
Subsequently, TFT and GTFT were replaced by win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) as
the winning strategy chosen by evolution (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993). WSLS starts
by cooperating, and repeats the previous move whenever it did well, but changes
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otherwise. WSLS corrects mistakes better than GTFT and does not suffer random
drift. However, it is severely exploited by the pure defector AllD players.
Intention recognition strategies implemented in Chapters 4 and 5 will be com-
pared to these well-known strategies of the iterated PD.
Evolutionary Dynamics In the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory
(EGT), the accumulated payoff from all interactions (see Eq. (3.1)) emulates
individuals’ fitness or social success and the most successful individuals will tend
to be imitated by others, implementing a simple form of social learning (Szabó and
Toke, 1998; Traulsen et al., 2006; Sigmund, 2010; Rendell et al., 2010). Any player
can change its strategy by adopting another player’s strategy with a probability
defined by the Fermi probability distribution below. If a strategy has a higher
(average) payoff or fitness than another, it tends to be imitated more by the other.
A strategy update event is defined in the following way, corresponding to the
so-called pairwise comparison (Szabó and Toke, 1998; Traulsen et al., 2006). At
each time-step, one individual i with a fitness fi is randomly chosen for behavioral
revision. Individual i will adopt the strategy of a randomly chosen individual j with






where the quantity β, which in physics corresponds to an inverse temperature, con-
trols the ‘intensity of selection’ or ‘imitation strength’. When β = 0 we obtain the
limit of neutral drift, and with the increasing of β one enhances the role played by
the game payoff in the individual fitness, and behavioral evolution (Traulsen et al.,
2006, 2007).
In the absence of mutations, the end states of evolution are inevitably monomor-
phic, as a result of the stochastic nature of the evolutionary dynamics and update
rule. As we are interested in a global analysis of the population dynamics with mul-
tiple strategies, we further assume that with a small probability µ individuals switch
to a randomly chosen strategy, freely exploring the space of possible behaviors. By
introducing a small probability of mutation or exploration, the eventual appearance
of a single mutant in a monomorphic population, this mutant will fixate or will be-
come extinct long before the occurrence of another mutation and, for this reason,
the population will spend all of its time with a maximum of two strategies present
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simultaneously (Fudenberg and Imhof, 2005; Imhof et al., 2005; Hauert et al., 2007;
Traulsen et al., 2009; Santos et al., 2011). This allows one to describe the evolu-
tionary dynamics of our population in terms of a reduced Markov Chain of a size
equal to the number of different strategies, where each state represents a possible
monomorphic end-state of the population associated with a given strategy, and the
transitions between states are defined by the fixation probabilities of a single mutant
of one strategy in a population of individuals who adopt another strategy. The re-
sulting stationary distribution characterizes the average time the population spends
in each of these monomorphic states, and can be computed analytically (Karlin and
Taylor, 1975; Fudenberg and Imhof, 2005; Imhof et al., 2005; Hauert et al., 2007;
Santos et al., 2011) (see below).
In the presence of two strategies the payoffs of each are given by Eq. (3.1),
whereas the probability to change the number k of individuals with a strategy A










The fixation probability of a single mutant with a strategy A in a population of








where λj = T−(j)/T+(j).
In the limit of neutral selection (β = 0), λj = 1. Thus, ρB,A = 1/N . Con-
sidering a set {1, ..., nS} of different strategies, these fixation probabilities deter-
mine a transition matrix [Tij ]i,j=1,...,nS , with Tii = 1 −
∑nS
k=1,k 6=i ρk,i/(nS − 1) and
Tij,j 6=i = ρji/(nS − 1), of a Markov Chain. The normalized eigenvector associated
with the eigenvalue 1 of the transposed of M provides the stationary distribution
described above (Karlin and Taylor, 1975; Fudenberg and Imhof, 2005; Imhof et al.,
2005; Hauert et al., 2007; Santos et al., 2011), describing the relative time the pop-
ulation spends adopting each of the strategies.
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Structure of the remainder of Part II The remainder of this part is organized
as follows. In the next two chapters, Chapters 4 and 5, we provide two different
models showing that intention recognition promotes the emergence of cooperation,
within the framework of the iterated PD. In Chapter 6, we study the role of com-
mitment in the evolution of cooperation. Then, in Chapter 7, we provide a model
combining intention recognition and commitment strategies, leading to improved
cooperation, even in the framework of non-repeated interactions (the one-shot PD).
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Chapter 4
INTENTION RECOGNITION PROMOTES THE EMERGENCE OF
COOPERATION: A BAYESIAN NETWORK MODEL
There is a good side and a bad side to most people, and
in accordance with your own character and disposition
you will bring out one of them
and the other will remain a sealed book to you.
Mark Twain (1835-1910).
Abstract. We derive a three-layer Bayesian Network model for inten-
tion recognition in the context of repeated social dilemmas and evolu-
tionary game theory, by assessing the internal dynamics of trust between
intention recognizers and their opponents. On the basis of past direct
interactions, intention recognizers are able to some extent to predict the
next move of their opponents (cooperate or defect). That in turn enables
them to prevail over the most famous strategies of repeated dilemmas of
cooperation, even in the presence of noise.




We model intention recognition within the framework of repeated interactions. In the
context of direct reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Nowak, 2006a; Sigmund, 2010) intention
recognition is being performed using the information about past direct interactions.
We study this issue using the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), i.e., intentions are
inferred from past individual experiences.
Contrary to other approaches dealing with the integration of (direct or indirect)
information about the past in individual decisions, e.g. in (Masuda and Ohtsuki,
2009; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2006; Wang et al., 2008; Vukov et al., 2011), intention
recognition is performed using a Bayesian Network (BN) model. BNs have proven
to be one of the most successful approaches for intention recognition (Charniak and
Goldman, 1993; Bui et al., 2002; Tahboub, 2006; Pereira and Han, 2011b). Their
flexibility for representing probabilistic dependencies as well as causal relations, and
the efficiency of inference methods have made them an extremely powerful tool for
problem solving under uncertainty (Pearl, 1988, 2000; Spirtes et al., 2000; Glymour,
2001), and appropriate to deal with several probabilistic as well as causal depen-
dencies occurring in intention recognition. There has been mounting evidence that
the behavior of the human perceptual, motor, and cognitive systems are captured
remarkably well by BN models, which provide a framework for understanding in-
formation processing in the brain (Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2004; Kording and
Wolpert, 2004; Tenenbaum and Griffiths, 2001).
We derive a BN model for intention recognition in the context of social dilem-
mas, taking into account mutual trusts between the intention recognizer and his
opponent. Trusts are accumulated through past interactions, assuming that inten-
tion recognizers have a memory. Greater memory sizes enable to build longer-term
mutual trusts, and therefore allow better tolerance to the errors of intended actions.
We study analytically the case of small memory size, and experimentally the effect of
having greater memory sizes. In addition, we compare the performance of intention
recognizers with the most famous strategies of the iterated PD (see above).
Here we show that our innovative intention recognition strategy (IR) can cor-
rect mistakes even better than win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS ), and not be exploited by
pure defectors. We compare the performance of tit-for-tat (TFT ), WSLS, and IR,
using EGT methods in finite populations (Imhof et al., 2005; Nowak et al., 2004),
in a well-mixed population of pure cooperators (AllC), pure defectors (AllD) and,
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oTrust (Tr) Intention (I) pastObs (O) 
Figure 4.1: Bayesian Network for Intention Recognition in Social Dilemmas. Pre-
intentional level has one node, oTrust (Tr), receives Boolean values, t (true) or
f (false), representing the other’s trust on us (the intention recognizers). Inten-
tional level has one node, Intention (I), receiving value C or D, corresponding to
more cooperative and more defective, respectively, in the past. It is causally affected
by oTrust. Activity level has one node, pastObs (O), causally affected by Intention
node. Its value is a pair (nC , nD) where nC and nD are the number of times the
recognized player cooperated and defected, respectively, in the recent M (memory
size) steps. The node pastObs is the only observed (evidence) node.
additionally, of individuals of either of the above other three strategies, as well as all
these strategies together. The results show that IR performs best, in the sense that
populations spend more time in a homogenous state of IRs, even in the presence of
noise.
4.2 Bayesian Network for Intention Recognition in So-
cial Dilemmas
In Chapter 2 (also in (Pereira and Han, 2009c, 2011b)), a general BN model
for intention recognition is presented and justified based on Heinze’s intentional
model (Heinze, 2003; Tahboub, 2006). Basically, the BN consists of three layers:
cause/reason nodes in the first layer (called pre-intentional), connecting to intention
nodes in the second one (called intentional), in turn connecting to action nodes
in the third (called activity). Intuitively, the observed actions of an agent are
causally affected by his/her intentions, which are in turn causally affected by the
causes/reasons for which he committed to the intentions (Bratman, 1987, 1999;
Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Singh, 1991).
Based on this general model, we present an intention recognition model in the
context of the social dilemmas, taking into account the past direct interactions (Fig-
ure 4.1). The model is described from the view of an intention recognizer (denoted
by I) with respect to a co-player (denoted by J ), whose intention (C or D) is to
be recognized. A player’s intentions here can be understood as the characters or
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types of the player: how cooperative or defective he is in general when playing with
me. Saying that the co-player has intention C (resp., D) means that, in general, he
intends to cooperate with me (resp., exploit or defect towards me). Thus, if he has
been cooperative in the past, it is likely he will continue to cooperate in the current
interaction.
J ’s intention in a given interaction is causally affected by the trust he holds
towards his opponent (I), which is accumulated over their past (observed) interac-
tions. J ’s intention in turn has given rise to his past actions. Let M > 0 be the
memory size of intention recognizers, i.e. they can remember their moves and their
opponents’ moves in the last M rounds of interaction with any specific players.
For this BN, we need to determine the prior probability of the node oTrust, i.e.
P (Tr); the conditional probability table (CPD) of node Intention—specifying the
conditional probability of J having an intention (C or D) given the trust he holds
towards his opponent (I), i.e. P (I|Tr); and the CPD table of the node pastObs—
specifying the conditional probability of the past observations given J ’s intention
(C or D), i.e. P (O|I).
To begin with, let nC(X ,Y) and nD(X ,Y) denote the numbers of times a player
X cooperated and defected, respectively, in the last M interactions with another
player Y. Note that nC(X ,Y) + nD(X ,Y) ≤M , and the equality occurs only when
the two players have interacted with each other at least M times.
Trust Distribution. The probability that J trusts I is given by how often I
cooperated with J . This can be written as




nC(I,J )− nD(I,J )
2M
. (4.1)
It is easily seen that 0 ≤ P (Tr = t) ≤ 1, and P (Tr = t) = 0 (resp., 1) if I defected
(resp., cooperated) in all recent M interactions. These correspond to the extremes
that I lost all his/her trust (resp., gained complete trust) concerning J . We further
assume that, in the first interaction, the trust level is neutral: P (Tr = t) = 12 .
Definition of P(I|Tr). We use the following CPD table
P (I = C|Tr = t) = P (I = D|Tr = f) = h,
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P (I = C|Tr = f) = P (I = D|Tr = t) = 1− h,
where h is the probability the intention recognizer (I) thinks the co-player (J ) has
intention C given that he (J ) completely trusts me (I).
As the intention recognizers are cooperative, i.e. they seek the cooperators to
cooperate with and generously start by cooperating with everybody, we assume
h ≥ 0.5. This probability reflects the intention recognizers’ optimistic level—
assumed fixed for their entire life cycle (generation).
Definition of P(O|I). The conditional probability of the past observations about
the co-player given his intention. It can be interpreted as how trustful or cooperative
the intention recognizer (I) thinks his co-player (J ) is, and can be defined as how
often J cooperated with I in an interaction. It can be given as follows















where n1 = nC(J , I) and n2 = nD(J , I).
In a nutshell, the intention recognition model presented takes into account the
past direct interactions, in terms of mutual trusts, which are encoded into a Bayesian
Network.
Intention Recognizer. In an interaction, the probabilities of the co-player having
intention C and having intention D, given his M recent past actions o = (nC , nD),
are computed using Eq. (2.2)
p(I = C|O = o) = p(I = C,O = o)
p(O = o)
,




The intention recognizer plays C if he recognizes that the co-player is more coop-
erative (thus more likely to play C than to play D), i.e. p(I = C|O = o) ≥ p(I =
D|O = o). Otherwise, he plays D. Players using this intention recognition strat-
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egy are henceforth referred to as IR players 1. With the trust functions given in
Eq. (4.1) and (4.2), we obtain that the intention recognizer (I) cooperates with his
co-player (J ) iff (see Appendix 4.5.1 for details)
∆ = sP +Q ≥ 0, (4.4)
where s = 2h − 1 (0 ≤ s ≤ 1); P = nC(I,J ) − nD(I,J ) and Q = nC(J , I) −
nD(J , I).
4.3 Results
We consider a population of constant size N . At each evolution step, a random
pair of players are chosen to play with each other. The population consists of pure
cooperators (AllC s), pure defectors (AllDs) plus either of TFT s or of WSLS s or of
intention recognizers who, being capable of recognizing another individual’s intention
based on the past interactions, seek the cooperators to cooperate with and to defect
toward detected defectors.
We shall start by considering a finite population consisting of AllC, AllD and
IR players. It is easily seen that in the absence of noise, a player adopting a IR
strategy performs similarly to a TFT player, i.e. always cooperates with an AllC,
always defects with AllD after cooperating in the first round, and always cooperate
amongst themselves. In the sequel we study the performance of IR in the presence
1For those who are interested in Logic Programming modeling (other readers can just ignore
this footnote), in the following we provide a declarative representation of this IR strategy using
the intention-based decision making framework in Chapter 3.
1. abds([move/1]).
2. on observed(decide)← new round.
3. decide← move(c). decide← move(d).
← move(c), move(d).
4. expect(move(X)).
5. move(c) / move(d)← has intention(co player, c).
move(d) / move(c)← has intention(co player, d).
Starting a new interaction, an IR needs to choose a move, either cooperate (C) or defect (D) (lines
2-3). Both options are expected, and there are no expectation to the contrary (line 4). There are
two a priori preferences in line 5 stating that an IR prefers to cooperate if the co-player’s recognized
intention is to cooperate, and prefers to defect otherwise. The built-in predicate has intention/2
in the body of the preferences triggers the intention recognition module to validate if the co-player
is more likely to have the intention given in the second argument.
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of noise, and compare with TFT and WSLS. First we study analytically the case of
memory two, i.e. M = 2.
4.3.1 Evolution of short-memory intention recognizers
In the presence of noise, let us assume that an intended action (C or D) can fail
with probability ε ∈ [0, 1]. We obtain the following payoff matrix for AllC, AllD and
IR, where all terms of order O(ε2) have been ignored (see Appendix 4.5.2.1)


















Let A(X,Y ) be the payoff of strategist X when playing against strategist Y . We
can show that (Appendix 4.5.3)
A(IR, IR) > A(WSLS,WSLS) > A(TFT, TFT ),
A(AllD, IR) < A(AllD, TFT ) < A(AllD,WSLS),
A(IR,AllD) > A(TFT,AllD) > A(WSLS,AllD),
A(AllC,WSLS) < A(AllC, TFT ) < A(AllC, IR),
A(WSLS,AllC) > A(TFT,AllC) > A(IR,AllC).
The first inequality implies that IR deals with noise better than TFT and WSLS,
when interacting with individuals alike. As a result, a homogeneous population of
IRs has a higher level of cooperation (thus, greater average payoff) than the ones
of WSLS s and TFT s 2. The next two inequalities imply that IR deals with AllD
better than TFT, which is in turn better than WSLS. The fixation probability of
an IR taking over a population of AllD is greater than those of TFT and WSLS
(Figure 4.2). Finally, the last two inequalities imply that IR is more cooperative to
2Recall that a homogeneous population or homogeneous state is a population with just a single
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Figure 4.2: Transition probabilities and stationary distributions (in percentage), com-
puted analytically for two distinct sets of parameters. We consider a population
of AllC s, AllDs and either WSLSs, TFT s or IRs (M = 2). The black arrows are
only shown for the transition directions that are rather more likely than neural. The
strongest transition is from AllC to AllD. The transition from AllD to IR is stronger
than to TFT. This is reversed in case of WSLS, where the most probable transition
occurs from WSLS to AllD. For slow intensity of selection β (panel a), the transitions
between AllC and IR and AllC and TFT are near neutral, and for strong selection
(panel b), there is a transition from TFT to AllC, which is stronger than from IR
to AllC. Also, the greater β, the stronger the transition from AllC to AllD and to
WSLS. The calculations in both cases are made with N = 100 and ω = 0.9; ρN = 1/N





































β=0.01 β=0.1 β=1%time %time %time
β=0.01 β=0.1 β=1%time %time %time
β=0.01 β=0.1 β=1%time %time %time


























































WSLS TFT IR WSLS TFT IR WSLS TFT IR
WSLS TFT IR WSLS TFT IR WSLS TFT IR
WSLS TFT IR WSLS TFT IR WSLS TFT IR
WSLS TFT IR WSLS TFT IR WSLS TFT IR
Figure 4.3: Percentage of time spent at AllC, AllD and either WSLS, TFT or IR.
We compare IR with WSLS and TFT when interacting with AllC s and AllDs. We
consider different selection intensities β (0.01, 0,1 and 1), noise levels ε (0.01 and 0.1)
and PD benefit-to-cost ratios b/c (2 and 3). In all cases, IR is better than TFT and
WSLS. In a population of AllC s, AllDs and IRs, the system spends more time in
the homogeneous state of IRs, especially when selection is strong. TFT and WSLS
perform poorly at strong selection intensities, as the population spends most of the
time at AllDs. The calculations in all cases are made with N = 100 and ω = 0.9.
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Figure 4.4: Stationary distribution in a population of five possible strategies AllC,
AllD, WSLS, TFT and IR (M = 2). The population spends most of the time in
the homogeneous state of IRs. WSLS also performs well in this 5-strategy setting,
reconfirming that it needs other catalyzers such as TFT to perform well. On the
contrary, these results show that IR performs well in either case (the other setting in
Figure 4.3). The calculations in all cases are made with N = 100, b/c = 3, ω = 0.9
and h = 0.6. The average fitness of IR, WSLS and TFT players interacting with each
other are obtained by averaging over 107 simulated interactions.
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AllC (i.e. it is more tolerant of noise originated by AllC ).
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show a comparison among WSLS, TFT and IR in terms
of the percentage of time the population spends at their homogenous state, in a
setting of either strategy and AllC and AllD individuals. In all cases, IR is better
than TFT and WSLS. In a population of AllC s, AllDs and IRs, the population
spends more time in the homogeneous state of IRs, especially when the intensity of
selection is strong. TFT and WSLS poorly perform at strong selection intensities—
the population spends most of the time at AllDs. The poor performance of WSLS
is not surprising, as WSLS needs TFT players as a catalyst to perform well, as
discussed in (Sigmund, 2010).
Figure 4.4 shows the results for the setting where all the five strategies AllC,
AllD, TFT, WSLS and IR are in the population. Again, the population will be
most likely found in the homogeneous state of IRs. WSLS also performs well in this
setting (since TFT s are present).
In short, in these two commonly used settings, IR always outperforms TFT
and WSLS. The population spends more time in the homogeneous state of IRs.
Furthermore, since a population of IRs is highly cooperative, it is clear that the
introduction of intention recognition significantly increases the cooperation level of
the population, leading to a greater social welfare.
4.3.2 The role of memory size
The impressive results obtained in the previous section addressed the evolutionary
chances of very short-memory intention recognizers. Yet, it is reasonable to suppose
that individuals may record a larger number of rounds and use it at their profit. As
shown in Figure 4.5a, a greater memory size enables a better tolerance to noise. It
allows the build-up of long-term mutual trusts, which enables a better assessment of
errors. The intention recognizers become more generous (see Fig. 4.5a) and, above
all, more tolerant to other players’ errors. As a result, a homogenous population of
large memory IRs can reach closer to the state of perfect cooperation, even in the
presence of noise.
In addition, they are more resilient to changing opinion about untrustworthy
players. Namely, the greater M the smaller probability that an IR defects with
another IR and with an AllC (see Fig. 4.5c), and the smaller the probability of
cooperating with AllD (see Fig. 4.5b).
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Figure 4.5: Probabilities of reactions computed numerically for IRs of different mem-
ory sizes (M = 2, 6, 10), and analogous quantities for WSLS and TFT strategists,
as a function of the level of noise. a) Probability of defection of IR, TFT and WSLS
strategists when playing with themselves. The probability of defection between IRs
decreases with the memory size. b) Probability that each of the three strategies—
IR, TFT and WSLS—cooperates with a AllD. The probability that IR cooperates
with AllD decreases when memory size increases. c) Probability that a IR, TFT and
WSLS player defects with a AllC. The probability that IR defects with AllC decreases
when memory size increases. In all cases, ω = 0.9, h = 0.6 and the probabilities are
obtained by averaging over 107 simulated interactions.
4.3.3 The role of IRs optimism and their tolerance to noise
In the following, we study the relation of the optimistic level h of an IR with his/her
noise tolerance, towards a cooperative and towards a defective co-player. For sim-
plicity, we consider the following two cases.
First of all, suppose that at the m-th round, we have P = P0 > 0 and Q = Q0 > 0
(i.e. the players were cooperative), and the co-player will constantly defect (with
probability 1 − ε). Let k be the expected number of rounds IR is tolerant to his
co-player’s defection. Clearly, k ≤M (see Appendix 4.5.1).
If m ≥M , from Eq. (4.4) and the fact that IR’s memory size is M we have that
k must satisfy the following equation
sPk +Qk = 0, (4.5)
where Pi+1 = Pi+(1−ε−Pi/M) and Qi+1 = Qi−(1−ε+Qi/M) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k−1.
This can be explained as follows. With probability (1− ε), IR cooperates, thus the
value of Pi is increased by (1−ε). But since m ≥M , the value of Pi is also decreased,
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on average, by Pi/M (one round is “forgotten”). A similar argument can be used
for Qi.











The right-hand side is clearly a decreasing function of s. Thus, k is an increasing
function of s. Now if m < M , by putting k = k1 + M −m and applying the same
method we can show that k1 is also an increasing function of s.
In short, in both cases k is an increasing function of s (hence, also of h). It means
that the more optimistic the IR is (i.e. the greater h), the more tolerant/generous
he is towards a cooperative co-player. It also means that the more optimistic an IR,
he might become more generous to defective players if errors occur more frequently
at the beginning of their interaction (defective players show up to be cooperative).
Similarly, let us consider the case where at some round, both players were defec-
tive, i.e. P0 < 0 and Q0 < 0, and the co-player starts cooperating (either by mistakes
or because the co-player is actually a cooperative one). The number of rounds that
IR keeps on defecting while the co-player cooperates, by using the same method,
can be shown to be an increasing function of h. Hence, the more optimistic a IR is,
the less generous he is towards a defective player. However, it also means that the
more optimistic a IR is, the less generous he might become to cooperative players
if errors occur more frequently at the beginning of their interaction (cooperative
players show up to be defective).
In short, when errors are not frequent at the beginning, a more optimistic IR
becomes more tolerant to noise, since he/she is more generous towards cooperative
players and less so to defective ones. On the other hand, if errors are frequent at
the beginning (cooperative players show up to be defective, and vice-versa, defective
players show up to be cooperative), the more optimistic a IR is, more rounds he/she
would take to recognize correctly the opponents’ intentions. Overall, this suggests
that, ideally, a IR should not be optimistic at the beginning of an interaction since
otherwise an error could create a wrong bad impression which is hard to recover
from. When more interactions are made, a higher optimism increases the tolerance
3Consider the sequence Xi, where Xi = sPi + Qi. It satisfies the recursive equation Xi+1 =
M−1
M
Xi + (1− s)(1− ε).
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to noise of an IR strategist. As a result, it suggests that h can be expressed as an
increasing function of time.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
Using the tools of EGT, in this chapter we have shown the role of intention recogni-
tion for the emergence of cooperation within the framework of the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Intention recognition is performed using a Bayesian Network model via
computing mutual trusts between the intention recognizers and their opponents.
Given the broad spectrum of problems which are addressed using this cooperative
metaphor, our result indicates how intention recognition can be pivotal in social
dynamics. We have shown that the intention recognition strategy prevails over the
most successful existent strategies (TFT, WSLS ) of the iterated PD, even when
players have a very limited memory. IR deals with AllD better than TFT – the
best known defector-dealer, and correct mistake better than WSLS – the best known
mistake-corrector (Nowak, 2006b; Sigmund, 2010). As a result, a homogenous pop-
ulation of IRs has a higher level of cooperation than the ones of WSLS s and TFT s,
resisting the invasion of other strategies.
In (Imhof et al., 2005), it has been shown that in the absence of noise, in a
population of AllC s, AllDs and TFT s, the population spends most of the time in
a homogeneous state of TFT s. However, as we have shown here, that it is not the
case if noise is present, especially under strong selection. In the absence of noise, IR
behaves as well as TFT. Moreover, IRs are selected by evolution in the latter case
where noise is present. We have shown that in a population of AllC s, AllDs and
IRs, the population spends most of the time in the homogeneous state of IRs—in a
broad range of scenarios and parameters—especially when the intensity of selection
is strong. We have also exhibited experimentally that in a population where all the
five strategies AllC, AllD, TFT, WSLS and IR are present, IRs still prevail most
of the time. Therefore, together with the fact that IRs can correct mistakes better
than WSLS s and TFT s, the presence of IRs would significantly increase the overall
level of cooperation of the population.
Additionally, we have shown the role of a large memory size in recogniz-
ing/correcting errors. Having a greater memory size allows intention recognizers
to build longer-term mutual trusts/distrusts, and hence enables them to better
110
4.4. Concluding Remarks
recognize erroneous moves. It then further enables them to better tolerate a selfish
act made by cooperative trustful individuals, and to refuse to cooperate after an
erroneous cooperation made by a defective untrustworthy ones. Indeed, intention
recognition gives rise to an incipient mechanism of commitment formation, from
which future behaviors may be assessed and trust bonds established. Further
discussions on the relation between commitment and intention recognition will be
found in Chapter 7.
Overall, our work provides new insights into the complexity and beauty of be-
havioral evolution driven by elementary forms of cognition.
Notwithstanding, intentions are inferred from past individual experiences only,
within the framework the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). Naturally, the same
principles could be extended to cope with indirect information, as in indirect reci-
procity (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Pacheco et al., 2006; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2006).
This eventually introduces moral judgment and concern for individual reputation,
which constitutes “per se” an important area where intention recognition may play
a pivotal role. In subsequent work we aim to extend our model to incorporate this




4.5.1 Decision making with intention recognition
Here we derive a simplified expression for intention recognizers’ decision making, i.e.,
when to cooperate and when to defect. Recall that an IR cooperates iff he recognizes
that the co-player is more likely to cooperate than to defect, i.e. p(I = C|O = o) ≥
p(I = D|O = o). From Eq. (4.3) (main text), we have that the inequality holds if
an only if
p(I = C,O = o) ≥ p(I = D,O = o)
⇐⇒ p(I = C,O = o, Tr = t) + p(I = C,O = o, Tr = f) ≥
p(I = D,O = o, Tr = t) + p(I = D,O = o, Tr = f)
⇐⇒ p(O = o|I = C)p(I = C|Tr = t)p(Tr = t)+
p(O = o|I = C)p(I = C|Tr = f)p(Tr = f) ≥
p(O = o|I = D)p(I = D|Tr = t)p(Tr = t)+
p(O = o|I = D)p(I = D|Tr = f)p(Tr = f)
⇐⇒ mtr [otr.h+ (1− otr)(1− h)] ≥ (1−mtr) [otr(1− h) + (1− otr)h] ,
where otr = P (Tr = t) and mtr = P (O = o|I = C).
Simplifying both sides we obtain
h(2.otr − 1) ≥ otr −mtr. (4.6)
From Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2) (main text), (4.6) can be rewritten as
∆ = sP +Q ≥ 0, (4.7)
where s = 2h − 1 (0 ≤ s ≤ 1), P = nC(I,J ) − nD(I,J ), and Q = nC(J , I) −
nD(J , I).
In short, (4.7) provides a simple decision making model for the intention recog-
nizer, taking into account the co-player’s M recent moves as well as the intention
recognizer own’s M recent moves, linking by a factor of (2h − 1) where h is the
optimistic level of the intention recognizer.
We have that −M ≤ P,Q ≤M . Let us look at some extreme cases.
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• If Q = M , i.e. the co-player cooperates in all M recent steps, then ∆ > 0.
The IR cooperates in the next round.
• If Q = −M , i.e. the co-player defects in all M recent steps, then ∆ < 0. The
IR defects in the next round.
• If h = 1/2, then ∆ = Q. The IR only considers the co-player’s past actions to
decide his next move: if the co-player cooperated at least as much as defected
in the M recent rounds, then IR cooperates in the next round, and defects
otherwise. We henceforth consider h > 1/2: the IR also takes its own moves
into account.
4.5.2 Memory-Two Intention Recognizers
To provide a simple mathematical analysis, let us consider the simplest case where
IR players have a very short memory M = 2. By following a similar method as
described in (Sigmund, 2010), we derive the analytical payoff matrix for AllC, AllD
and IR in the presence of noise. Based on that, we then compare analytically IR
with other famous strategies, including TFT and WSLS.
To begin with, since s > 0, a memory-two IR decides his current move depending
on the state of his own and his co-player’s last two moves. There are 16 possible
states, forming by all the combinations of four possible game situations (R,S, T, P )
in each of the last two encounters. We enumerate these states by statei, with
1 ≤ i ≤ 16.
We consider stochastic strategies (f, l, q1, q2, ..., q16) ∈ [0, 1]18 where f and l are
the propensities to play C in the initial and second rounds, respectively, and qi are
propensities to play C after having been at statei, 1 ≤ i ≤ 16.
Let us assume that player 1 using (f1, s1, p1, p2, ..., p16) encounters a co-
player 2 using (f2, s2, q1, q2, ..., q16). We have a Markov chain in the state space
{state1, ..., state16}. The transition probabilities are given by the stochastic matrix





p1q1 ... (1− p1)(1− q1) 0 ... 0 0
0 ... 0 p2q3 ... 0 ... 0
... ... ...




0 ... 0 0 .... 0 ... (1− p16)(1− q16)

.
There are several zeros in the matrix. The state with the second component
X ∈ {R,S, T, P} can only go to the states with the first component being X. For
example, in the first row, state1, i.e. (R,R), can only go to states with the first
component being R, i.e. (R,R), (R,T ), (R,S ), (R,P) (i.e. statei, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4).
The initial probabilities for the sixteen states are given by the vector
f ={f1f2s1s2, f1f2s1(1− s2), f1f2 (1− s1) s2, f1f2 (1− s1) (1− s2) ,
f1 (1− f2) s1s2, f1 (1− f2) s1 (1− s2) , f1 (1− f2) (1− s1) s2,
f1 (1− f2) (1− s1) (1− s2) , (1− f1) f2s1s2, (1− f1) f2s1 (1− s2) ,
(1− f1) f2 (1− s1) s2, (1− f1) f2 (1− s1) (1− s2) ,
(1− f1) (1− f2) s1s2, (1− f1) (1− f2) s1 (1− s2) ,
(1− f1) (1− f2) (1− s1) s2, (1− f1) (1− f2) (1− s1) (1− s2)}.
In the next round, these probabilities are given by fQ, and in the round n by
fQn. We denote by g the vector {R,S, T, P,R, S, T, P,R, S, T, P,R, S, T, P}, then
the payoff for player 1 in round n is given by
A(n) = g . fQn. (4.8)
For ω < 1 the average payoff per round is (1− ω)
∑
wnA(n) (Sigmund, 2010), i.e.,
(1− ω)g . f(Id− ωQ)−1, (4.9)
where Id is the identity matrix of size 16.
4.5.2.1 Payoff Matrices in Presence of Noise
We now derive the payoff matrix for the 3-strategy game involving AllC, AllD and
IR in the presence of noise, i.e., an intended action (C or D) can fail with probability
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ε ∈ [0, 1]. The strategies AllC and AllD are given by {1− ε, 1− ε, 1− ε, ...., 1− ε},
{ε, ε, ε, ...., ε}, respectively. Strategy IR is given by {1 − ε, l, q1, ...., q16} where l =
2ε(1 − ε) when playing with AllD and ε2 + (1 − ε)2 when playing with AllC or IR
4; and qi = 1− ε for i ∈ {1..5, 7, 9..11, 13} and ε for i ∈ {6, 8, 12, 14..16}. Note that
X..Y , where X ≤ Y are two natural numbers, denote the sequence X,X + 1, ..., Y .
Basically, IR will cooperate in the next round (with probability 1− ε) iff there is at
least a mutual cooperation (i.e. R) in the last two steps (i.e. i ∈ {1..5, 13}) or there
is at least one T and no P (i.e. i ∈ {7, 9..11}).
Considering the PD game with T = b, R = b − c, P = 0, S = −c, the payoff
matrix for AllC, AllD and IR, applying Eq. (4.9) for each pair of strategies, is
approximately given (where all terms of order O(ε2) have been ignored),
(b− c)(1− ε) −c+ (b+ c)ε Λ














By a similar method, we derive the payoff matrixes AllC, AllD and either TFT
or WSLS (the results for the general case of Prisoner’s Dilemma can be found in
(Imhof et al., 2007)). First, for AllC, AllD and WSLS
(b− c)(1− ε) bε− c(1− ε) c(−1 + ε)− b(1−ε)(1−(1−2ε)ω)−1+(1−2ε)2ω





1+(1−2ε)2ω (b− c)(1− ε)
(
1− 2εω + 4ε2ω
)
 ,
where Λ′ = b(1− ε) + c(1−ε)(1−(1−2ε)ω)−1+(1−2ε)2ω .
Now, for AllC, AllD and TFT, the payoff matrix reads (b− c)(1− ε) bε− c(1− ε) c(−1 + ε) + b
(
1 + 2ε2ω − ε(1 + ω)
)
b(1− ε)− cε (b− c)ε −cε− b(−1 + ε)(1 + (−1 + 2ε)ω)
Λ′′ bε− c(1− ε)(1− (1− 2ε)ω) (b−c)(1−ω+ε(−1+2ω))1+(−1+2ε)ω
 ,
where Λ′′ = b(1− ε)− c
(
1− ε− εω + 2ε2ω
)
.
4These can be easily seen from the fact that in the second round IR’s decision only depends on
what the co-player did in the first round (cf. (4.7)).
5This notation is added only for a better alignment.
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4.5.3 Comparing IR, WSLS, and TFT
Let A(X,Y ) be the payoff of strategist X when playing with strategist Y (from the
payoff matrices). In the sequel we will show that, for b ≥ (1 +ω)c, ω > 3/4 and ε <
1/3:
A(IR, IR) > A(WSLS,WSLS) > A(TFT, TFT ),
A(AllD, IR) < A(AllD, TFT ) < A(AllD,WSLS),
A(IR,AllD) > A(TFT,AllD) > A(WSLS,AllD),
A(AllC,WSLS) < A(AllC, TFT ) < A(AllC, IR),
A(WSLS,AllC) > A(TFT,AllC) > A(IR,AllC).
The first condition always holds by the usual assumption in Donation game b ≥ 2c;
the second condition means the game is repeated at least 4 rounds.
4.5.3.1 TFT, WSLS, IR: Competing Amongst Themselves
Comparing the bottom rightmost element of each payoff matrix we have
A(WSLS ,WSLS )−A(TFT ,TFT ) =
(b− c)(1− 2ε)2εω(2ω − 2εω − 1)
1 + (−1 + 2ε)ω
> 0
(for small enough ε and big enough ω, namely ε < 1− 12ω ),
A(IR, IR)−A(WSLS ,WSLS ) =
(b− c)ε
(
−1 + 3ω + ε
(
−3ω + 7ω2 + 3ω3 + 2ω4
))
1 + εω (3 + ω + ω2)
> 0.
(all the terms of order O(ε3) in the numerator have been ignored).
In short, for ε < 1− 12ω we have
A(IR, IR) > A(WSLS ,WSLS ) > A(TFT ,TFT ).
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4.5.3.2 TFT, WSLS, IR: With AllD
A(AllD ,WSLS )−A(AllD ,TFT ) =
b(1− 2ε)2ω
(
ε+ ω − 3εω + 2ε2ω
)
1 + (1− 2ε)2ω
> 0,
A(AllD ,TFT )−A(AllD , IR) = b(1− ω)(1− 3ε− 2εω)
1− εω
> 0




ε+ ω − 3εω + 2ε2ω
)
1 + (1− 2ε)2ω
> 0,
A(IR,AllD)−A(TFT,AllD) =
cεω3 + c(1− ω)
(
1− 3ε− εω − εω2
)
1− εω2(1 + ω)
> 0
(all the terms of order O(ε2) in the numerator have been ignored).
In short, it always holds that
A(AllD ,WSLS ) > A(AllD ,TFT ) > A(AllD , IR),
A(IR,AllD) > A(TFT ,AllD) > A(WSLS ,AllD).
4.5.3.3 TFT, WSLS, IR: With AllC
A(AllC ,WSLS )−A(AllC ,TFT ) = −b(1−2ε)
2εω(1+(1−2ε)ω)
1−(1−2ε)2ω < 0,
A(AllC ,TFT )−A(AllC , IR) =
−ε
(
b(1− ω)(2ω − 1) + εω
(
b− bω2 + 4bω − 3c+ cω
))
1− ω + 3εω − εω2
< 0









2cε2ω3 + c(2ω(1− ε)− 1) + ε
(




(for big enough ω and small enough ε, namely ε < 1− 12ω , and b ≥ (1 + ω)c).
In short, for b ≥ (1 + ω)c, ω > 3/4; and ε < 1/3 we have
A(AllC ,WSLS ) < A(AllC ,TFT ) < A(AllC , IR),
A(WSLS ,AllC ) > A(TFT ,AllC ) > A(IR,AllC ).
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Chapter 5
INTENTION RECOGNITION PROMOTES THE EMERGENCE OF
COOPERATION: A CORPUS-BASED MODEL
His plans are calm and deeply hidden, so no one can figure them out.
He changes his actions and revises his plans, so that people will not
recognize them. He changes his abode and goes by a circuitous route so
people cannot anticipate him. When people never understand what your
intention is, then you win.
SUN TZU (544 BC - 496 BC): THE ART OF WAR
Abstract. We introduce a new strategy that is able to assign an inten-
tion (strategy) to the actions of opponents, on the basis of an acquired
corpus consisting of possible plans achieving that intention, as well as
to then make decisions on the basis of such recognized intentions. The
success of these intention recognizers is grounded on the unshameful ben-
eficial exploitation of pure cooperators whilst remaining robust against
defection strategies. In addition, we show how intention recognizers do
indeed prevail against the most famous successful strategies of iterated
dilemmas of cooperation, even in the presence of noise.





Similarly to the previous chapter, by resorting to the tools of Evolutionary Game
Theory (EGT) we study the role of intention recognition in the evolution of cooper-
ation, within the framework of iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD). But in contrast
to the intention recognition model therein, herein we describe a model to recognize
a larger set of conceivable intentions, in terms of more sophisticated patterns of
behavioral strategies for the IPD.
As usual, the inputs of an intention recognition system are a set of conceivable
intentions and a set of plans achieving each intention—given in terms of either a
plan library (Geib and Goldman, 2009; Charniak and Goldman, 1993) or a plan
corpus (Blaylock and Allen, 2003, 2004; Armentano and Amandi, 2009; Han and
Pereira, 2011b) (for more details see Related Work of Chapter 2). In the EGT
context here, the conceivable intentions are the strategies already known to the
intention recognizer, whose recognition model is learnt from a plan corpus consisting
of sequences of moves in successive game rounds (called plan sessions) for each of the
different strategies whilst playing IPD. For the corpus-based intention recognition,
we use the method described in Chapter 2.
The rationale of the corpus-based approach in the evolutionary context relies
firstly on the idea of nature-nurture co-evolution or experience inheritance (Richerd-
son and Boyd, 2006; Shennan, 2002): the corpus represents ancestors’ given knowl-
edge or acquired experience in interacting with known strategies. Additionally, in-
tention recognizers can use themselves as a framework for learning and understand-
ing those strategies by self-experimenting with them (Woodward et al., 2009)—as
suggested by the famous ‘like-me’ framework (Meltzoff, 2007, 2005), i.e. hypothet-
ically assuming that I am like the other or that the other is like me. This is of-
ten addressed in the context of the “Theory of Mind” theory (ToM) (Premack and
Woodruff, 1978; Whiten, 1991; Cheney and Seyfarth, 2007), neurologically relying in
part on “mirror neurons”, at several cortical levels, as supporting evidence (Iacoboni
et al., 2005; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004; Nakahara and Miyashita, 2005). For a
recent general account of the neuronal basis of mind see (Gazzaniga, 2011). Indeed,
intention recognition can be considered as an elementary component of the ToM.
The other components of the ToM include attributions of other mental states (to
other agents) such as beliefs, desires, emotions, attention, and knowledge (Premack
and Woodruff, 1978; Whiten, 1991). Closely related to this second point, notice that
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contrary to the formal Evolutionary Game Theory framework being used here, there
have been several works showing the evolution of mind, which are based on genetic
algorithm simulations, e.g. (Takano and Arita, 2006; Zanlungo, 2007; Sayama et al.,
2011; Kim and Lipson, 2009).
In addition, to the best of our knowledge, although there is a large body of
literature on learning in games (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Macy and Flache,
2002), e.g. reinforcement learning (Sandholm and Crites, 1995; Van Segbroeck et al.,
2010), very little attention has been paid to studying how some cognitive ability
that requires learning (as the ability of intention recognition in this work) fares in
an evolutionary setting, particularly within the framework of Evolutionary Game
Theory. On the other hand, there have been some efforts to study the effects of
increased memory size in evolutionary settings, e.g. see (Hauert and Schuster, 1997),
though individual learning is not considered. Differently from this literature, our aim
is to provide a computational model showing how the cognitive ability of intention
recognition, which is so-critical and ubiquitous in humans’ activities (Woodward
et al., 2009; Tomasello, 2008; Meltzoff, 2007), is a viable possibility that might have
been retained by natural selection.
We offer a method to acquire an intention-based decision making model from
the plan corpus, stating what to play with a given co-player based on the recognized
intention and the game’s current state. The intention-based decision maker attempts
to achieve the greatest expected benefit for itself, taking advantage of the knowledge
about the co-player’s intention (or strategy). The model is discussed in Subsection
5.2.3.
We show that our intention recognizers prevail against the most famous successful
strategies of repeated dilemmas of cooperation, including tit-for-tat (TFT), generous
tit-for-tat (GTFT), and win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) (see above), even in the presence
of noise.
For easier following by the readers, we next recall the corpus-based intention
recognition method described in Chapter 2, including the description of the plan
corpora in the context of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and a simplified description
of the intention recognition model.
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5.2 Materials and Methods
5.2.1 Plan Corpus Description
We describe how to create plan corpora for training and testing the corpus-based
intention recognition models, for a given set of strategies. We start by making an
assumption that all strategies to be recognized have memory size bounded-up by M
(M ≥ 0)—i.e. their decision at the current round is independent of the past rounds
that are at a time distance greater than M . Note that the strategies described above
all have memory size bounded by M = 1. Nevertheless, our method is for general
M .
For clarity of representation, abusing notations, R, S, T , and P are henceforth
also referred to as (elementary) game states, in a single round of interaction. Ad-
ditionally, E (standing for empty) is used to refer to the game state having had no
interaction yet. The most basic element in a plan corpus is corpus actions, having
the following representation.
Definition 5.2.1 (Corpus Action) An action in a plan corpus is of the form
s1...sMξ, where si ∈ {E,R, T, S, P}, 1 ≤ i ≤ M , are the states of the M last
interactions, and ξ ∈ {C,D} is the current move 1.
Definition 5.2.2 (Plan Session) A plan session of a strategy is a sequence of
corpus actions played by that strategy (more precisely, a player using that strategy)
against an arbitrary player.
We denote by ΣM the set of all possible types of action. Clearly, |ΣM | = 2 × 5M .
For example,
Σ1 = {EC,RC, TC, SC, PC,ED,RD, TD, SD,PD}
This way of encoding actions and the assumption about the players’ bounded mem-
ory size lead to the equivalent assumption that the action in the current round is
independent of the ones in previous rounds, regardless of the memory size. The
independence of actions will allow us to derive a convenient and efficient intention
recognition model, discussed in the next subsection. Furthermore, it enables to save
1From now on, this notion of an action is used, which is different from the notion of a move
(which is either C or D).
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the game states without having to save the co-player’s moves, thus simplifying the
representation of plan corpora.
As an example, let us consider TFT and the following sequence of its interactions
with some other player (denoted by X), in the presence of noise
round : 0 1 2 3 4 5
TFT : − C C D D D
X : − C D D C D
TFT-states : E R S P T P
The corresponding plan session for TFT is [EC,RC, SD,PD, TD]. At the 0-th
round, there is no interaction, thus the game state is E. TFT starts by cooperating
(1-st round), hence the first action of the plan session is EC. Since player X also
cooperates in the 1-st round, the game state at this round is R. TFT reciprocates
in the 2-nd round by cooperating, hence the second action of the plan session is RC.
Similarly for the third and the fourth actions. Now, at the 5-th round, TFT should
cooperate since X cooperated in 4-th round, but because of noise, it makes an error
to defect. Therefore, the 5-th action is TD.
Definition 5.2.3 (Plan Corpus) Let S be a set of strategies to be recognized. A
plan corpus for S is a set of plan sessions generated for each strategy in the set.
For a given set of strategies, different plan corpora can be generated for different
purposes. In Subsection 5.3.1, for example, we generate plan corpora for training
and testing intention recognition models.
5.2.2 Corpus-based Intention Recognition Model
We could use any corpus-based intention recognition model in the literature for this
work (see Related Work in Chapter 2). Here we deploy our corpus-based intention
recognition model that was described in Chapter 2. For easy following, in the sequel
we provide a simplified description of the intention recognition model.
Let Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be the intentions to be recognized, and O = {A1, ..., Am} the
set of current observed actions. The intention recognition task is to find the most
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likely intention I? ∈ {I1, ..., In} given the current observed actions, i.e.
I? = arg max
Ii:1≤i≤n





j=1 P (Aj |Ii, A1, ..., Aj−1)
P (O)
The second equation is obtained by applying Bayes’ and then Chain rules (Pearl,
1988; Russell and Norvig, 2003). Since the denominator P (O) is a positive constant,
we can ignore it. Then, because of the independency amongst actions, we obtain





P (Aj |Ii) (5.1)
Note that this simplified expression is derived independently of the memory size
M . All the probabilities needed for this computation are to be extracted before-
hand using a training plan corpus. There is no update of these probabilities during
intention recognizers’ life cycle. These constants are arguably obtainable by evolu-
tionary means via lineage (Richerdson and Boyd, 2006; Shennan, 2002) – the corpus
represents ancestors’ received knowledge or acquired experience in interacting with
known strategies (Woodward et al., 2009), or the ‘like-me’ self-experimenting frame-
work (Meltzoff, 2007, 2005).
Also note that if two intentions are assessed with the same probability, then
the model predicts the one with higher priority. Priorities of intentions are set
depending on the behavioral attitude of the intention recognizer. For example, in
Figure 5.2, if IR’s co-player cooperates in the first round, the co-player’s intention
can be predicted as either AllC, WSLS or TFT (since they are assigned the same
conditional probability values). On being concerned about TFT ’s and WSLS ’s
retaliation after a defection (i.e. IR’s behavioral attitude), WSLS and TFT should
have higher priorities than AllC.
5.2.3 Intention-based Decision Making Model
We describe how to acquire a decision making model for an intention recognizer from
a training plan corpus. The intention recognizer chooses to play what would provide
it with the greatest expected payoff against the recognized strategy (intention).
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Namely, from training data we need to extract the function θ(s, I):
θ : {E,R, T, S, P}M × {I1, ..., In} → {C,D}
deciding what to play (C or D) given the sequence of M last game states s = s1...sM
(si ∈ {E,R, T, S, P} with 1 ≤ i ≤M), and the recognized intention I ∈ {I1, ..., In}.
It means that the intention recognizer needs to memorize no more than M last moves
of its co-player, besides the fixed set of probabilistic constants in Eq. (5.1). It is
done as follows. From the plan sessions in the training corpus for each intention we
compute the (per-round) average payoff the intention recognizer would receive with
respect to each choice (C or D), for each possible sequence of states s. The choice
giving a greater payoff is chosen. Formally, let DS(I) be the set of all sequences of
actions (plan sessions), Sq = A1....Ak (Ai ∈ ΣM , 1 ≤ i ≤ k), for intention I in the
corpus and π(Sq, j) the payoff the intention recognizer would get at round j. In the
following, if the sequence (plan session) in which the payoff being computed is clear
from the context, we ignore it and simply write π(j). Thus,























A more general version of this decision making model is provided by considering a
discount factor, say 1/α where 0 < α ≤ 1, stating by how much distant rounds’
payoffs are less important:

























The first model is a special case of the second one where α = 1. This is the most
future-optimistic case. On the other hand, if α is small enough (α ≈ 0), θ(s, I) = D:
in a given round of PD, it is always best to defect. This is the future-pessimistic
case.
Note that, at the first round, there is no information about the co-player. The
intention recognizer cooperates, i.e. θ(EM , I) = C ∀I ∈ {I1, ..., In}.
5.3 Models Acquisition and Evaluation
5.3.1 Plan Corpus Generation
With the corpus description provided in Subsection 5.2.1, let us start by generating a
plan corpus of four of the most famous strategies within the framework of repeated
games of cooperation: AllC (always cooperate), AllD (always defect), TFT and
WSLS (see above). Not only these strategies constitute the most used corpus of
strategies used in this context, as most other strategies can be seen as a high-
level composition of the principles enclosed in these strategies. Hence, intention
recognizers map their opponent’s behaviors to the closest strategy that they know
and interact accordingly. When their knowledge is extended to incorporate new
strategies, the models can be revised on the fly. However, this issue is beyond the
scope of this thesis.
Further, note that here we are not trying to design any optimal strategy for
the iterated PD as this is impossible to prove. Indeed, our aim is to show how
the ubiquitous cognitive ability of intention recognition in humans (and many other
species) (Woodward et al., 2009; Tomasello, 2008; Meltzoff, 2005) was conceivably
adopted by natural selection, by using a simple AI intention recognition model.
Although we could easily include other more complex strategies, such as those with
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AllC AllD TFT WSLS Total
Precision 0.859 0.999 0.818 0.579 0.824
Recall 0.859 0.999 0.818 0.575 0.824
Converg. 0.859 0.999 0.719 0.579 0.805
Table 5.1: Intention recognition results for each strategy and for the totality.
greater memory size and/or learning capability, and then let the intention recognizers
learn to recognize them in a similar manner, by equipping the recognizers with
memory capacity concomitant with that of its co-players’. But as noted before, that
is not the goal of the present work.
We collect plan sessions of each strategy by playing a random move (C or D) in
each round with it. To be more thorough, we can also play all possible combinations
for each given number of rounds m. For example, if m = 10, there will be 1024 = 210
combinations—C or D in each round. When noise is present, each combination is
played repeatedly several times.
The training corpus to be used here is generated by playing with each strategy
all the possible combinations 20 times, for each number of rounds m from 5 to 10.
The testing dataset is generated by playing a random move with each strategy in
each round, also for m from 5 to 10. We continue until obtaining the same number of
plan sessions as of the training dataset (corpus). Both datasets are generated in the
presence of noise (namely, an intended move is wrongly performed with probability
0.05).
5.3.2 Intention Recognition Model
5.3.2.1 Evaluation Metrics
For evaluating the intention recognition model, we use three different metrics. Preci-
sion and recall report the number of correct predictions divided by total predictions
and total prediction opportunities, respectively. If the intention recognizer always
makes a prediction (whenever it has the opportunity), recall is equal to precision.
Convergence is a metric that indicates how much time the recognizer took to con-
verge on what the current user goal/intention was. Recall the formal definitions of
the metrics in Chapter 2.
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Figure 5.1: Decision making model for different values of α. If the recognized intention is
AllC or AllD, intention recognizers (IR) always defect, regardless of the current state.
If it is TFT, IR cooperates when α is large enough, regardless of the current state. If it
is WSLS, if the current states are S or T , IR always defects; otherwise, IR cooperates
for large enough α. This model is acquired for a PD with R = 1, S = −1, T = 2, P = 0.
The model has the same behavior for all PD payoff matrixes used in this chapter.
5.3.2.2 Results
The intention recognition model is acquired using the training corpus. Table 5.1
shows the recognition results of the model for the testing dataset, using the three
metrics described above. We show the recognition result for each strategy, and
for the whole dataset. Given that the training as well as the testing datasets are
generated in the presence of noise, the achieved intention recognition performance
is quite good. In the next section, we study the performance of players using this
intention recognition model together with the intention-based decision making model
(called IR players) in large scale population settings—particularly to address “What
is the role of intention recognition for the emergence of cooperation?”
5.3.3 Decision Making Model
The decision making model (in Subsection 5.2.3) is acquired using the training corpus
(Figure 5.1). We henceforth use α = 1, i.e., independently of the PD payoff matrices
(used in this chapter), if at the current round the co-player’s recognized intention
is an unconditional one (AllC or AllD), IR always defects, regardless of the current
game state; if it is TFT, IR always cooperates; and if it is WSLS, IR cooperates if
and only if the current state is either R or P 2. From here it is clear that, similar to
2For those who are interested in Logic Programming modeling (other readers can just ignore
this footnote), in the following we provide a declarative representation of this IR strategy using
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TFT, the strategy IR in this context bases its decision in the current round solely
on the last move of others (M = 1).
Figure 5.2 shows how an IR using these acquired intention recognition and
intention-based decision making model interacts with other strategies, including
AllC, AllD, TFT, WSLS, and another IR, in the absence of noise. Except with AllD,
IR plays C in the first two rounds with other strategies: IR always plays C in the first
round, and since others also play C (thus, the action is EC ), they are predicted as
a TFT (since P (EC|ALLC) = P (EC|TFT ) = P (EC|WSLS)  P (EC|AllD))—
therefore, IR plays C in the second round. Note that here TFT is set with a
higher priority than WSLS, which in turn has a higher priority than AllC. In the
third round, these strategies are all predicted as AllC since they play C in the sec-
ond round (and since P (RC|ALLC) > P (RC|WSLS) > P (RC|TFT )). Hence,
IR plays D in this round. The moves of these strategies (the other IR plays
D, others play C) classifies IR to be WSLS, and the other three remain to be
AllC, since P (RD|WSLS) > P (RD|TFT )  P (RD|AllC). The two inequalities
P (RC|WSLS) > P (RC|TFT ) and P (RD|WSLS) > P (RD|TFT ), for big enough
training corpus, are easily seen to hold: although TFT and WSLS equally likely
play C (resp., D) after R, since WSLS corrects mistakes better than TFT, mutual
cooperations are more frequent in plan sessions for WSLS in the training corpus.
The reaction in the fourth round classifies TFT to be TFT, IR and WSLS to be
WSLS, and AllC to be AllC ; and like that in the subsequent rounds. From the
the intention-based decision making framework in Chapter 3.
1. abds([move/1]).
2. on observed(decide)← new round.
3. decide← move(c). decide← move(d).
← move(c), move(d).
4. expect(move(X)).
5. move(d) / move(c)← has intention(co player, allc).
move(d) / move(c)← has intention(co player, alld).
move(c) / move(d)← has intention(co player, tft)
move(c) / move(d)← has intention(co player, wsls), game state(s), (s = ‘R’; s = ‘P’).
move(c) / move(d)← has intention(co player, wsls), game state(s), (s = ‘T’; s = ‘S’).
Starting a new interaction, an IR needs to choose a move, either cooperate (C) or defect (D)
(lines 2-3). Both options are expected, and there are no expectation to the contrary. The a priori
preferences in line 5 stating which move IR prefers to choose given the recognized intention of the
co-player (AllC, AllD, TFT or WSLS) and the current game state (‘T’, ‘R’, ‘P’ or ‘S’). The built-in
predicate has intention/2 in the body of the preferences triggers the intention recognition module
to validate if the co-player is most likely to follow a given intention (strategy) specified by the
second argument.
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fifth round on, IR cooperates with WSLS, TFT and another IR. If the number of
rounds to be played is very large, up to some big round, these three strategies will be
recognized as AllC again (since P (RC|ALLC) > P (RC|WSLS) > P (RC|TFT )),
then the process repeats as from third round. In our corpus, it only happens af-
ter more than 100 rounds. In playing with an AllD, IR cooperates in the first
round, and defects in the remaining rounds, since P (ED|ALLD)  P (ED|I)
for all I ∈ {AllC, TFT,WSLS} and furthermore P (s|ALLD)  P (s|I) for all
I ∈ {AllC, TFT,WSLS} and s ∈ {RD,SD, TD,PD} .
5.4 Experiments and Results
In the following we provide analytical results under different evolutionary dynamics
as well as using computer-based simulations. We show that the introduction of
intention recognition promotes the emergence of cooperation in various settings,
even in the presence of noise.
5.4.1 Analysis
To begin with, let us consider a population of AllC, AllD, and IR players. They
play the iterated PD. Suppose m (m < 100) is the average number of rounds. In
the absence of noise, the payoff matrix of AllC, AllD, and IR, in m rounds, is given
by (Figure 5.2, α = 1)

AllC AllD IR
AllC Rm Sm 2R+ S(m− 2)
AllD Tm Pm T + P (m− 1)
IR T (m− 2) + 2R P (m− 1) + S R(m− 1) + P
.
In each round AllC cooperates. Thus, its co-player would obtain a reward R if it
cooperates and a temptation payoff T otherwise; hence, in playing with AllC (first
column of the matrix), another AllC obtains m times of R since it cooperates in
each round; AllD obtains m times of T since it defects in each round; and IR obtains
2 times of R and (m − 2) times of T since it cooperates with AllC in the first two
rounds and defects in the remaining rounds (Figure 5.2). Other elements of the
matrix are computed similarly.
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Figure 5.2: Interactions of IR with AllC, AllD, TFT, WSLS and another IR, in the absence of
noise and α = 1.
Pairwise comparisons (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010; Nowak,
2006b) of the three strategies lead to the conclusions that AllC is dominated by IR
and that IR is an evolutionary stable strategy (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) if
R(m− 1) > T + P (m− 2), (5.4)
which always holds for m ≥ 3 (since 2R > T + P and R > P ). Evolutionarily
stable strategy is a strategy which, if adopted by a population of players, cannot be
invaded by any alternative strategy that is initially rare (Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998). This condition guarantees that once IR dominates the population, it becomes
stable (for m ≥ 3).
Furthermore, one can show that
1. IR is risk-dominant (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010) against
AllD if R(m− 1) + S > P (m− 1) + T , which is equivalent to
m >
T +R− S − P
R− P
. (5.5)
For Donation game, it is equivalent to: m > 2b/(b− c).
2. IR is advantageous (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010) against





For Donation game, it is equivalent to: m > (2b+ c)/(b− c).
Since IR and AllD are both evolutionary stable strategies, Eq. (5.5) provides the
condition for which IR has the greater basin of attraction (Nowak, 2006b; Sigmund,
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2010). Eq. (5.6) provides the condition for which natural selection favors an IR to
replace a population of AllDs, i.e. IR has a fixation probability greater than the
neural one (1/N) (Nowak, 2006b; Sigmund, 2010).
5.4.2 Evolutionary Simulations
In the presence of noise, it was not easy to provide an exact mathematical analysis.
Instead, we will study this case using computer simulations. For convenience and
a clear representation of simulation results, we perform our simulations using the
Donation game (Sigmund, 2010), i.e., T = b, R = b− c, P = 0, S = −c, satisfying
that b > c > 0.
We start with a well-mixed population of size N , with individuals using different
strategies. In each round of a generation, each individual interacts with all others,
engaging in a PD game. The payoffs are accumulated over all the rounds. After each
generation, an individual is randomly selected from the population, and will adopt
the strategy of another randomly selected individual using the pairwise comparison
rule (Szabó and Toke, 1998; Traulsen et al., 2006).
The results for some different settings are shown in Figure 5.3. Our results show
that IR always prevails against other strategies, including TFT, WSLS and GTFT,
for different benefit-to-cost ratios b/c, as well as more robust to noise. Namely, it
has a strictly larger range of the benefit-to-cost ratio where cooperation can emerge,
and can maintain it under a larger level of noise.
5.4.3 Intensities of Selection
We consider a setting where five strategies AllC, AllD, TFT, WSLS, and IR are
present in the population. We compute numerically stationary distributions for
variable intensity of selection β (Figure 5.4).The results show that, for small enough
noise, the population always spends more time in the homogeneous state of IR,
especially for strong intensities of selection (Figure 5.4a). When noise is large, WSLS
wins for strong intensities of selection, but IR still wins for the slow ones (Figure
5.4b). Note that in case the intensity of selection β is very small, it is famously
known in the literature as weak selection (Nowak et al., 2004; Traulsen et al., 2006;
Wu et al., 2010). Weak selection describes the situation in which the effects of payoff
differences are insignificant, hence the evolutionary dynamics are mainly driven by
random fluctuations. This aspect is frequently observed in evolutionary biology
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Figure 5.3: Simulation results for Donation game. In panels (a) and (b), we consider popula-
tions of three strategies, AllC, AllD and either IR, TFT or WLSL—equally distributed
at the beginning. We plot the final fraction of IR, TFT and WSLS. All simulations
end up in a homogeneous state (i.e. having only one type of strategy) in less than
5000 generations. Our results show that IR prevails TFT and WSLS for different
benefit-to-cost ratios b/c (panel a) and for different levels of noise (panel b). For a
small ratio b/c (around 1.2), IR starts having winning opportunity, and from around
1.4 the population always converges to the homogeneous state of IR. For TFT, they
are 1.4 and 2.1, respectively. WSLS has no chance to win for b/c ≤ 2.4. The dashed
black curve in (a) shows that the fraction of cooperation in the population of AllC,
AllD and IR is monotonic to b/c. In (b), our result shows that, in the presence of
noise, IR outperforms TFT and WSLS. This result is robust to chances on the value
of b/c (the inset of panel (b)). In panels (c) and (d), we consider a more complex
setting where the population consists of several types of strategies: AllC, AllD, TFT,
WSLS, GTFT (probability of forgiving a defect is 0.5) and IR (panel (c)) or without
IR (panel (d)). Except for the defective AllD and IR, the other strategies are cooper-
ative. Thus, instead of initially being equally distributed, we include a higher fraction
of AllDs in the initial population. Namely, each type has 40 individuals, and AllD has
80. IR always wins (panel (c)). However, if IR individuals are removed, AllD is the
winner (panel (d)), showing how IRs work as a catalyzer for cooperation. We have
tested and obtained similar results for larger population sizes. Finally, in (a) and (b)
we show how WSLS performs badly, as WSLS needs TFT s as a catalyst to perform
well (Sigmund, 2010)—which can be observed in panels (c) and (d). All results were
obtained averaging over 100 runs, for m = 10, N = 100 and β = 0.1.
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Figure 5.4: Stationary distribution (in percentage) of each strategy depending on the
intensity of selection β. The population consists of five strategies AllC, AllD, TFT,
WSLS, and IR. For small values of β, selection is nearly neutral. Strategy updating
is mostly random and frequencies of all strategies are roughly equal. Discrimination
between strategies occurs when β increases. (a) When noise is small, IR always wins;
(b) When noise is large, IRs wins for small β; WSLS wins when β is large. All
calculations are made with b/c = 3, m = 10, N = 100. When noise is present, the
average payoffs of each strategy are obtained by averaging 107 runs.
– a phenotype is often found to be slightly advantageous over another phenotype
(Akashi, 1995; Charlesworth and Eyre-Walker, 2007), as well as in human updating
strategy in behavioral games (Traulsen et al., 2010).
5.5 Discussion – two models of intention recognition for
the evolution of cooperation
There are various ways in which the capacity for intention recognition can confer on
its holder an evolutionary advantage. In the previous chapter, the intention recog-
nizers assess their co-players’ cooperativeness, while in this chapter they recognize
the co-players’ strategies or patterns of behavior. Both can be found pervasive in real
human interactions and communications. When looking for a collaborator/partner,
one usually assesses how he/she was cooperative with us in the past, in order to
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decide if one should cooperate with him/her in current affairs.
In more complex situations, one might need to assess more complicated pat-
terns of behavior, as was done by the model in this chapter. The patterns could
be those of social behavior prototypically represented by the strategies in social
dilemmas, but they could be more complicated, e.g. the strategic tactics in military
settings (Heinze, 2003; Sunzi and Sawyer, 1994). To enable such more complicated
assessments, it is natural that the intention recognizers have more prior experience,
especially in interacting with those patterns of behavior (Simon, 1957, 1990; Arthur,
1994; Todd, 2001). The main advantage resulting from this additional complication
is that herein the intention recognizer can, to some degree, predict future behavior
of the recognized strategist and take advantage from the information. For instance,
a pure cooperator AllC would always cooperate, hence, the intention recognizer can
exploit (i.e. defect with) the AllC without having to worry about its future retal-
iation. On the other hand, knowing that conditional cooperators like TFT s would
retaliate after a defection, the intention recognizer is cooperative towards them.
Differently, the intention recognizers from the previous model cannot distinguish
between pure cooperators and conditional cooperators, hence they are cooperative
towards them.
Technically, both models have been implemented by supplying Bayesian net-
work models with appropriate characterizations. One might even design a three-
layer Bayesian network, similar to the one of the previous chapter, to recognize a
co-player’s strategy; however, a significant role of the prior acquired plan corpus
or experience is to learn a (best-response) intention-based decision making model.
Differently, the intention recognizers in the previous chapter resorted instead to a
heuristic generalizing the behavior of tit-for-tat, namely, cooperating if the co-player
is more likely to cooperate and defecting otherwise.
In both models, the intention recognizers are restricted to exploiting only the
direct past interactions with the co-players. However, it is obvious that indirect
past observed interactions and other environmental relevant factors (such as noise
and population structure) should play an important role in the intention recognition
process. We envisage in the future to extend these models to integrate other relevant
factors to improve the intention recognition models.
Moreover, when considering intention recognition, or any cognitive capacities
in general, one might think of a need to take into account the cost required for
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performing the cognition (for instance to gather and memorize more relevant fac-
tors necessary for the performance). Our additional analysis shows that the results
obtained from both intention recognition models are robust with respect to the cog-
nitive cost, assuming it to be rather small compared to the cost of cooperation (i.e.,
compared to the parameter c in the Donation game).
5.6 Concluding Remarks
Using the tools of evolutionary game theory, we have addressed explicitly the role
played by intention recognition in the evolution of cooperation. We have shown,
analytically as well as experimentally, that intention recognition strongly promotes
the emergence of cooperation and maintains it well. Given the broad spectrum of
problems which are addressed using this cooperative metaphor, our result indicates
how intention recognition can be pivotal in social dynamics. Individuals which are
equipped with an ability to recognize intention of others, or intention recognizers,
can quickly recognize the defectors AllDs, thus not being exploited by them as for
the WSLS strategy. For their own benefit, the intention recognizers can exploit the
unconditional cooperators, thus do not suffer random drift as TFT and GTFT. Fur-
thermore, the intention recognizers are cooperative with the conditional cooperators,
including TFT, WSLS, and players alike themselves.
We have shown that a population with some initial fraction of intention recog-
nizers acting selfishly to achieve greatest benefit can lead to a stable cooperation
where intention recognizers come to prevail upon and permeate the population. The
intention recognition strategy has a greater range of benefit-to-cost ratios leading
to cooperation than the most successful existent strategies, including TFT, WSLS.
We have also shown that it is more robust to noise, as well as does prevail under a
various range of intensities of selection.
In addition, our approach of using a plan corpus makes a case for different other
AI techniques (Russell and Norvig, 2003) to work with the problem of cooperation.
In this work, we studied the role of intention recognition for the emergence of co-
operation, but other cognitive abilities are also of great interest and importance,
for example pattern recognition algorithms. Classification algorithms (or supervised
learning in general) are clearly a good candidate. Indeed, intention recognition can
be considered as a classification problem: the sequence of observed actions is clas-
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sified into a known strategy. In this regard, intention recognition is similar to the
part-of-speech tagging problem (Halteren, van H., 1999) where words need to be
probabilistically categorized into one of given tags (e.g. noun, verb, article, etc.):
actions correspond to words, while intentions correspond to possible tags. Hence,
naturally one can use techniques from this area to implement an intention recog-
nition strategy in the EGT context (see, e.g. my work using a Neural Network
model (Han and Marques, 2010)). Moreover, clustering algorithms (or unsupervised
learning in general) can be used to categorize the sequences of actions that are not
fit with the known strategies. This is a way to learn about unknown strategies,
categorize them, revise the model to take them into account (and pass the revised
model to the successors).
In short, our study provides new, clear evidence of the evolutionary advantages
of having the cognitive skill of intention recognition to deal with problems where





THE EMERGENCE OF COMMITMENTS AND COOPERATION
We may have all come on different ships,
but we’re in the same boat now.
Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968).
Abstract. Agents make commitments towards others in order to influ-
ence others in a certain way, often by dismissing more profitable options.
Most commitments depend on some incentive that is necessary to ensure
that the action is in the agent’s interest and thus, may be carried out to
avoid eventual penalties. The capacity for using commitment strategies
effectively is so important that natural selection may have shaped spe-
cialized capacities to make this possible. Evolutionary explanations for
commitment, particularly its role in the evolution of cooperation, have
been actively sought for and discussed in several fields, including Psy-
chology and Philosophy. In this chapter, using the tools of evolutionary
game theory, we provide a new model showing that individuals tend to
engage in commitments, which leads to the emergence of cooperation
0This chapter is based on the publication (Han et al., 2012b).
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even without assuming repeated interactions. The model is character-
ized by two key parameters: the punishment cost of failing commitment
imposed on either side of a commitment, and the cost of managing the
commitment deal. Our analytical results and extensive computer simu-
lations show that cooperation can emerge if the punishment cost is large
enough compared to the management cost.
6.1 Introduction
Over the last few years, several mechanisms have been pointed out to promote the
emergence and maintenance of cooperation. From group and kin relations, memory
and reputation based reciprocity mechanisms, to social diversity and context based
reactions, grounded or not on incipient levels of cognition, there has been a large
improvement on our capacity to understand the roots of animal and human coop-
eration (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998;
Nowak, 2006b; Santos et al., 2008; Sigmund, 2010; Han et al., 2011a,b). They are
certainly hugely important, but are they sufficient? Or, as many have suggested
(Boehm, 1999; Hirshleiffer, 1999; Humphrey, 1999), might there be other routes to
social behavior that have been neglected? Certainly there are. Commitment, which
amounts to expressing an intention rather than having it recognized, may stand as
another route to cooperation, even in its simplest form, as we purport to show here.
Agents make commitments towards others when they give up options in order to
influence others. Most commitments depend on some incentive that is necessary to
ensure that the action is in the agent’s interest and thus will be carried out (Gintis,
2001), on pain of some heavy penalty. Committers also incur in a small cost when
proposing or setting up a commitment so as to make it credible upfront to others,
and entice these to accept to commit.
The capacity for using commitment strategies effectively is so important that nat-
ural selection may have shaped specialized signaling capacities to make this possible
(Skyrms, 2010; Robson, 1990; Santos et al., 2011; Nesse, 2001b; de Vos et al., 2001;
Back and Flache, 2008). And it is believed to have an incidence on the emergence
of morality (Ruse, 2001). Assuming cooperation to be, at best, just the result of in-
dividuals’ purely competitive strategies can make it conceptually unstable (Oyama,
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2000), most especially in non-iterated or history-free interactions. And it seems pos-
sible that the spread of simplistic notions, rooted in science, about the evolutionary
origins of social relationships could foster a trend to make these relationships more
conflicted, and society more brutal. An antidote is an evolutionary approach to
behavior that incorporates a capacity for mutual commitment, shown advantageous
for all concerned (Nesse, 2001b), even in non-iterated or memory-free settings.
Hence, our goal in this chapter is to examine, through Evolutionary Game The-
ory (EGT) (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Sigmund, 2010), how the most simple
of commitment strategies work, and how they can give rise to the emergence of
cooperation. We shall do so in the setting of the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD).
In a nutshell, convincing others of one’s credibility in a commitment proposal
amounts to submitting to options that change the incentives of the situation. These
options, namely commitment cost and penalty for defaulting, can be expressed by
the payoffs specified in a game. When opponent players observe meticulously such
payoffs, and realize that compliance with a proposed commitment is in the proposing
player’s best interests, then, given any opponent player’s open option to commit,
these may change their expectations and behavior accordingly, and adopt as a result
a strategy which either accepts commitment proposals or ignores them.
In general, there are four main reasons to believe a commitment will be fulfilled
(Nesse, 2001b): i) a commitment can be self-reenforcing if it is secured by incentives
intrinsic to the situation; ii) a commitment can be secured by external incentives
controlled by third parties; iii) a commitment can be backed by a pledge of reputa-
tion; and iv) a commitment can be reinforced by internal emotional motives.
The first two types are secured in much the same way a loan is secured by
a collateral. They objectively change the situation so that fulfillment becomes in
the individual’s best interests. The latter two types do not change the objective
contingencies; they are subjective commitments in that they may involve a continued
option of reneging, according to some or other stance extraneous to the game’s given
payoffs matrix.
In our EGT setting however, we will simply assume that a game’s payoff ma-
trix, concerning a set of strategies, summarily ingrains and expresses in its structure
the impingement of all such contingencies. For instance, often a capacity for com-
mitment allows individuals to act in ways that reap the benefits of image scoring
through maintaining a reputation, or the access of others to a social history of prior
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interactions. In this study, for simplicity but also for exhibiting the purity and
power of the commitment mechanism, we ignore the effect of repeated interactions
(Trivers, 1971), and of any reputation (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Pacheco et al.,
2006) associated with particular individuals. We aim to show that the simplest of
core commitment mechanisms can improve cooperation, and leave any other com-
plications for the future, most promisingly how commitment can be combined with
and reinforce other known mechanisms of cooperation. And perhaps surprisingly we
can do so. Thus, no credibility of commitment will be taken into account (Castel-
franchi and Falcone, 2010) beyond that which is expressed in a game’s payoff matrix.
No reputation appraisal of the commitment proposer is made by its co-player, and
no historical or social data is even available to do so. Each pairwise interaction is
purely based on fixed individual strategies that might involve commitment or the
lack thereof. Also, no “cheater or deceit detection” or “intention recognition” is in
place (Han et al., 2011a,b). Nevertheless, systematic unconditional bluffing on the
part of a player is a possible fixed feature of its strategy, in the sense that, from the
start, the player does not intend to fulfill commitments.
It will be seen in our commitment model that players defaulting on their commit-
ments, be they the proposing or the accepting party, will be subject to evolutionary
disadvantage for a wide range of parameters.
We show that more elaborate commitment strategies are not strictly necessary
for commitment to become evolutionarily advantageous. Neither an aptitude for
higher cognition, nor for empathy, nor for mind reading are needed. These aptitudes
would only be required for more sophisticated forms of commitment, scaffolded atop
the core one. We will explain the evolution, in a population, of the capacity for a
simple form of commitment as the result of otherwise being excluded from a group
of committed promise abiding cooperators, in the sense that this strategy tends to
invade the game playing population under rather general conditions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we discuss
the relevant literature. In Section 6.3, our EGT commitment model and its methods
are defined and explained. Forthwith, in Section 6.4, we proffer results obtained with
the model, both analytic and via numeric and computer simulations. We conclude




Evolution of cooperation has been a central research topic of many fields, including
Biology, Economics, Artificial Intelligence, Political Science and Psychology (Axel-
rod, 1984; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 2006b; Santos et al., 2008; Sigmund,
2010; Han et al., 2011b; Hofmann et al., 2011). Several mechanisms responsible for
promoting cooperative behavior have been recently identified (see surveys in (Nowak,
2006b; Sigmund, 2010)). In these contexts, several aspects have been shown to play
an important role in the emergence of cooperation. Differently, our model does not
require any of those aspects, namely it does not assume kinship or in-group related-
ness of agents, nor repeated interactions or reputation consideration, nor concrete
structures of population distribution. However, we envisage that the mechanism
of commitment could reinforce the existing mechanisms of cooperation, e.g., easing
the conditions for the emergence of cooperation therein, or leading to high levels
of cooperation under otherwise identical conditions. This will be the subject of the
future work.
Evolutionary explanations of commitment, particularly its role in the evolution
of cooperation, have been actively sought for and discussed in several fields, in-
cluding Psychology and Philosophy (Nesse, 2001b; Gintis, 2001; Hirshleifer, 2001;
Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010; de Vos et al., 2001; Back and Flache, 2008; Ruse,
2001). But there are only a few computational models that show the evolution-
ary advantages of commitment in problems where cooperative acts are beneficial
(Skyrms, 2010; Robson, 1990; Santos et al., 2011). In addition, often models rely
on repeated interactions or long-term relationships (de Vos et al., 2001; Back and
Flache, 2008), alike the conditions where Triver’s direct reciprocity (Trivers, 1971)
may play a role. Here we provide an analytic model in the framework of evolutionary
game theory showing that, with the availability of the mechanism of commitment,
cooperation can emerge even without assuming repeated interactions.
Last but not least, it is undoubtedly important to mention the extensive litera-
ture of AI and Multi-agent System research on commitment, e.g., (Schelling, 1990;
Wooldridge and Jennings, 1999; Hirshleifer, 2001; Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010;
Winikoff, 2007; Harrenstein et al., 2007; Chopra and Singh, 2009). The main concern
therein is how to formalize different aspects of commitment and how a commitment
mechanism can be implemented in multi-agent interactions to enhance them (e.g.
for improved collaborative problem solving (Wooldridge and Jennings, 1999)), espe-
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cially in the context of game theory. In contradistinction, our concern is in the nature
of an evolutionary explanation of commitment, particularly how it can promote the
emergence of cooperation.
6.3 Models and Methods
6.3.1 Model
Let us consider a commitment variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which a
new type of cooperator (denoted by COM C) that, before each interaction, asks the
co-player whether it commits to cooperate. If the co-player does not so commit,
there is no interaction. Both players get 0. Otherwise, if the co-player commits,
they then go on to play with each other in the present interaction. If the co-player
keeps to its commitment, both players obtain the reward payoff, R 1 . Otherwise
(if the co-player fails its commitment), the proposing or focal player obtains the
sucker payoff, S, and its co-player obtains the temptation payoff, T . However, the
one that fails the commitment will suffer a penalty cost, and its non-defaulting co-
player gains a compensation for the potential loss due to its default of fulfilling the
commitment. For simplicity, we assume that these two amounts (penalty and com-
pensation) are equal, being denoted by δ. The penalty cost can be a real monetary
one, e.g., in the form of prior debit (e.g., in the case of accommodation rental) or
of a subsequent punishment cost (e.g., commitment was performed in terms of a
legal contract, and one who fails commitment must pay a cost to compensate for the
other), or an imaginary abstract value, e.g., public spread of good/bad reputation
(bad reputation for the one that fails, and sympathy for the other), or even an emo-
tional suffering (Nesse, 2001b; Gintis, 2001; Hirshleifer, 2001; Ruse, 2001). How this
cost is set up depends on the types of commitment at work, or the reason for which
the commitment is believed to be fulfilled (see Introduction), which topic is beyond
the scope of this thesis. However, various techniques can be seen in (Schelling, 1990;
Hirshleifer, 2001).
Two players that defect in an interaction obtain the punishment payoff, P 2. As
1Note that here we do not yet take into account any execution noise (see, e.g., (Sigmund, 2010;
Pacheco et al., 2006)), that is, under this noise the agents might mis-implement their intended
choice, from cooperate to defect or vice versa. Thus, COM C will never mis-implement the intended
commitment choice. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that our additional analysis shows that the results
obtained in the sequel are robust to a rather high level of execution noise.
2For the sake of a clear representation, in our analysis we adopt P = 0 (Santos et al., 2006b;
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usual, for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the payoff entries satisfy the ordering, T > R >
P > S, whereas the four possible outcomes can be written down as a payoff matrix
( C D
C R,R S, T
D T, S P, P
)
.
For setting up a commitment, the proposer must pay a small management cost,
ε. The cost of proposing and setting up the commitment might be high, but it is
reasonable to assume that this cost is quite small compared to the mutual benefit
of a cooperation strategy guaranteeing commitment, ε << R.
Given the nature of a situation expressed in terms of payoff entries, one can nat-
urally expect that if a proposed punishment cost, δ, is high enough compared to the
cost of managing the commitment, ε – to convince and guarantee that cooperation
is in the proposer’s interest and also drive away potential exploiters – cooperation
can emerge, even in the fierce environment of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. This penalty
and management relation is subject to detailed study below, both analytically and
by means of computer simulations.
We consider a finite population of a constant size, consisting of four strategies:
COM C (as described above), C (always cooperates, without proposing to commit),
D (always defects, and does not commit when being asked to), and D COM (always
defects, though commits when being asked to). Here, we assume that cooperators,
including COM C and C players, always commit whenever being asked to since
they are better off to do so, as cooperation is their default choice, and reasonable
commitment deals only are proposed. Hence, for the sake of exposition, the two
other (unreasonable) strategies, those of cooperators that refuse to commit and of
defectors that propose commitment, are omitted here (they would become eliminated
anyway). The former is dominated by the pure cooperator strategy, C, while the
latter is by the pure defector strategy, D.
In each round, two random players are chosen from the population for an inter-
Sigmund, 2010) (as in the Donation game), even if the more general case can be analyzed in the
same manner and portray similar results to the ones presented below.
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action. For the row player, the (average) payoff matrix reads

COMC C D DCOM
COMC R− ε/2 R− ε −ε S + δ − ε
C R R S S
D 0 T P P
DCOM T − δ T P P
. (6.1)
Note that when a COM C interacts with another COM C, only one of them pays
the cost of having proposed commitment, ε (e.g., the arbitrary one that proposes).
Therefore, the average payoff of a COM C in playing with another COM C is, R−
ε/2.
6.3.2 Methods
Our analysis is based on evolutionary game theory methods for finite populations
(Nowak et al., 2004; Imhof et al., 2005) (see EGT methods).
Now let us recall some important analytic measures which will be used in our
analytical study. In a pair-wise comparison of strategy A with strategy B, we say
that A is advantageous (against B) if an A mutant has a fixation probability in a
population of agents using B greater than that of the neutral selection (which equals
the inverse of population size, 1/N) (Nowak et al., 2004; Nowak, 2006b; Sigmund,
2010). Interestingly, it was shown that this condition holds if
(N − 2)πA,A + (2N − 1)πA,B > (N + 1)πB,A + (2N − 4)πB,B, (6.2)
which, in the limit of large N , is simplified to
πA,A + 2πA,B > πB,A + 2πB,B. (6.3)
Another important measure to compare the two strategies A and B is which direction
the transition is stronger or more probable, an A mutant fixating in a population of
agents using B or a B mutant fixating in the population of agents using A. It can
be shown that the former is stronger if (Kandori et al., 1993; Sigmund, 2010)
(N − 2)πA,A +NπA,B > (N − 2)πB,A +NπB,B, (6.4)
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Figure 6.1: Stationary distribution and fixation probabilities. The population spends most
of the time in the homogenous state of COM C. The black arrows stand for the
transitions that are rather stronger than neutral. The strongest transitions are from
C to D and D COM, and the slowest one is from COM C to C. There are rather
strong transitions from D and D COM to COM C. Parameters: T = 2, R = 1, P =
0, S = −1; δ = 4; ε = 0.05; imitation strength, β = 1; population size, N = 100;
µN = 1/N denotes the neutral fixation probability.
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which, in the limit of large N , is simplified to
πA,A + πA,B > πB,A + πB,B. (6.5)
6.4 Results
We compute the fixation probabilities and stationary distribution numerically for
small mutation or exploration rates (see EGT Methods). The population spends
most of the time in the homogeneous state where all individuals utilize the commit-
ment strategy (Figure 6.1).
In general, amongst the monomorphic states of the population, the strongest
transitions are from C to D and C to D COM. The difference of a small cost of
proposing commitment, ε, between COM C and C, leads to a near-neutral transition
from COM C to C. The more intricate transitions are between COM C and D or
D COM, which are the central part of our analysis.
Between D and COM C, for ε << R, COM C is advantageous. Namely, by a
pairwise comparisons of COM C and D (Nowak et al., 2004; Nowak, 2006b) that





This inequality also guarantees that, for a population of size N > 4, the more
probable transition is from D to COM C, i.e., satisfying that (Kandori et al., 1993;
Sigmund, 2010) (see Eq. 6.5)
(N − 2)(R− ε
2
)−Nε > 0. (6.7)








It guarantees that the transition of D COM to COM C is more probable than the
opposite if
(N − 2)(R− ε
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). (6.10)





















the transition of D COM to COM C is the more probable one, as well as greater
than neutral.
Taking together with the fact that the transition of COM C to C is near neutral,
one can expect that if the two parameters δ and ε satisfy the inequalities (6.6)
and (6.12), COM C will prevail – the population will spend most of the time in its
homogenous state. This expectation is supported by the numerical results in Figures
6.2 and 6.3. For a given payoff matrix of the PD, for strong enough punishment cost
of failing commitment, δ, and small enough cost of setting up the commitment, ε,
the population spends most of the time in the homogeneous state of COM C (Figure
6.2). In addition, this result is also flexible with respect to the payoff values of the
PD (Figure 6.3). For the sake of a clear representation of the result, we use in this
numerical experiment the Donation game (Sigmund et al., 2010) – a special case
of PD – where T = b, R = b − c, P = 0, S = −c, satisfying that b > c > 0; b
and c stand for “benefit” and “cost” of cooperation, respectively. It shows that, for
given δ and ε, for large enough b/c, the population spends most of the time in the
homogeneous state of COM C.
So far, our analytic and numerical results were obtained in the limit of small
mutation rates. Next, by extensive computer simulations, we show that this re-
markable performance of the commitment strategy COM C is flexible with respect
to mutation rates (Figure 6.4). Namely, for all the mutation rates up to 0.1, the
population always spends most of the time in the homogenous state of COM C. It
is also noteworthy, that our analytic results for small imitation strengths and under
the extremes of low and high mutation or exploration rates — based on the methods
described in (Antal et al., 2009) — comply with this simulation results.
All in all, our study exhibits that, in spite of the absence of repeated interactions,













 commitment cost, ε
Figure 6.2: Contour plot of the frequency of COM C as a function of ε and δ. In a
population of COM C, COM D, C, and D individuals, for a wide range of ε and δ,
the population spends most of the time in the homogeneous state of COM C. The
smaller the cost of proposing commitment, ε, and the greater the punishment cost of
failing commitment, δ, the greater the frequency of COM C. The payoffs being used














￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿









￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿



















2 3 4 5 6 7
Figure 6.3: Frequency of each strategy as a function of benefit-to-cost ratio, b/c, for
Donation game (T = b, R = b − c, P = 0, S = −c, with b ≥ c). In a population
of COM C, COM D, C, and D individuals, for a large enough benefit-to-cost ratio,
the population spends most of the time in the homogeneous state of COM C, while D
prevails when this ratio is very small. Parameters: δ = 4; ε = 0.05; imitation strength,
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Figure 6.4: Frequency as a function of mutation rates. Symbols indicate results from com-
puter simulations (averaged over 109 update steps), and solid lines show the numerical
approximation results for small mutation rates. The population consists of COM C,
COM D, C, and D individuals. COM C always dominates for all the mutation rates
up to 0.1. Parameter values: T = 2, R = 1, P = 0, S = −1; δ = 4; ε = 0.05; imitation
strength, β = 1.0; population size, N = 100. The simulation results are obtained




of commitment proposal may enable the emergence of cooperation. By imposing a
high cost for failing a commitment, when compared to the cost of setting up or
managing the commitment deal, the commitment cooperative agents COM C can
get rid of the fake committers (D COM) as well as avoid being exploited by the pure
defectors (D), while playing approximately equally well against the pure cooperators
(C). The results of this study suggest that our specialized capacity for commitment,
which might have been shaped by natural selection (Nesse, 2001b) consists in a
capacity for managing to impose a high cost of punishment, whether it is monetary
or of abstract emotional or reputation value, with a relatively small cost.
We note that there is a significant difference between our commitment model
and the works on costly punishment (Ohtsuki et al., 2009; Rand and Nowak, 2011;
Dreber et al., 2008; Hauert et al., 2007; Fehr and Gachter, 2002). A commitment
deal must be agreed by both sides of it in advance, thereby giving credibility and
justification to punish any defaulting player. In addition, the prior agreement gives
rise to compensation—the amount of which, in some cases, is agreed explicitly in
advance—to the non-defaulting player. This compensation for the non-defaulting
player is the significant difference that makes successful those players using the
commitment strategy, while those using the costly punishment strategy have only a
narrow margin of efficiency (Ohtsuki et al., 2009); does not stand out as a winning
strategy (Dreber et al., 2008); nor does it promote cooperation at all when taking into
account antisocial punishment (Rand and Nowak, 2011; Herrmann et al., 2008). The
compensation might bring benefit to the commitment strategists once an appropriate
deal would be arranged.
This suggests that although costly punishment, whether it is social or antisocial,
might not promote the evolution of cooperation, what we call ‘justified’ punishment,
which is warranted by an appropriate commitment deal, does. This kind of pun-
ishment might not be costly at all, and can even bring net benefit to its upholder,
hence leading to the emergence of cooperation.
We also note that in our model D COM plays worse than D when a strong
commitment deal is in place. The commitment proposers COM C can even be better
off when playing with the fake committers D COM than when playing with the pure
defectors D, because of the big compensation they can earn from the strong deal.
This might lead to a new kind of commitment proposal cheaters, who would make
efforts to cheat their co-players into a strong commitment deal with particularly high
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punishment cost, and then later deliberately attempt to make them unable to fulfill
the commitment deal (perhaps in a secret way to avoid retaliation), hence obtaining
the compensation benefit. This kind of behavior might evolve in situations wherein
failing a commitment is very costly (for instance destroying opponents’ reputation
in an election). This new aspect of commitment separates it from costly punishment
models in the literature, opening the door to the study of deceit within commitment
(Trivers, 2011).
6.5 Discussion
Within the general game theory concept of commitment, several distinctions can help
separate different subtypes. In particular, some commitments are upfront promises
of a next move that can help, while others are upfront threats of a subsequent move
that can harm. Commitments can be conditional or unconditional. Threats are
usually attempts to influence another person’s next move by stating a conditional
subsequent move, and that’s how we may envisage them. Promises are more likely to
be unconditional, and that’s how we may conceive of them, though more generally
they can be conditional on the other fulfilling a matching promise. Concerning
this, we note a difference between a commitment and a convention. A convention
is a means for monitoring a commitment: it specifies under what circumstances a
commitment can be abandoned and how an agent should behave both locally and
towards others when one of these conditions arises (Wooldridge and Jennings, 1999).
Commitments can also be just towards oneself, taking into account the evolution of
possible futures afforded by actions and events, and the individual’s prior and post
preferences, in what might be classically seen as a game against nature.
In (Pereira and Han, 2009b,a), three different types of individual commitment –
hard, revocable, and momentary – are studied in such an evolution context. Let us
recall that commitment, in the context of game theory, is a device or mechanism to
decide the outcome with the other party (Schelling, 1990). Schelling distinguishes
between commitment pure and simple and commitment that takes the form of a
threat. What he calls “ordinary” commitment corresponds, in game theory, to the
making of an opening announcement in a sequential play, which we dub preemptive,
just before both players make their actual move. To constitute a preemption, a
player’s announcement action must be irrevocable, that is a promise that is assuredly
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kept. Preemptive commitment is not necessarily profitable, because it hinges on
the opponent’s actual move. Schelling however does not assume the other type of
commitment as a “threat”, which pertains to the player’s move in reaction to the
opponent’s move. Threats, being conditional, may be of the “if-then-else” form, and
can thus combine a threat and a promise, the latter albeit implicit whenever there
are just two possible moves. We prefer instead to label “reactive” such so-called
threat commitments. In the game context, these occur when the player with the
last move irrevocably pledges to respond, in a specified but contingent way, to the
opponent’s prior choice (Hirshleiffer, 1999).
In a nutshell, some players can be “preemptive” committers – those that al-
ways propose and always accept proposed commitments–, others may be “reactive”
committers – those that always make a “reactive” statement and comply with the
implicit requests in such statements–, while other players, though accepting to com-
mit nevertheless default on their commitment, and even others simply omit and
ignore preemptive or reactive commitments in their strategies – they might for in-
stance be persistent defectors or persistent cooperators as we have seen, or, for that
matter, follow any other strategy ignorant of commitment. Moreover, in iterated
games, commitments can concern future rounds and not just the present one.
We purport to have shown that a simple commitment abiding cooperative strat-
egy can be evolutionarily advantageous even in a non-iterated game setting. But
much remains to be explored. In the more general setting and to avoid confusion, it
can be helpful to distinguish, even if only conceptually, between “execution moves”
and “pre-play moves” (Hirshleiffer, 1999). The terms first move and last move then
always refer exclusively to execution moves – the choices that actually generate the
payoffs. In contrast, commitments come earlier with respect to execution moves:
they are pre-play moves. A preemptive commitment is a pre-play move that al-
lows the player making it to take the first execution move. A reactive commitment,
although also a pre-play move, can be made only by the player who has the last ex-
ecution move. In either case, by giving up on his or her choice through committing,
the commitment player leaves the opponent with “the last clear chance to decide
the outcome” (Schelling, 1990).
In our present game setting, however, there was no need to make the distinction
between the first and the second to play, because each possible player strategy
move is exhibited and fixed from the start, as expressed and ingrained in the payoff
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matrix. By so introducing the several committed unconditional move strategies –
though the payoff is of course conditional on the opponent’s move–, we can emulate
what would happen in a round if a move sequence actually existed. Put briefly, our
commitment model is of the simplest kind and, moreover, it is brought to bear solely
on the very next move fold of a pair of players, with no history available on prior
commitments. Nevertheless, it captures core features of commitment, namely the
high cost of defaulting to discourage false commitment, and thus make it plausible,
and a comparatively small but non-zero cost of commitment proposal to lend it initial
credibility. On top of this core model more elaborate models affording commitment
can subsequently be rooted, including those involving delayed deceit.
What’s more, commitment (or intention manifestation) and intention recogni-
tion, are but two sides of a coin really, and their joint study in the EGT setting is
all but unavoidable. We will study the combination of these two mechanisms in the
next chapter.
It has become increasingly obvious that maximizing reproductive success often
requires keeping promises and fulfilling threats, even when that requires in turn sac-
rifices regarding individual short-term interests. That natural selection has shaped
special mental capacities to make this possible seems likely, including a capacity
for commitment (Nesse, 2001b) and for intention recognition (Han et al., 2011a,b).
The commitment stance goes yet further, and many aspects of human groups seem
shaped by effects of commitments and intention recognition, namely group bound-
aries, initiation rituals, ideologies, and signals of loyalty to the group (Skyrms, 1996,
2003, 2010). Conversely, many aspects of groups seem to exist largely to facilitate
commitment to cooperate and to limit the utility of coercive threats.
The generalized ability for commitment to support cooperative interaction is an
important aspect of plasticity in human behavior, and humans support their deal-
making in lots of ways. The law is full of instances of people using techniques of
commitment to establish the honesty of their intentions, namely through a variety
of contracts (Goodenough, 2001). Institutions themselves are supported on com-
mittal contracts, and the law of the land proffers methods for constituting and of
accountability of social institutions (Searle, 2010).
We believe studies of commitment will benefit greatly from rigorous models that
allow for their analytical study and computer simulation, and in particular within
the fold of EGT for the better to examine the emergence of complex social behavior.
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Chapter 7
INTENTION RECOGNITION, COMMITMENT AND THE EVOLUTION
OF COOPERATION
Commitment is what transforms a promise into reality. It is the words
that speak boldly of your intentions. And the actions which speak louder
than the words. It is making the time when there is none. Coming
through time after time after time, year after year after year. Commit-
ment is the stuff character is made of; the power to change the face of
things. It is the daily triumph of integrity over skepticism.
Abraham Lincoln, 1809-1863
Abstract. Individuals make commitments towards others in order to
influence others to behave in certain ways. Most commitments may de-
pend on some incentive that is required to ensure that the action is in the
agent’s best interest and thus, should be carried out to avoid eventual
penalties. Similarly, individuals may ground their decision on an accu-
rate assessment of the intentions of others. Hence, both commitments
and intention recognition go side by side in behavioral evolution. In
this chapter, we analyze the role played by the co-evolution of intention
0This chapter is based on the publication (Han et al., 2012c).
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recognition plus the emergence of commitments, in the framework of the
evolution of cooperative behavior. We again resort to the tools of evolu-
tionary game theory, showing how the combination of these two aspects
of human behavior can enhance the emergent fraction of cooperative acts
under a broad spectrum of configurations.
7.1 Introduction
Intention recognition is ubiquitous in many kinds of human interactions and com-
munications, with much documented experimental evidence (Woodward et al., 2009;
Meltzoff, 2007; Tomasello, 1999, 2008). It is so critical for human social functioning
and the development of key human abilities, such as language and culture, that it
might have been shaped by natural selection (Woodward et al., 2009; Tomasello,
2008; Skyrms, 1996; Han et al., 2011a,b) (see again Chapters 4 and 5). Technically,
intention recognition can be defined as a process of becoming aware of the intentions
or goals of another agent, inferring them through observed actions or their effects
on the environment (Kautz and Allen, 1986b; Charniak and Goldman, 1993; Heinze,
2003; Pereira and Han, 2009c, 2011b).
Clearly there might be cases where it is difficult, if not impossible, to recognize
the intentions of another agent. It might be your first interaction with someone
in your life, and you have no information about him/her which can be used for
intention recognition. You also might know someone well, but you still might have
very little relevant information in a given situation to predict the intentions with
high enough confidence. In such cases, the strategy of proposing a commitment, or
manifesting an intention, can help to impose or clarify intentions of others 1.
Moreover, agents make commitments towards others when they give up options
in order to influence others. Most commitments depend on some incentive that is
necessary to ensure that an action (or even an intention) is in the agent’s interest and
thus will be carried out in the future (Gintis, 2001). As previously, the capacity for
using commitment strategies effectively is so important that natural selection may
have shaped specialized capacities to make this possible (Skyrms, 2010; Robson,
1Intention is choice with commitment (Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Bratman, 1987; Roy, 2009b).
Once an agent intends to do something, it must settle on some state of affairs for which to aim,
because of its resource limitation and in order to coordinate its future actions. Deciding what
to do established a form of commitment (Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Roy, 2009b). Proposing a
commitment deal to another agent consists in asking it to express or clarify its intentions.
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1990; Santos et al., 2011; Ruse, 2001; Frank, 2001; Nesse, 2001b; de Vos et al., 2001;
Back and Flache, 2008).
One of the commitments we all know is marriage. By giving up the option to
leave someone else, spouses gain security and an opportunity for a much deeper
relationship that would be impossible otherwise (Nesse, 2001b; Frank, 2001), as
it might be risky to assume a partner’s intention of staying faithful without the
commitment of marriage. A contract is another popular kind of commitment, e.g.
for an apartment lease (Frank, 2001). When it is risky to assume another agent’s
intention of being cooperative, arranging an appropriate contract provides incentives
for cooperation. However, for example in accommodation rental, a contract is not
necessary when the cooperative intention is of high certainty, e.g. when the business
affair is between close friends or relatives. It said, arranging a commitment deal can
be useful to encourage cooperation whenever intention recognition is difficult, or
cannot be performed with sufficiently high certainty. On the other hand, arranging
commitments is not for free, and requires a specific capacity to set it up within
a reasonable cost (for the agent to actually benefit from it) (Nesse, 2001b,a) —
therefore it should be avoided when opportune to do so. In the case of marriage,
partners sometimes choose to stay together without an official commitment when it
might be too costly (e.g., it could be against parents’ or families’ wish, or it may
need to be in secret because of their jobs) and/or they strongly trust each other’s
faithfulness (e.g., because of emotional attachment (Frank, 1988, 2001)). In short, a
combination of the two strategies, those of commitment and of intention recognition,
seems unavoidable. Nevertheless, intention recognition without actual commitment
can be enhanced by costly engagement gifts, in support of sexual selection and
attachment (Miller and Todd, 1998; Haselton and Buss, 2001). Furthermore, social
emotions can act as ersatz commitment (Frank, 1988).
In this chapter, we start from the model of commitment formation presented
in the previous chapter (also see (Han et al., 2012b)), characterized by two key
parameters: a punishment cost of failing commitment imposed on either side of a
commitment deal, and the cost of managing it. Therein we have shown that, if
a strong enough commitment deal can be arranged, that is, with a small enough
management cost and a large enough punishment cost, cooperation can emerge in a
population of selfish agents.
On top of that model, also using the tools of Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)
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(Maynard-Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 2006a; Sigmund et al.,
2010), we show that combining intention recognition and commitment strategies in
a reasonable way can lead to the emergence of improved cooperation, not able to be
achieved solely by either strategy. Our study seeks what is a reasonable combination
of commitment and intention recognition. We shall do so in the setting of the one-
shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (see EGT methods).
It will be seen from our model that, in most of the cases, there is a wide range
of combination of the intention recognition and commitment strategies, which leads
to a strategy that performs better than either strategy solely – in the sense that
the population spends more time in the homogeneous state of agents using that
strategy (Imhof et al., 2005; Hauert et al., 2007) (see also EGT methods for finite
populations). Our results suggest that, if one can recognize intentions of others with
high enough confidence or certainty, one should rely more on it, especially when it
is difficult to reach to a conceivably strong commitment deal. It helps to avoid
the unnecessary cost of arranging and managing the deal. That is, in a transparent
world where people have nothing to hide from each other, contracts are unnecessary.
On the other hand, when intention recognition with high precision is difficult (due
to, e.g. environment noise, agents have great incentives to hide intentions, or there
are not enough observed actions), one should rely more on the commitment strategy,
particularly if a reasonable deal can be envisaged.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 7.2, we in-
troduce the model of commitment, on top of which we integrate the co-evolution of
commitment and intention recognition. In Section 7.3, we provide analytical and
computer simulations obtained from our model. In Section 7.4, some discussions on
the implication of the results are provided. The chapter ends by proffering some
concluding remarks.
7.2 Models
For ease of following the remainder of this final core chapter of the thesis, we first
summarize the commitment variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma presented in the




7.2.1 Commitment variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Let us consider a commitment variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which a
new type of cooperator (denoted by COM C) that, before each interaction, asks the
co-player whether it commits to cooperate. If the co-player does not so commit,
there is no interaction. Both players get 0. Otherwise, if the co-player commits,
they then go on to play with each other in the present interaction. If the co-player
keeps to its commitment, both players obtain the reward payoff, R. Note that here
we do not yet take into account execution noise (see, e.g., (Sigmund, 2010)), i.e.
the agents might mis-implement their intended choice, from cooperate to defect
or vice versa. Thus, COM C will never mis-implement the intended commitment
choice, all the more so because commitment always entails an initial cost, thus
being no point in proposing commitment when not intending to honor it. The
payoffs of the commitment PD game, as we shall see, would make such bluffing
players inevitably worse off. Otherwise (if the co-player fails its commitment), the
proposing or focal player obtains the sucker payoff, S, and its co-player obtains the
temptation payoff, T . However, the one that fails the commitment, whatever the
player, will suffer a penalty cost for its non-defecting co-player to get a compensation.
For simplicity, it is assumed that these two amounts are equal, denoted by δ. This
cost can be a real monetary one, e.g., in the form of prior debit (e.g., in the case of
accommodation rental) or of a punishment cost (e.g., commitment was performed
in terms of a legal contract, and the one who fails commitment must pay a penalty
cost), or an imaginary abstract value, e.g., public spread of good/bad reputation
(bad reputation for the one that fails, and sympathy for the other), or even emotional
suffering (Nesse, 2001b; Gintis, 2001; Hirshleifer, 2001; Ruse, 2001). How this cost
is set up depends on the types of commitment at work, or the reason for which the
commitment is believed to become fulfilled (Schelling, 1990; Hirshleifer, 2001; Han
et al., 2012b).
Two players that defect in an interaction obtain the punishment payoff, P . As
usual, for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the payoff entries satisfy the ordering, T > R >
P > S, whereas the four possible outcomes can be written down as a payoff matrix
( C D
C R,R S, T





For setting up a commitment, the proposer must pay a small cost, ε. The cost of
proposing and setting up the commitment might be high, but it is reasonable to
assume that this cost is very small compared to the mutual benefit of a cooperation
strategy guaranteeing commitment, ε << R.
We consider a finite population of constant size, consisting of four strategies:
COM C (as described above), C (always cooperates, without proposing a commit-
ment deal), D (always defects, and does not commit when being asked to), and
D COM (always defects, though commits when being asked to). In the previous
chapter, we have shown analytically and by computer simulations that COM C
dominates the population if the punishment cost δ is large enough compared to the
management cost ε, thereby leading to the emergence of cooperation.
In each round, two random players are chosen from the population for an inter-
action. For the row player, the (average) payoff matrix reads
M1 =

COM C C D D COM
COM C R− ε/2 R− ε −ε S + δ − ε
C R R S S
D 0 T P P
D COM T − δ T P P
. (7.1)
7.2.2 Combination of intention recognition and commitment
We provide a new strategy, IRCOM, which combines the two strategies, those of
intention recognition and commitment. In an interaction, IRCOM recognizes its co-
player’s intention, which is either to cooperate or to defect, similarly to our model for
the evolution of cooperation presented in Chapter 4 (see also (Han et al., 2011a)).
A confidence level, cl, is assigned to the recognition result. It defines the degree
of confidence (here in terms of probability) that IRCOM predicts the co-player’s
intention correctly 2. In general, cl follows some probability distribution. As in a
2In AI, the problem of intention recognition has been paid attention for several decades, and the
main stream is that of probabilistic approaches (Charniak and Goldman, 1993; Heinze, 2003; Bui
et al., 2002; Blaylock and Allen, 2004; Armentano and Amandi, 2009). They tackle the problem by
assigning probabilities to conceivable intentions (conditional on the current observations), based on
which the intentions are ranked. Similarly to (Blaylock and Allen, 2004; Armentano and Amandi,
2009; Han and Pereira, 2011b), in our model, a degree of confidence in terms of a probability
measure, is assigned to intentions. Additional discussions on probabilistic approaches to intention
recognition are found in Chapter 2.
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real intention recognition problem, the distribution should depend on the intention
recognition method at work (how efficient it is), the environment IRCOM lives
in (is it supportive for gathering relevant information for the recognition process,
e.g. observability of co-players’ direct and indirect interactions, perception noise,
population structure), etc. For example, we can consider different distributions
satisfying that the longer IRCOM survives, the more precisely or confidently it
performs intention recognition; or, considering the repeated interaction setting in
the framework of the iterated PD, the more IRCOM interacts with its co-player, the
better it can recognize the co-player’s intention (see intention recognition models for
the iterated PD in Chapters 4 and 5).
We model cl by a continuous random variable X with probability density func-
tion f(x, U), where U is a vector characterizing the factors that might influence cl,
including the efficiency of the intention recognition model at work, the environmen-
tal factors (e.g., noise, population structure), and the interaction setting (repeated,
one-shot, etc.).
If IRCOM is confident enough about the intention recognition process and result,
that is cl is greater than a given, so-called, confidence threshold θ ∈ [0, 1], then in the
current interaction IRCOM cooperates if the recognized intention of the co-player is
to cooperate, and defects otherwise. The prediction is wrong with probability (1−cl).
For simplicity, we assume that the prediction is a (continuous) random variable, Y ,
uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Hence, the probability that IRCOM utilizes intention
recognition, but with an incorrect and correct prediction, respectively, can be written
as joint probability distributions (Gut, 2009, Chapter 1) (Han et al., 2012e)





f(x, U)dy dx, (7.2)





f(x, U)dy dx. (7.3)
If cl ≤ θ, i.e. IRCOM is not confident enough about its intention prediction, it
behaves the same as COM C (see above). The greater θ is, the more cautious
IRCOM is about its intention recognition result. Obviously, if θ = 1, IRCOM
behaves identically to COM C; and if θ = 0, IRCOM behaves identically to a (pure)
intention recognizer (Han et al., 2011a,b) (see Figure 7.1).
We now replace COM C with IRCOM, considering a population of four strate-
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gies, IRCOM, C, D, and D COM. For the row player, the (average) payoff matrix
reads
M = θM1 +M2, (7.4)
where M2 is the payoff matrix when IRCOM utilizes the intention recognition strat-
egy, i.e. in the case cl > θ. To derive M2, we consider the case that cl has a uniform
distribution in the interval [0, 1], i.e. f(x, U) = 1 for x ∈ [0, 1] and 0 otherwise.
Note that, on average, this can be considered as the distribution of a very inefficient
intention recognition model because the confidence level or precision is a random
number uniformly drawn from [0, 1]. As the prediction of the co-player’s intention is
only between two options, cooperate and defect, a random choice prediction already
has a confidence level of 0.5.
Computing the integrals in Eqs. (7.2) and (7.3), we obtain: pic = (1−θ)1−θ2 and
pc = (1− θ)1+θ2 . Hence,
M2 = (1− θ)

m11 m12 m13 m14
m21 R S S
m31 T P P





P (1− θ)2 + (S + T )(1− θ)(1 + θ) +R(1 + θ)2
]
;
m12 = 12 [T (1− θ) +R(1 + θ)]; m13 =
1
2 [S(1− θ) + P (1 + θ)];
m14 = 12 [S(1− θ) + P (1 + θ)]; m21 =
1
2 [S(1− θ) +R(1 + θ)];
m31 = 12 [T (1− θ) + P (1 + θ)]; m41 =
1
2 [T (1− θ) + P (1 + θ)].
The main subject of the following analysis is to address, given the payoff entries
of the PD, and the parameters of the commitment deal IRCOM can manage, how
confident about the intention recognition result IRCOM should be to make a decision
without relying on commitment proposal. That is, if there is an optimal value of θ
for an IRCOM to gain greatest net benefit. Our analysis is based on evolutionary
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Figure 7.1: Frequency of each strategy as a function of confidence threshold, θ. Symbols
indicate results from computer simulations (averaged over 107 interactions for each
pair of strategies), and dashed curves show the exact numerical results. In a population
of IRCOM, COM D, C, and D individuals, for large enough θ, the population spends
most of the time in the homogeneous state of IRCOM. The performance of IRCOM
decreases when θ is too high. It implies that IRCOM should not be too cautious
about its intention recognition capacity, i.e. not be too careful to always propose
commitment instead of believing in its intention recognition capability and strategy.
Parameters: δ = 4; ε = 0.05; payoff entries, T = 2, R = 1, P = 0, S = −1; population
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Figure 7.2: Frequency of IRCOM as a function of confidence threshold, θ. (a) We plot
for different values of management cost, ε. In a population of IRCOM, COM D, C,
and D individuals, for large enough θ and small enough ε, the population spends
most of the time in the homogeneous state of IRCOM. The smaller ε, the better the
performance of IRCOM. The performance of IRCOM decreases when θ is too high,
and the greater ε, the more significant the decrease is. It implies that the more costly
the management of the commitment deal, the more beneficial it is to rely on intention
recognition. (b) We plot for different values of punishment cost, δ. In a population
of IRCOM, COM D, C, and D individuals, for large enough θ and large enough δ, the
population spends most of the time in the homogeneous state of IRCOM. The greater
δ, the better the performance of IRCOM. The performance of IRCOM decreases when
θ is too high, and the decrease is more significant when δ is smaller. It implies that
the weaker the commitment deal can be arranged, the more beneficial it is to rely on
intention recognition alone more often. Parameters: δ = 4 in panel (a) and ε = 0.05
in panel (b); payoff entries, T = 2, R = 1, P = 0, S = −1; population size, N = 100;




To start with, we compute the stationary distributions analytically and resorting to
agent-based simulations (see EGT methods and Figure 7.1). The results show that,
for a large range of θ, IRCOM performs better than COM C (i.e. IRCOM with
θ = 1), whereas the population spends most of the time in the homogenous state of
IRCOM. However, when the confidence threshold is low, defection becomes domi-
nant. This said, when the intention recognition is not of high enough certainty—that
is, IRCOM is not confident enough about whether its co-player intends to cooper-
ate or to defect in the current interaction—it would be better off counting on the
commitment strategy (this also can be observed in several different configurations
in Figure 7.2).
In Figure 7.2, we analyze the influence of the strength of the commitment deal
which can be arranged, on how the intention recognition and commitment strategies
can be combined appropriately. Note that the greater the punishment cost, δ, and
the smaller the management cost, ε, the stronger the commitment deal. Namely, in
Figure 7.2a, fixing δ, we plot for different values of management cost, ε. The perfor-
mance of IRCOM decreases when θ is too high, and the decrease is more dramatic
when ε is greater. It means that the costlier the management of the commitment
deal, the more beneficial it is to rely on intention recognition. Next, in Figure 7.2b,
fixing ε, we plot for different values of punishment cost, δ. The performance of
IRCOM decreases when θ is too high, and the decrease is more dramatic when δ is
smaller. In short, these results imply that the weaker the commitment deal can be
arranged, the more beneficial it is to rely on intention recognition.
So far the model has been studied with respect to a very inefficient intention
recognition model, where cl is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. It is not surprising that
the performance of the intention recognition strategy solely—which corresponds to
IRCOM with θ = 0 (see Figure 7.1)—is very poor (Figures 7.1 and 7.2). In the
sequel, let us study the model using more efficient intention recognition models.
We consider different probability distributions of the confidence level cl, reflecting
different levels of efficiency or precision of the intention recognition model at work,
given the relevant factors (noise, environment factors, interaction settings, etc.)
(Figure 7.3). Namely, in an increasing order of efficiency, cl is uniformly drawn from
intervals [0, 1], [0.5, 1], [0.7, 1], and [0.9, 1] 3 . The results show that, whenever the
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Figure 7.3: Frequency of IRCOM as a function of confidence threshold, θ, in a popu-
lation of IRCOM, COM D, C, and D individuals. We consider different probability
distributions of the confidence level cl, reflecting the efficiency or precision of the inten-
tion recognition model at work, given the relevant factors (noise, environment, etc.).
Namely, cl is uniformly drawn from [0, 1], [0.5, 1], [0.7, 1], and [0.9, 1]. The results show
that if a strong commitment deal can be arranged (panel a), it is better to rely on
the commitment strategy using a high enough confidence threshold—even when the
intention recognition model is very efficient, while it is more beneficial to rely, even ex-
clusively, on the intention recognition strategy if it is efficient enough, in the case that
only weak commitment deals can be arranged (panel b). Parameters: ε = 0.05, δ = 4
(panel a) and ε = 0.5, δ = 2 (panel b); payoff entries, T = 2, R = 1, P = 0, S = −1;
population size, N = 100; imitation strength, β = 0.1; The payoff matrices in all cases




intention recognition model is efficient enough, the intention recognition strategy
solely (i.e. IRCOM with θ = 0) performs quite well, complying with the results
obtained in (Han et al., 2011a,b), where concrete intention recognition models are
deployed.
However, when a quite strong commitment deal can be envisaged (Figure 7.3a),
arranging it can still glean some evolutionary advantage. But in case that only weak
commitment deals can be arranged (Figure 7.3b), it is then more beneficial to rely,
even exclusively, on the intention recognition strategy should it be efficient enough.
7.4 Discussion
A general implication of our analysis is that an appropriate combination of the two
strategies of commitment and intention recognition often leads to a strategy that
performs better than either one solely. It is advantageous to rely on the intention
recognition strategy (when reaching sufficiently high confidence about its result)
because it helps to avoid the cost of arranging and managing commitment deals,
especially when no strong deals can be arranged or envisaged. This result has
a similar implication to that obtained in (Johnson and Fowler, 2011), where the
authors show that overconfidence might give evolutionary advantage to its holders.
In our model, an IRCOM can gain extra net benefit if it is a little overconfident
(that is, when using sufficiently small θ), taking the risk to rely on the intention
recognition result instead of arranging some commitment deal. Differently, because
in our model IRCOM is further guaranteed by an efficient strategy of commitment,
being over-overconfident (that is, using a too small θ) and relying exclusively on
intention recognition might prevent it from opportunely gaining benefit from the
commitment strategy—especially in case the intention recognition model at work is
not efficient. This said, the performance of overconfident individuals (Johnson and
Fowler, 2011) can be enhanced by relying on the commitment strategy when they
need to muster overly high courage (say, in order to decide to claim some resource).
Dilemma), these levels of efficiency can be achieved (on average) by considering large enough num-
bers of interactions between two players (or high enough probabilities of a next interaction or ‘the
shadow of future’ (Nowak, 2006b; Sigmund, 2010)), given that the noise is small enough. Normally,
the more an intention recognizer interacts with a fixed co-player, the better it predicts its co-player’s
intention. For example, this holds for the two intention recognition models described in (Han et al.,
2011a,b). Furthermore, in (Frank et al., 1993), the authors present experimental evidence showing
that, in a one-shot PD, subjects of only brief acquaintance were able to recognize players with an
intention to defect with more than twice chance accuracy.
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In the framework where intention recognition is difficult and of high risk, for
example, climate change negotiation (Raihani and Aitken, 2011; Milinski et al.,
2006; Santos and Pacheco, 2011), military setting (comprising a lot of bluffing)
(Schelling, 1990; Leeds, 2003), and international relationships (Lockhart, 1978), our
model suggests arranging a strong commitment deal.
7.5 Conclusion
Assume simply that we are given an intention recognition method, that affords
us a degree of confidence distribution cl about its predictions, with regard to the
intentions of others, and hence their future actions, typically on the basis of their
seen actions and surrounding historical and present circumstances. Assume too some
commitment model is given us about providing mutual assurances, and involving an
initial cost and a penalty for defaulting.
We have shown how to combine together one such general intention recogni-
tion method, with a specific commitment model defined for playing the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD), in the setting of Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), by means of
a single payoff matrix extended with a new kind of player, IRCOM, which chooses
whether to go by the result of its intention recognition method about a co-player’s
next move, or to play by the commitment strategy, depending on whether its level
of confidence on the intention prediction, cl, exceeds or not some a given confidence
threshold θ. Our results indicate that IRCOM is selected by evolution for a broad
range of parameters and confidence thresholds.
Then we have studied, for a variety of cl and θ, in the context of PD in EGT,
how IRCOM performs in the presence of other well-known non-committing strategies
(always cooperate, C, and always defect, D) – plus the strategy that commits when
being asked to, but always defects, D COM. Analytical and simulation results show
under which circumstances, for different cl and θ, and distinct management and
punishment costs, ε and δ, the new combined strategy IRCOM proves advantageous
and to what degree. And indeed IRCOM proves to be adaptably advantageous
over those other strategies, in all circumstances, from a quite small confidence level
onwards.
Much remains to be done with respect to further consideration of combining the
two strategies of intention recognition and commitment. The two go often together,
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and not just in the basic way we have examined. Indeed, they are the two sides of the
same coin, one side being an attempt to identify an intention, the other side being a
manifestation of an intention. For one, we only considered the case where intention
recognition comes first in order to decide on a commitment proposal. But in general,
once a commitment is made, intention recognition is a paramount method to follow
up on whether the commitment will be honored, on the basis of detecting or not
the intermediate actions leading up to commitment fulfillment. Social organizations
rely on these mechanisms to structure themselves. Furthermore, the information
about commitments can be used to enhance intention recognition. For example,
consider the Bayesian Network based intention recognition model in Chapter 4,
which operates upon computing mutual trust. One can naturally say that the more
often a co-player fulfills commitments, the more the intention recognizer should trust
him/her, and that the co-player who is currently in a commitment deal (with the
intention recognizer) is more trustworthy (to the intention recognizer) than the one
without such a commitment, even he/she has been more cooperative in the past
(directly as well as indirectly).
It seems to us that intention recognition, and its use in the scope of commit-
ment, is a foundational cornerstone where we should begin at, naturally followed
by the capacity to establish and honor commitments, as a tool towards the suc-
cessive construction of collective intentions and social organization (Searle, 1995,
2010). Finally, one hopes that understanding these capabilities can be useful in the
design of efficient self-organized and distributed engineering applications (Bonabeau





CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Begin thus from the first act, and proceed;
and, in conclusion,
at the ill which thou hast done,
be troubled, and rejoice for the good.
Pythagoras, 582 BC - 497 BC
Abstract. This final chapter is structured as follows. First, a brief
summary of the thesis and the main conclusions are provided. Then
some directions for future work are discussed.
8.1 Summary and Conclusions
This thesis is split into two parts. In Part I, we study techniques for intention
recognition and its applications, which span two chapters.
In Chapter 2 we present a corpus-based method for intention recognition, which
is context-dependent and incremental. The method is performed by dynamically
constructing a three-layer Bayesian Network (BN) model for intention recognition
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(IRBN), from a prior knowledge base consisting of readily maintained and readily
constructed fragments of BN. Their simple structures allow easy maintenance by
domain experts or their automatic construction from available plan corpora. We
have shown that taking into account contextual information appropriately influ-
ences the intention recognition process, and can significantly improve its perfor-
mance, especially when the observed agents might change or abandon their initial
goals/intentions. In addition, we have formalized a method for representing rela-
tionships amongst intentions in an IRBN, thereby enabling us to more appropriately
handle the case where the observed agent might follow multiple intentions at once.
These two aspects are apparently indispensable in intentions recognition, but mostly
omitted in previous work. Furthermore, the context-dependent aspect of our method
is reinforced by a combination of BN and Logic Programming techniques. While the
IRBNs represent average general knowledge, Logic Programming techniques can be
used for anchoring the IRBNs in specific contexts as they evolve. This way, the
size of the IRBNs can significantly be reduced, and sometimes the final solution of
the intention recognition process can be reached immediately, without performing
BN inference. The method has been evaluated with several benchmarks, including
the Linux and IPD plan corpora, with some definite degree of success. The IPD
plan corpora themselves also endow new, domain-independent benchmarks, for the
evaluation of intention recognition systems.
We admit that the method exhibits several aspects that need further evaluation
and improvement, which were pointed out in the chapter’s own conclusions (see
Section 2.9). Nonetheless, it was developed far enough to be successfully applicable
for the modelling work in the evolutionary game theory context in Part II—the
more important aim and contribution of this thesis.
In Chapter 3 we present a framework for intention-based decision making,
which adopts our previously implemented Evolution Prospection system (Pereira
and Han, 2009a,b; Han, 2009) for decision making, and the intention recognition
system described in Chapter 2 for recognizing intentions of other agents. Various
ways in which recognized intentions of others can be useful for enhancing decision
making processes are described and exemplified. The framework serves to bridge
intention recognition to those real-world application domains, where it is important
and useful to take into account intentions of other agents in the environment, plus
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situation specific information and reasoning about it—before making a decision
to act. We have demonstrated its applicability in the Elder Care and Ambient
Intelligence domains.
In Part II, we study the roles of two cognitive abilities that are ubiquitous
in humans, those of intention recognition and commitment, in the evolution of
cooperative behavior within a population of agents. It comprises four chapters.
In Chapters 4 and 5, using the tools of evolutionary game theory, we present two
different models that explicitly address the roles played by intention recognition in
the evolution of cooperation. In both these models we have shown, analytically as
well as by computer simulations, that intention recognition strongly promotes the
emergence of cooperation and maintains it well, in spite of mutations and noise.
We have shown that the strategy of intention recognition outperforms the famous
strategies in the framework of the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, including tit-for-tat
(TFT), generous tit-for-tat (GTFT), and win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS).
The model in Chapter 4 is based on a specification of the general Bayesian net-
work structure for intention recognition provided in Chapter 2, now in the framework
of social dilemmas. It takes into account mutual trust between intention recognizers
and their co-players, accumulated through past direct interactions. The intentions
to be recognized are in form of the co-player’s motives, that is, to cooperate or to de-
fect in the current interaction, taking into account the player’s pairwise interaction
history. Differently, the model in Chapter 5 relies on the corpus-based incremental
intention method described in Chapter 2, wherein the intentions to be recognized are
the co-players’ possible known strategies. The method requires a prior plan corpus,
which is assumed to stand for (intention recognizers’) ancestors’ received knowledge
or acquired experience in interacting with known strategies (Woodward et al., 2009;
Meltzoff, 2007, 2005).
The two different models have shown, to some significant degree, that there are
various ways in which the capacity for intention recognition can confer on its holder
an evolutionary advantage, specifically in situations where cooperation is profitable.
Given the broad spectrum of problems which are addressed using this cooperative
metaphor (Axelrod, 1984; Nowak, 2006a; Sigmund, 2010), our results indicate how
intention recognition can be pivotal in social dynamics.
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In Chapter 6, resorting again to the tools of evolutionary game theory, we provide
a computational model showing that even commitment of the simplest form can
lead to the emergence of cooperation, albeit in non-iterated settings. The model is
characterized by two key parameters: the punishment cost of failing a commitment
deal imposed on either side of the deal, and the cost of managing it. Our analytical
results and extensive computer simulations exhibit that cooperation can emerge if
the punishment cost is large enough compared to the management cost. Our study
suggests that humans’ specialized capacity for commitment, which might have been
shaped by natural selection (Nesse, 2001b), consists in a capacity for managing to
impose a high cost of punishment, whether it is monetary or of abstract emotional or
reputation value, with a relatively small managing cost. Furthermore, these results
have provided important insight into the design of multi-agent systems resorting to
commitments to facilitate cooperation (Schelling, 1990; Wooldridge and Jennings,
1999; Hirshleifer, 2001; Castelfranchi and Falcone, 2010; Winikoff, 2007; Harrenstein
et al., 2007; Chopra and Singh, 2009).
On top of the commitment model, in Chapter 7, we bring forward a model
showing that an appropriate combination of intention recognition and commitment
can lead to a strategy performing better than either one by itself, thereby leading
to the emergence of improved cooperation.
8.2 Future works
8.2.1 Part I: Intention Recognition Methods
As mentioned above, there are several aspects of our intention recognition method
presented in Chapter 2 that demand further development and assessment. Besides
the technical issues pointed out in the chapter’s conclusions (Section 2.9), we intend
to gather real data for further evaluation, especially regarding the multiple inten-
tions recognition formalism and the combination of Bayesian Network and Logic
Programming techniques for context-dependent intention recognition. As another
area of future effort, we aim at real deployment of our intention recognition method
to further tackle different application domains, e.g. Ambient Intelligence (Han and
Pereira, 2010c; Sadri, 2011a), Elder Care (Pereira and Han, 2011a), and several oth-
ers that are listed in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.5), where intention recognition has
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been of increasing importance (Sadri, 2011b,a; Han and Pereira, 2010c; Pereira and
Han, 2011b; Geib, 2002; Geib and Goldman, 2001; Haigh et al., 2004; Armentano
and Amandi, 2007). The data from these application domains can then be used to
furnish further evaluation of the method.
In this thesis we have focused on the problem of individual intention recognition,
that is, recognizing intentions of a single agent. Many complications arise and are
magnified when considering intention recognition of multiple agents, or collective
intention recognition as it is usually dubbed (Kaminka et al., 2001; Sukthankar,
2007). Collective intention is an important topic actively discussed in philosophical
and multi-agent system literature (Bratman, 1999; Malle et al., 2003; Tuomela, 2005;
Searle, 2010; Kanno et al., 2003). Most researchers agree that collective intentions
are not summative, that is, a collective intention of a group of agents is not merely
reducible to a summation of the individual intentions. It requires some “glue” under-
pinning cognitive attitudes—such as mutual beliefs and mutual awarenesses—to be
there amongst the agents to guarantee they hold a collective intention and perform
activities cooperatively.
Although there has been much effort made for tackling the problem of recognizing
intentions of a group of agents, most, if not all, ignore to address the required
“glue” cognitive attitudes, making the assumption that the collective intention is
initially assigned to and adopted by the group—like in case of a football team or an
army troop (see for instance (Kaminka et al., 2001)). Consequently, they could not
fully address the problem of collective intention recognition. They could recognize
the collective intention of an arbitrary set of agents assuming beforehand that it
existed, but they cannot figure if it was actually so designed. For example, in the
Elder Care domain concerning multiple users, there are often cases where the elders’
actions accidentally form a plausible plan—which achieves a conceivable intention—
but actually each of them is following his/her own intention. In (Han and Pereira,
2010b), we have done some initial work on this direction, which we intend to develop
further in near future.
8.2.2 Part II: The Evolution of Cooperation
In this thesis we study the roles of two cognitive abilities which are ubiquitous
in humans, those of intention recognition and of arranging commitment, in the
evolution of cooperation within a population of agents. There are several potentially
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valuable continuations of these inroads.
First, in what regards intention recognition, we have built models focusing only
on direct interactions, that is, agents playing the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma might
recognize intentions of others (their motives to cooperate or defect, or their strate-
gies) based on past direct interactions. Undoubtedly, the intention recognition pro-
cess can be improved using observable indirect interactions (Nowak and Sigmund,
2005), the concrete structure of a population (Szabó and Fáth, 2007; Santos et al.,
2006b), the information about group membership (Garćıa and van den Bergh, 2010)
or kinship relations (Hamilton, 1964; West et al., 2002), or similarity (on an arbitrary
characteristic) (Riolo et al., 2001) of the recognized agents, etc. Hence, as natural
extensions, we will attempt to build models to study how the intention recognition
capacity can enable cooperation to emerge in such wider contexts. Another possi-
bility of extension regarding intention recognition is that our three-layer Bayesian
network model for intention recognition (see the model in Chapter 4) can provide a
general framework for an integrated modeling of several known important factors,
such as trust, reputation, commitment, emotions, etc. (Dreber et al., 2008; Ohtsuki
et al., 2009; Fehr and Gachter, 2002)—in order to study their combined influence for
the evolution of cooperation. Tentatively, such factors can figure in the first layer of
the three-layer network, as they might causally affect the way a co-player behaves
or what he intends to do. For instance, the co-player’s intention to cooperate seems
to strongly depend on his emotions towards his co-player, as well as his co-player’s
reputation and commitments.
Regarding commitment, we have built a computational model showing that
a simple form of commitment can promote the evolution of cooperation in a
(well-mixed) population of individuals playing the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, i.e.
without taking into account the structure of the population, reciprocity, kinship, etc.
We have also argued that our model can be a good replacement for the models on
punishment, which recently have been shown not to promote cooperation well (Rand
and Nowak, 2011). In future work, similarly to what has been done with punishment
(Ohtsuki et al., 2009; de Weerd and Verbrugge, 2011), we would like to study how
the mechanism of commitment works in combination with other known mechanisms
of cooperation, including direct and indirect reciprocity, and structured populations.
In addition, in this thesis we only study the evolution of cooperation within the
178
8.2. Future works
two-player game interaction context, namely the Prisoner’s Dilemma. But appar-
ently multi-player interactions are unavoidable in real life situations (Hardin, 1968;
Hauert et al., 2002; Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010; Han et al., 2012e; Santos et al.,
2008; Pacheco et al., 2009), and therein intention recognition might also be useful.
In this respect, it also opens the door for studying collective intention recognition
modeling and methods (Han and Pereira, 2010b; Sukthankar and Sycara, 2008;
Kanno et al., 2003) in a large scale population setting, where there might be group
of agents such as alliances and teams attempting collective goals.
Furthermore, in this thesis we have focused on two cognitive abilities, the
ability to recognize intentions of others and the ability to arrange appropriate
commitments. Obviously, there are several other cognitive abilities that might have
important evolutionary roles, which we would like to explore. First choices are
those considered part of the “Theory of Mind” theory, including the understanding
and attribution of beliefs, desires, preferences, emotions, pretending, deceit, etc.
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Whiten, 1991; Cheney and Seyfarth, 2007; Trivers,
2011).
In summary, we have provided new, clear (theoretical and experimental simula-
tions) evidence revealing the evolutionary advantages of having high cognitive skills,
specifically in dealing with problems where cooperation is beneficial. The approach
of resorting to AI cognitive modeling methods and the tools of evolutionary game
theory that we adopted here can be taken up to further investigate the evolutionary
roles of cognition in the evolution of cooperative behavior, on the one hand, and,
on the other hand, supply important insight into the global influence of different





Aesop. Fox-crow fable: http://mythfolklore.net/aesopica/bewick/51.htm. Last ac-
cess: November 24, 2011. 5, 73
Akashi, H. 1995. Inferring weak selection from patterns of polymorphism and diver-
gence at ”silent” sites in Drosophila DNA. Genetics, 139(2):1067–1076. 134
Albrecht, D. W., Zukerman, I., and Nicholson, A. E. 1998. Bayesian models for
keyhole plan recognition in an adventure game. User Modeling and User-Adapted
Interaction, 8:5–47. 19, 60
Alferes, J. J., Banti, F., Brogi, A., and Leite, J. A. 2005. The refined extension
principle for semantics of dynamic logic programming. Studia Logica, 79(2):7–32.
11
Alferes, J. J., Leite, J. A., Pereira, L. M., Przymusinska, H., and Przymusinski, T. C.
2000. Dynamic updates of non-monotonic knowledge bases. J. Logic Programming,
45(1-3):43–70. 11
Alferes, J. J., Pereira, L. M., and Swift, T. 2004. Abduction in well-founded seman-
tics and generalized stable models via tabled dual programs. Theory and Practice
of Logic Programming, 4(4):383–428. 11, 63, 64
Ampatzis, C., Tuci, E., Trianni, V., and Dorigo, M. 2008. Evolution of signaling
in a multi-robot system: Categorization and communication. Adaptive Behavior,
16(1):5–26. 7
Antal, T., Traulsen, A., Ohtsuki, H., Tarnita, C. E., and Nowak, M. A. 2009.




Armentano, M. G. and Amandi, A. 2007. Plan recognition for interface agents.
Artif. Intell. Rev., 28:131–162. 4, 16, 17, 19, 59, 68, 85, 89, 177
Armentano, M. G. and Amandi, A. 2009. Goal recognition with variable-order
markov models. In Proceedings of the 21st international joint conference on Ar-
tificial intelligence, pages 1635–1640. 4, 17, 20, 21, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 120, 162
Arthur, W. B. 1994. Inductive reasoning and bounded rationality. American Eco-
nomic Review, 84(2):406–411. 7, 135
Axelrod, R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, ISBN 0-465-02122-2.
8, 40, 50, 90, 93, 140, 143, 175
Axelrod, R. and Hamilton, W. 1981. The evolution of cooperation. Science,
211:1390–1396. 93, 140
Back, I. and Flache, A. 2008. The Adaptive Rationality of Interpersonal Commit-
ment. Rationality and Society, 20(1):65–83. 9, 140, 143, 159
Baral, C. 2003. Knowledge Representation, Reasoning, and Declarative Problem
Solving. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA. 11, 51, 55, 60, 64
Baral, C. and Gelfond, M. 1994. Logic programming and knowledge representation.
Journal of Logic Programming, 19:73–148. 11
Baral, C., Gelfond, M., and Rushton, N. 2009. Probabilistic reasoning with answer
sets. Theory and Practice of Logic Programming, 9(1):57–144. 52, 53, 63
Blaylock, N. and Allen, J. 2003. Corpus-based, statistical goal recognition. In
Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
(IJCAI’03), pages 1303–1308. 4, 17, 21, 32, 120
Blaylock, N. and Allen, J. 2004. Statistical goal parameter recognition. In Zilber-
stein, S., Koehler, J., and Koenig, S., editors, Proceedings of the 14th International
Conference on Automated Planning and Scheduling (ICAPS’04), pages 297–304.
AAAI. 4, 17, 21, 32, 35, 36, 38, 39, 60, 68, 120, 162
Blaylock, N. and Allen, J. 2005. Recognizing instantiated goals using statistical
methods. In Kaminka, G., editor, IJCAI Workshop on Modeling Others from
Observations (MOO-2005), pages 79–86. 35
182
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Boehm, C. 1999. The natural selection of altruistic traits. Human Nature, 10(3):205–
252. 140
Bonabeau, E., Dorigo, M., and Theraulaz, G. 1999. Swarm Intelligence: From
Natural to Artificial Systems. Oxford University Press, USA. 7, 171
Börgers, T., Sarin, R., and Street, G. 1997. Learning through reinforcement and
replicator dynamics. Journal of Economic Theory, 77:1–14. 91
Bratman, M. E. 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. The David Hume
Series, CSLI. 7, 9, 16, 17, 20, 28, 32, 40, 55, 62, 63, 84, 89, 99, 158
Bratman, M. E. 1992. Planning and the stability of intention. Minds and Machines,
2(1):1–16. 16, 17, 20, 55
Bratman, M. E. 1999. Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency.
Cambridge University Press. 7, 62, 89, 99, 177
Brewka, G. and Eiter, T. 1999. Preferred answer sets for extended logic programs.
Artif. Intell., 109:297–356. 11
Brown, S. M. 1998. A decision theoretic approach for interface agent development.
PhD thesis, Faculty of the Graduate School of Engineering of the Air Force Insti-
tute of Technology Air University, USA. 20
Bui, H. 2003. A general model for online probabilistic plan recognition. In Gottlob,
G. and Walsh, T., editors, Proceedings of the 8th International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI’03), pages 1309–1318. 21, 89
Bui, H., Venkatesh, S., and West, G. 2002. Policy recognition in the abstract hidden
markov model. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 17:451–499. 5, 19, 98,
162
Burmeister, B., Arnold, M., Copaciu, F., and Rimassa, G. 2008. BDI-agents for
agile goal-oriented business processes. In Proceedings of the 7th international
joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: industrial track,
AAMAS ’08, pages 37–44. 62
Castelfranchi, C. and Falcone, R. 2010. Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Com-
putational Model (Wiley Series in Agent Technology). Wiley. 142, 143, 176
183
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cesta, A. and Pecora, F. 2004. The robocare project: Intelligent systems for elder
care. In AAAI Fall Symposium on Caring Machines: AI in Elder Care. 77
Charlesworth, J. and Eyre-Walker, A. 2007. The other side of the nearly neutral
theory, evidence of slightly advantageous back-mutations. Proceedings of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 104(43):16992–16997.
134
Charniak, E. and Goldman, R. P. 1990. Plan recognition in stories and in life. In
Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelli-
gence, UAI ’89, pages 343–352, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, The Netherlands.
North-Holland Publishing Co. 4, 85
Charniak, E. and Goldman, R. P. 1991. A probabilistic model of plan recognition.
In Proceedings of the ninth National conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume
1 (AAAI’1991), AAAI’91, pages 160–165. AAAI Press. 20
Charniak, E. and Goldman, R. P. 1993. A Bayesian model of plan recognition.
Artificial Intelligence, 64(1):53–79. 4, 7, 16, 17, 19, 20, 89, 98, 120, 158, 162
Cheney, D. L. and Seyfarth, R. M. 2007. Baboon Metaphysics: The Evolution of a
Social Mind. University Of Chicago Press. 6, 90, 120, 179
Chopra, A. K. and Singh, M. P. 2009. Multiagent commitment alignment. In
Proceedings of the 8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and
MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS), pages 937–944. 143, 176
Cohen, P. R. and Levesque, H. J. 1990. Intention is Choice with Commitment.
Artificial Intelligence, 42(2-3):213–261. 9, 17, 40, 62, 99, 158
Cohen, P. R., Perrault, C. R., and Allen, J. F. 1981. Beyond question answering.
In Strategies for Natural Language Processing, pages 245–274. Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates. 4, 5
Conati, C., Gertner, A. S., Vanlehn, K., and Druzdzel, M. J. 1997. On-Line Student
Modeling for Coached Problem Solving Using Bayesian Networks. In Proceedings
of the Sixth International Conference on User Modeling, pages 231–242. 19
184
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cook, D. J., Augusto, J. C., and Jakkula, V. R. 2009. Ambient intelligence:
Technologies, applications, and opportunities. Pervasive and Mobile Computing,
5(4):277–298. 76, 77
Cozman, F. G. 2004. Axiomatizing noisy-or. In de Mantaras, R. L. and Saitta, L.,
editors, In Proceedings of the 16th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(ECAI-04), pages 979–980. IOS Press. 27, 28
Darwin, C. 1859. On the origin of species by means of natural selection. Cambridge-
London. Reprinted in Harvard University Press (1964). 30. 8
de Vos, Smaniotto, R., and Elsas, D. 2001. Reciprocal altruism under conditions of
partner selection. Rationality and Society, 13(2):139–183. 9, 140, 143, 159
de Weerd, H. and Verbrugge, R. 2011. Evolution of altruistic punishment in hetero-
geneous populations. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 290(0):88 – 103. 178
Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. 1992. Probabilistic Temporal reasoning. In Proceedings
of the Seventh National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-88), pages
524–528. AAAI. 60
Diez, F. J. 1993. Parameter adjustment in Bayes networks. the generalized noisy
or-gate. In Proceedings of Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
(UAI’93), pages 99–105. Morgan Kaufmann. 18, 28
Dreber, A., Rand, D. G., Fudenberg, D., and Nowak, M. A. 2008. Winners don’t
punish. Nature, 452(7185):348–351. 91, 153, 178
Duong, T., Phung, D., Bui, H., and Venkatesh, S. 2009. Efficient duration and
hierarchical modeling for human activity recognition. Artif. Intell., 173:830–856.
17
Falk, A., Fehr, E., and Fischbacher, U. 2008. Testing theories of fairness—intentions
matter. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(1):287 – 303. 50
Fehr, E. and Gachter, S. 2002. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415:137–
140. 91, 153, 178
Forbes, J., Huang, T., Kanazawa, K., and Russell, S. 1995. The batmobile: towards a
Bayesian automated taxi. In Proceedings of the 14th international joint conference
on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2, pages 1878–1885. 19, 60
185
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Frank, R. H. 1988. Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions.
W. W. Norton and Company. 10, 159
Frank, R. H. 2001. Cooperation through Emotional Commitment. In Nesse, R. M.,
editor, Evolution and the capacity for commitment, pages 55–76. New York: Rus-
sell Sage. 10, 159
Frank, R. H., Gilovich, T., and Regan, D. T. 1993. The evolution of one-shot
cooperation: An experiment. Ethology and Sociobiology, 14(4):247 – 256. 169
Friedewald, M., Costa, O. D., Punie, Y., Alahuhta, P., and Heinonen, S. 2005. Per-
spectives of ambient intelligence in the home environment. Telemat. Inf., 22:221–
238. 80
Friedewald, M., Vildjiounaite, E., Punie, Y., and Wright, D. 2007. Privacy, iden-
tity and security in ambient intelligence: A scenario analysis. Telematics and
Informatics, 24(1):15 – 29. 80
Fudenberg, D. and Imhof, L. A. 2005. Imitation processes with small mutations.
Journal of Economic Theory, 131:251–262. 95
Fudenberg, D. and Levine, D. K. 1998. The Theory of Learning in Games, volume 1
of MIT Press Books. The MIT Press. 121
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